[Salon] The Future of China-Israel Relations Amid Beijing’s Position on Gaza War





https://epc.ae/en/details/scenario/end-of-pragmatism-the-future-of-china-israel-relations-amid-beijing-s-position-on-gaza-war

The Future of China-Israel Relations Amid Beijing’s Position on Gaza War

Key Takeaways

  • China’s hardline toward Israel’s war in Gaza and significantly increased support for Palestinians reflect Beijing’s endeavor to align with the Global South discourse and challenge Washington’s policy in the region.
  • The recent Chinese positions suggest Beijing thinks it can coexist with the “collateral damage” resulting from its ties with Israel. 
  • The government of Benjamin Netanyahu has noticeably adopted a cautious reaction toward China’s sharp criticism and has expressed a desire not to escalate with Beijing.
  • The hardline Chinese stance on the Gaza War will have adverse consequences on China-Israel cooperation and accelerate the decline in their bilateral ties in the political, technological, and trade fields.

 

China has criticized Israel in an unprecedented manner since the beginning of the war in Gaza. This escalation will have long-term repercussions on the two countries’ bilateral ties, especially considering American pressure on Tel Aviv to increase control of Chinese investments and decrease cooperation with Beijing on military technology and other advanced technology fields.

 

From Ideology to Pragmatism

 

Before dealing with China’s position toward Israel in the wake of the Gaza War, we should put China’s relationship with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in its historical context. This relationship went through three main stages: The first was during Mao Zedong’s leadership of the Communist Party in the 1950s and 1960s until the mid-1970s. This phase witnessed an ideological foreign policy founded on supporting movements and regimes in the region hostile to Western imperialism and providing military and financial aid to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) since it was established in 1964. During this period, Beijing also refused to establish official diplomatic ties with Israel and chose to be aligned with leaders of the pan-Arab movement.

 

In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping adopted a policy that focused on enhancing internal economic development and employing foreign policy to achieve this goal. This shift was reflected in China’s relations with Israel, which saw increased trade in technological and agricultural products. In contrast, China’s relations with Palestinians declined due to a shift in the thinking of the Chinese leadership away from supporting Palestinian armed resistance, preferring political settlement, and supporting the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement in 1979 to undermine the Soviet Union’s influence. Moreover, Beijing was not in favor of the Palestinians’ proximity to the Soviet Union.

 

However, since establishing diplomatic ties between China and Israel in 1992, Beijing has adopted a policy encouraging political settlement, supporting the Oslo Agreement and the two-state solution, and maintaining balanced relations. This phase coincided with the rise of the importance of the Middle East as a critical energy source since China shifted from an exporter to an oil importer in 1993. China’s regional policy also focused on enhancing economic and trade ties and neutralizing political dimensions.

 

President Xi Jinping continued to support negotiations and the two-state solution. He preferred regional stability at the expense of Palestinian armed resistance and attempted to convince Palestinians to abandon the “internationalization” of their cause. The peak of Chinese-Israeli cooperation culminated with the two states signing an “Innovative Comprehensive Partnership” in 2017, as China became Israel’s largest trading partner.

 

Besides regional and economic considerations, internal ones paved the way to adhere to this policy: Undermine the legitimacy of armed action or “internationalization” option for activist groups among Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and Tibet. Beijing considers Taiwan a “part and parcel” of China. Therefore, China refrains from grating legitimacy to armed resistance as a base to achieve self-determination for Palestinians to automatically undermine the legitimacy of Washington’s support for Taiwan’s right to armed defense if China tries to annex it by force. However, during the ongoing war in Gaza, Beijing has adopted a more hardline position toward Israel compared to previous rounds of fighting.

 

Manifestations of Decline in China-Israel Ties

 

Over the last two decades, the Chinese-Israeli mutual understanding was based on the separation between economic and trade ties and Beijing’s stand on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. China condemned Israel’s 2014 war on Gaza and supported the United Nation’s investigation of allegations of “crimes against humanity” in this war. However, in the same year, Beijing invested US$ 4 billion in Israel, and trade between the two countries doubled from US$ 11 billion to over US$ 24 billion. However, China’s position on the ongoing war in Gaza seems different and more tough toward Israel. Beijing has refused to denounce the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas against Israel. 

 

On October 25, 2023, China and Russia also vetoed a resolution in the Security Council to denounce Hamas and obstructed a resolution in the UN General Assembly on October 27, 2023, that condemned abducting Israeli hostages. On October 14, 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Israel’s actions have “gone beyond the scope of self-defense” and turned into “group punishment” to Palestinians. On November 23, 2023, Chinese Representatives at the UN in Geneva called on Israel to join the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Treaty and abandon nuclear weapons. On March 7, 2024, Yi described the war in Gaza as a “disgrace for civilization.”

