Five US Sentinel-class fast-response cutters and two Avenger-class mine
countermeasures ships from Task Force 52 sail together in the Gulf of
Oman, November 3, 2023 [photo credit: @US5thFleet]
Let's move on now to Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two heavyweights
vying for regional hegemony. I'm wondering how you see Riyadh
manoeuvring its foreign policy in response to threats, real or
perceived, from Iran.
We should not disregard the events of 2019 and the strategic shock
that caused in Riyadh when Iranian proxies or the Huthis with Iranian
support, or al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī (Popular Mobilisation
Forces) with Iranian support, it's unclear whom, launched missiles and
drones attacks against critical oil infrastructures in Saudi Arabia.
They brought offline over half of the Saudi production for several weeks
and the Trump administration, despite Trump being seen as a friendly
president for the Saudis, refrained from reacting. it was a major, major
moment of crumbling of the US deterrence umbrella. And from that point
on the Saudis understood that they should simply no longer count on US
support and US willingness to impose and reinforce such deterrence on
Iran. So they decided they needed, that they had no choice, but to
explore a different route which was engagement and they started a very
slow process that led to the March 2023 signing of a detente agreement
between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Beijing. And the agreement was very
clear. The Saudis basically asked Iran to contain all of its proxies and
refrain from attacking Saudi interests, Saudi assets, Saudi territory.
And in exchange, the Saudis were open to help where possible within the
existing sanctions to end the isolation of the Iranian regime, both
politically and economically. And that's exactly what we've seen. We
have seen the Huthis no longer hitting Saudi interests, Saudi territory
or Saudi assets. And we have seen Saudi Arabia trying to lessen the
isolation of Iran by involving them in some of the meetings on
Palestine, for example, the joint special Arab League and Organisation
of Islamic Cooperation meeting. We've seen the Saudis exploring where
they can push a bit more trade, notwithstanding the sanctions. And so
(détente) is working and has been working, even under the extra pressure
after the Israeli war on Gaza.
The 7 October attack came at a time when Saudi Arabia was close
to closing out its Yemen adventure. How imperilled do you think the
peace process is now that the Huthis have taken on the role of providing
the sort of military muscle in support of Palestine that none of the
Arab states are prepared to do?
The Saudis and the Huthis had been negotiating very intensively a
peace agreement or a permanent ceasefire agreement leading to a
political process within Yemen that would have solved the political
conflict at the domestic level. And then everything was frozen after the
Israeli operation in Gaza and the Huthi operation in the Red Sea. And
the Saudis initially tried to accelerate and basically close the
remaining issues and get it done and signed immediately because they
could see that the trajectory of events would have made it almost
impossible to do that at a later stage. And, in fact, that's what
happened. The Huthis already were no longer interested in closing the
deal in the very first weeks of the Israeli operation in Gaza for
several reasons. First their operation in the Red Sea has given them a
lot more credibility regionally and also domestically. So I am sure that
they're going to go back to the negotiating table at some point asking
for way more than they would have already asked for and what they had
been given in the negotiations so far. And, of course, Saudi Arabia
technically is a strategic partner of the United States. And it is being
portrayed by the Huthis as part of the Western axis, if you will. So to
close the deal with the Saudis, given that they will still remain a
strategic partner for the US, is politically tricky for the Huthis. And
it's, of course, very tricky for the Saudis as well, because right now,
the Huthis are taking global trade hostage. Also I'm not sure how many
of their global partners not just the US, but mostly the US - who by the
way have re-designated the Huthis as a Specially Designated Terrorist
organisation - how they would see Saudi Arabia signing such a deal with a
terrorist organisation.
And the Huthis have been clear that should the Saudis side too closely with the UK and the Americans they will pay a price.
This is a very delicate situation for Saudi Arabia because, again,
there are so many pressure points on their existing deals with the
Iranians and with the Huthis. The Saudis did go back to Tehran, after
the beginning of Huthi operations in the Red Sea. And they did make sure
that in their deal, the Saudi-Iranian deal, that they were expecting
Tehran to contain the Huthis in the context of their Red Sea operations
and they have so far but of course that meant that in exchange the
Saudis had to commit to not being too close to the Americans, not to
lend too much strategic and military support to the US operations in the
region. So that's a fine balance to navigate.
Now, you talked about the relationship between President Biden
and the Crown Prince and I think we both agree it's been at best chilly.
How strained are those relations and is MbS hoping to see Donald Trump
back in the White House come January 2025?
So that's, of course, a sensitive question in the sense that it's a
very delicate topic in Saudi Arabia. But I do think that we can easily
say that the relations between Biden and MbS are still pretty bad. And
the events after 7 October and after the Israeli operations in Gaza have
not contributed to making them better. From the US point of view, the
US is quite disappointed at the Saudis because they have not been very
cooperative and they have not been reliable. And they have not shown an
understanding of the US position. And you know, what the US needs to do
to protect its own strategic interests in the wider Middle East and
North Africa region. So big disappointment on the US side but also a lot
of unhappiness on the Saudi side because from their point of view how
the Americans are handling the whole situation is very regrettable: that
the US is not putting enough pressure on Israel for a ceasefire, that
they are letting all of what we are seeing on the ground in Palestine
unfold, that they seem unable to contain Israel's more adventurous
instincts to expand operations into Rafah or into Lebanon and that they
are so fixated on keeping the normalisation between Saudi Arabia and
Israel on the table, that they have kept pushing the Saudis to go public
and say that the process is not disrupted, which serves the Saudi
interests by the way, because they still believe that Israel should be
part of that future (Iran) deterrence formula. I mean, we shouldn't get
carried away into thinking that from now on Saudi Arabia will only use
engagement to keep relations with Iran under control. They will
ultimately want to reinstate some formula for containment and for
deterrence. But the fact that the US is so fixated on this process is
disturbing from a Saudi point of view. So this situation is incredibly
difficult.
Now, Donald Trump is very unpredictable and Donald Trump has given
the Saudis one of the most significant disappointments and strategic
shocks in contemporary history by not reacting to the 2019 (Aramco)
attacks. But from the Saudi point of view they were able I think to
still have a have a more fruitful, constructive working relationship
with Trump.
Some final thoughts on the Saudi response to the Gaza war?
It has provided a huge opportunity for Mohammed bin Salman to become
one of the most, if not the most, influential voice regionally in the
Middle East and in North Africa. And I think that the Saudi leadership
has been up to that opportunity. They have decided to seize it. They
have taken the route of pursuing opportunities and short-term interest,
even if it meant taking risks with some of their regional moves and
projects such as the normalisation with Israel while at the same time
pursuing a deterrent with Iran. This is not playing it safe. It is
extreme strategic hedging and really going after your immediate
opportunities, trying to pursue them to the maximum extent, never being
static. In all of that, the polar star has been to preserve and
strengthen inner and domestic and local and individual Saudis strengths,
which are also very much dependent, not just on the oil markets but
also on the health of Vision 2030 and the local economy and growth in
that sense. For that it is, of course, imperative to maintain regional
stability and security. And if that is not possible because of what we
have seen unfolding after 7 October and Israeli operations in Gaza, at
least to focus deeply on preserving stability within the Saudi borders
and to do everything you must do to make sure that you can insulate the
kingdom as much as possible from what is happening around the region in
terms of kinetic violent spillovers.