The New Cold War’s Second WindForeign Policy's latest attempt to revive the worst aspects of the Cold War is an exercise in propaganda, not elucidation.
[Editor’s note: this is the third installment of the Simone Weil Center’s Symposium on ‘Containment 2.0.’ The first two installments can be read here and here] The specter of Trump II haunts the dreams of those who look back on the first Cold War and see not the terror of the Cuba Missile Crisis; the bloodletting of Vietnam; the move to DEFCON III in 1973; or the nuclear false alarms of the Carter and Reagan eras. Rather, they see a halcyon era wherein the US, led by a wise bipartisan establishment, weathered the storm thanks to the wise and patient application of the containment doctrine. To their barely concealed dismay, they realize that the years-long 100 billion dollar plus effort at propping up an authoritarian kleptocracy centered in Kiev is indeed flailing: The money is running out, and popular (as well as political) support for the venture is on a downward trend. They see in Trump (wrongly, I happen to think) an existential threat to America’s proxy war in Ukraine and so, the administration and the US establishment are desperately trying to create a renewed sense of urgency regarding the Ukrainian war effort. Their project now needs, above all, a second wind, and reinvigoration requires invention. Once upon a time Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whose ideological progeny now stalk the corridors of power in Joe Biden’s Washington, advised President Truman that the public case for the Truman Doctrine had to be “clearer than truth,” or, put another way, not true at all. Having been debased by the decade-long editorship of Gideon Rose, the once august journal Foreign Affairs staggers along - a zombie from another time. But it maintains its uses to the established order. And one of its principle uses is to provide intellectual justification for the unjustifiable. It wouldn’t be the first time. By the late 1940s, the American people were exhausted and war weary. A second wind was needed and the threat of a monolithic Communist threat provided the oxygen. George F. Kennan’s 1947 “X” article in the same journal served a similar purpose for the first Cold War, not dissimilar to Winston Churchill’s anti-communist clarion call in Fulton, Missouri the year before. Kennan was brilliant, but he was also occasionally hysterical. And cooler heads, such as Walter Lippmann, realized that the “X” strategy condemned us to an unnecessarily drawn out and dangerous Cold War. As Lippmann biographer Ronald Steele points out, …To confront the Soviets at “every point where they show signs of encroaching” was, Lippmann charged, a “strategic monstrosity” doomed to fail. It could be attempted only by “recruiting, subsidizing, and supporting a heterogeneous array of satellites, clients, dependents, and puppets.” Propping up anticommunist regimes around the periphery of the Soviet Union would require unending American intervention.” To Kennan’s great credit he soon came to realize that containment abetted militarization and presented militarists in government like Acheson, Paul Nitze, Frank Wisner, Allen and John Foster Dulles and many others besides, an intellectual and strategic framework to do their worst. Which they did. The March 2024 issues of Foreign Affairs is once again playing its part - and while the dramatis personae are different, the story remains much the same. Which brings us, alas, to the article in question: “America’s New Twilight Struggle With Russia” by Max Bergmann, Michael Kimmage, Jeffrey Mankoff, and Maria Snegovaya. The first tip-off that the article’s purpose is to propagandize rather than inform is the presence of Bergmann on the byline. Bergmann, before ascending to his current perch at CSIS, worked under the shameless Clinton partisan Neera Tanden at John Podesta’s Center for American Progress where he directed a Neo-McCarthyite “Moscow Project,” one of the more unhinged products of an unhinged time. The four (!) authors argue for the broadest possible application of the containment doctrine in the most alarmist terms (“clearer than truth”). “Kennan’s vision of containment focused primarily on Europe,” they write. “Today, post-Soviet Eurasia and the rest of the world will be more central.” [Emphasis mine]. We are further told, “Ukraine’s defense is crucial for European stability and for preventing the spread of Russian power globally.” And still more, “Containing Russia in Ukraine means keeping the line of contact as close to the Russian border as possible, constraining Russia’s expansionist tendencies.” In other words, we are supposed to believe that a carve-out of Novorossiya presages an attempt by Russia to expand globally? The authors fail to note that Russia’s 2024 defense budget, at $109 billion, is roughly ten times less than US defense expenditures and ten times less than NATO defense spending. Where are they going to expand to?Transnistria? In the authors’ telling, Containment 2.0 will differ from the original through its steady application of American power throughout Asia. As they put it, “Any strategy for containing Russia must account for resource commitments to the Indo-Pacific and for the impact of U.S. policy on the Chinese-Russian relationship.” What they fail to acknowledge is that this has already been tried before - and the results did not redound to the benefit of the United States. The original iteration of containment, along with Paul Nitze's militarization of it (though his authorship, in 1950, of NSC-68) set the stage for the ‘Domino theory’ which in turn begat Vietnam. I can confidently assume that at least two of the four authors are fully aware of this, but the purpose of the exercise, as I said, is propaganda not elucidation. Withal, it never seems to occur to the authors that the war and its continuation hinge on one issue and one issue alone: NATO: No NATO, no war. Ukrainian neutrality was and remains the key to unravelling the Gordian knot. But recognizing this would require the authors to surrender their collective dream of a new Cold War in which they can play the part of architect, of grand strategist, of hero. In the end, the New Cold War needed a second wind and Foreign Affairs answered the call. Just like old times. Landmarks: A Journal of International Dialogue is free today. But if you enjoyed this post, you can tell Landmarks: A Journal of International Dialogue that their writing is valuable by pledging a future subscription. You won't be charged unless they enable payments. |