 

On February 22, 2023, the director-general of the Department of Treaty and Law at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ma Xinmin, told the International Court of Justice that Palestinians have the right to engage in armed struggle to resist Israeli occupation and refused to consider this as part of acts of terrorism. “The Palestinian people fight against Israeli oppression, and their struggle for completing the establishment of an independent state in the occupied territories are essentially just actions for restoring their legitimate rights,” Xinmin added. He cited the UN Charter and previous UN resolutions in support of Palestinians’ right to self-determination. 

 

XinMin said, “Several resolutions by the UN General Assembly recognize the legitimacy of armed struggle by all available means.” He reiterated the illegitimacy of occupation because it is the fundamental and legal motivation for the right to armed struggle. Xinmin also tried to distance himself from killing civilians and distinguish between legitimate armed resistance and acts of terrorism. “During legitimate armed struggle, all parties are obliged to comply with international humanitarian law and, in particular, refrain from committing acts of terrorism,” he said.

 

The legal context of these statements doesn’t reflect a radical change in Beijing’s political stand, retraction of previous Chinese initiatives for a solution, or retreat from supporting the two-state solution. However, these statements embody a significance related to Beijing’s historical stand supporting negotiations and rejecting the Palestinians’ armed struggle to end the occupation.

 

Hamas quickly “praised” China’s position. In contrast, the Israeli foreign ministry issued a statement denouncing the Chinese stand. “The laws of war do not permit the systematic and deliberate attack of civilians or the use of civilians as human shields, two war crimes that Hamas commits in the name of armed struggle. The Chinese statement could be interpreted as support for the murderous terrorist attack committed by Hamas on October 7.”

 

image.jpegSince establishing diplomatic ties between China and Israel in 1992, Beijing has adopted a policy encouraging political settlement, supporting the Oslo Agreement and the two-state solution, and maintaining balanced relations. (AFP)

 

These Chinese positions clearly show that Beijing thinks that it can coexist with the “collateral damage” resulting from its ties with Israel. In contrast, China has increased its support for Palestinians in a way that goes beyond the strategic vagueness characterizing Beijing’s foreign policy in general. However, this support has remained only in its diplomatic and rhetorical framework.

 

The declining trajectory of Chinese-Israeli relations is not an outcome of the ongoing war. These relations went through two fundamental stages during the President Xi era. The first was to benefit as much as possible from ties with China during Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, especially the fourth term (2015-2021). The second was slowing down and increasing restrictions during the coalition government of Lapid-Bennett after 2021.

 

During Netanyahu’s fourth term, the two sides tried to enhance cooperation in trade, investments in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and technological exchange. This track was consolidated by a series of government decisions in this direction from the Israeli prime minister’s office in 2013 and 2014 (decisions number 155, 251, and 1687). In 2014, the two sides formed a joint committee on innovation before signing the “Innovative Comprehensive Partnership” in 2017. In parallel, trade has increased from US$ 9 billion in 2012 to US$ 21 billion in 2022. Chinese investments in transportation, telecommunications, infrastructure, water, energy, and ports have also increased.

 

However, when the Trump administration waged a trade and technology war against China in 2017-2018, Washington increased its pressure on the Netanyahu government, adopting a policy based on balancing Washington’s interests and wishes and maximizing benefits from Chinese investments and technological cooperation. Due to this pressure, Israel established “the Advisory Committee for Examining National Security Aspects in Foreign Investments” in 2019 to investigate Chinese investments. 

 

Even after establishing this committee, the balancing act was clear by intentionally restricting its jurisdictions and fields of investigation despite adopting the principle of expanding national security beyond traditional security and military concepts. This approach changed during the coalition government of Bennett-Lapid, which demonstrated an understanding of American fears. This was reflected by signing the Strategic Dialogue between Tel Aviv and Washington during President Biden’s visit to Israel in 2022. Based on that, four action groups were formed to look into artificial intelligence, quantum computing, combating pandemics, environmental protection, and credible technologies. 

 

In October 2022, the Israeli government enhanced the jurisdictions of the Advisory Committee by granting it broader authority and boosting its work regulations. Since the Bennett-Lapid coalition government took office, it was clear that Israel has adopted a trajectory to enhance strategic partnership and technological cooperation with the US while increasing control and adding more obstacles to investments and technological cooperation with China.

 

There is no evidence of a radical change in this track when Netanyahu returned to power in December 2022. Netanyahu was the most enthusiastic leader for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was announced during the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023 as one of the projects of the American Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) competing with the Chinese BRI. In the short term, the Gaza War has created obstacles for this project. However, Israel has shown an impulse to play a central role in alternative initiatives for the Chinese projects.

 

This trajectory has deepened China’s skepticism toward Israel’s strategic choices and enhanced the belief that Tel Aviv is no longer a dependable partner in light of the raging competition with the US. This skepticism increased when Iran exported 90 percent of its oil to China or 10 percent of the total Chinese imports of oil in 2023. Israelis think this helps boost Iran’s economy and supports Tehran’s “Forward Defense” strategy by funding Iran’s regional proxies. Thus, Israel sees this Chinese policy as a direct threat to its security and interests.

 

This skepticism has deepened after October 7, 2023, in the wake of reports about discovering a massive stockpile of Chinese weapons in Hamas’s tunnels in Gaza. Other unconfirmed reports said that Israeli high-tech factories have difficulties importing components from China, and Chinese state-owned shipping giant Cosco suspended shipping to Israeli ports despite immunity enjoyed by Chinese firms in the Red Sea.

 

image.jpegOne of the most important goals of China’s harsh rhetoric toward Israel is to align with the discourse of Arab/Muslim nations and the Global South. (AFP)

 

Consequences on the Future of Bilateral Relations

 

One of the most important goals of China’s harsh rhetoric toward Israel is to align with the discourse of Arab/Muslim nations and the Global South as international pressure on Israel has peaked, Tel Aviv’s inability to make a breakthrough in the war, Netanyahu hardline government’s rejection of a ceasefire, and Washington’s continuous diplomatic and military support for Israel.

 

Moreover, Chinese positions show that challenging American leadership in the region has become a top priority for the Chinese leaders, which aligns with Beijing’s global vision and rise as a great power. The year 2017 when President Xi proposed a four-point peace proposal – can be considered the beginning of Beijing’s employment of the Palestinian issue to achieve the objectives of its global vision. Unlike all previous proposals, this one included, for the first time, “comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security and peace through development” to solve the Palestinian issue.

 

Such stands don’t have any political or diplomatic cost for China as long as they help undermine the American administration’s ethical and political positions. For instance, Beijing has adopted a completely different position toward Russia targeting civilians in Ukraine since the start of the war in 2022. This shows that the US is the leading party targeted by criticizing Israel. That said, China’s stands toward Israel stem from its view of Tel Aviv as an embodiment of the American regime in the region. However, the Netanyahu government has noticeably adopted a cautious reaction toward China’s sharp criticism and the desire not to escalate or get into a direct and constant confrontation with Beijing. Despite this, the decline of the Chinese-Israeli bilateral ties will have future consequences, notably:

 

First, the political aspect: The relations between the two sides will likely decline to unprecedented levels since establishing diplomatic ties in 1992. Although this will occur in the near and medium terms, it is not clear if conditions in the long term will permit regaining political depth, considering the decline in Chinese-American relations and the escalating competition between Beijing and Washington.

 

One can confirm that there is no chance that China will play a mediating role in the peace process in the future (it seems Beijing was not serious in the first place). Israel increasingly believes that China is a mediator biased toward Palestinians and is unlikely to be accepted as an alternative international sponsor instead of the US. This might also be reflected in Israel’s efforts to obstruct China, playing a pivotal role in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip after the war.

 

Beijing is expected to shift from the stage of supporting Washington’s role as the only mediator between Israelis and Palestinians to pressure in the coming years to form a multilateral system to supervise the peace process. This determinant might be the motive behind Beijing’s shift in the past months from the desire for mediation to a call (as part of the five-point peace plan proposed by Beijing on November 30, 2023, and during Chinese foreign minster Yi’s visit to Cairo on January 15, 2024) for a large-scale international conference under UN’s umbrella to supervise negotiations after the end of the Gaza War.

 

Second, technological and military cooperation: The decline in this field, which started in 2019, is expected to continue. The pace of this decline will most likely accelerate in military technology, AI, quantum computing, clean energy technology, and telecommunications technology. Netanyahu’s potential departure will not change this track.

 

Third, trade relations: It is likely that trade between the two sides will shift from the stagnation stage that started in 2021 (as Chinese exports to Israel reached 70 percent of the total volume of trade between them and the decline of Israeli exports to China since 2018); i.e., before the war to the stage of fast decline boosted by Washington’s pressure, especially on Israel imports of technological components and electric vehicles (Chinese firms were in the lead in sales of electric vehicles in 2023).

 

Conclusions

 

It seems that the dynamics of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have paved the way for China to adopt a bold and determined foreign policy that challenges the stands of the US and its allies in the context of providing its alternative model for global governance. This Chinese posture has been reflected in Beijing’s positions toward Israel, in particular in parallel with the continuous humanitarian tragedy caused by Israel’s war on Gaza and the international pressure to end this war.

 

It seems that China’s hardline stand toward Israel’s Gaza War will be reflected in speeding up the decline in the Chinese-Israel bilateral relations, especially with Tel Aviv getting closer to the US (if the Netanyahu government falls soon) and responding to Washington’s pressure regarding its ties with Beijing on a broader scale.



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