Two Assassinations, Same Problem: Israel Didn't Think About the Consequences
Two airstrikes within nine days, one attributed to Israel in Damascus, and the other in Gaza, epitomize the seriousness of the strategic entanglement Israel finds itself in now, in the seventh month of the war against Hamas.
The war in the Gaza Strip, which already in October slid into a limited confrontation with Hezbollah in Lebanon, is now threatening for the first time to also become a direct clash between Israel and Iran.
- On April 1, the Iranian Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi (also known as Hassan Mahadawi) was assassinated in the building adjacent to the Iranian Embassy in the Syrian capital. Mahdawi was killed along with six members of his staff.
On Wednesday, April 10, the Israel Air Force attacked a car in Gaza that was carrying three sons and three grandchildren of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas' political bureau, who lives in Qatar. All six passengers were killed.
The first operation looks like a planned move. Officially, Israel does not take responsibility for assassinations of high-ranking Iranian figures, but in this case it's difficult to discern anyone else in the region with an interest in eliminating Zahedi. It can be surmised that the general, who was the commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon, was under longtime surveillance, at the end of which a decision was made to exploit the operational opportunity that arose.
An action of this sort is not improvised. It's likely that given Zahedi's senior standing, the whole chain of authorizations was necessary to decide on an attack. In contrast, it's doubtful whether the security cabinet held a meeting to consider the likely implications of the operation.
The case of the Haniyeh brothers is different in essence. Sources in the Israel Defense Forces maintained on Wednesday that the three brothers were known Hamas militants who were distributing funds to members of the organization in Gaza at the time they were hit. It was a joint operation of the IDF and the Shin Bet security service.
Ismail Haniyeh's sons killed in the strike.
The authorization for the attack, the army was compelled to admit, was given by a colonel in the fire center of Southern Command – only an intermediate level official. The head of Southern Command, the IDF chief of staff, the director of the Shin Bet, the defense minister, the prime minister – none of them knew about the operation in advance, and the chain of command below them didn't bother to point out beforehand the possible consequences of killing six close family members of such a high-ranking Hamas figure.
The two attacks have something in common. Both feature unsupervised hyperactivity against the backdrop of Israel's political torpor. More than half a year after the October 7 massacre, Israel is finding it difficult to achieve a military victory that would strategically counterbalance part of the damage inflicted by the disaster, and is still not close to alleviating the dire distress of the families of the 133 hostages(many of whom are dead).
To some extent, there is an operations tail here that is wagging the political dog. In the attack attributed to Israel in Damascus, it's likely that the professionals applied pressure from below to take action; in Gaza, the decision was taken at an intermediate level, without even updating those above. In both cases, it appears that insufficient thought was given to the full significance of the act.
Over the past two days, the local media has been focusing on the Haniyeh incident. It's a newer event, and it involves people whom Israelis are familiar with. Haniyeh's expressionless face when he received the news in Doha about the death of his sons and grandchildren attests to Hamas' determination to continue fighting Israel. However, it's doubtful that it will disrupt a deal for the release of the hostages, as many think. In any event, the two people who will make the decisions – Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas' leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar – are not eager for a deal at the moment and are not hurrying toward reaching one.
The Iranian story is more dramatic and more urgent. On Thursday there was concern that it could soon lurch out of control. A series of assassinations of high-ranking Iranians in the past have been attributed to Israel, among them the assassination of the director of Iran's nuclear project, Prof. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, in 2020, and another senior figure in the Revolutionary Guards, who was killed in Damascus at the start of the war. In most of those cases, Iranian spokespersons threatened a response, but what ensued were relatively minor attack attempts against Israeli targets abroad.
This time, Tehran made a big effort to make it clear that a red line has been crossed and that it will respond. The Islamic Republic's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, publicly threatened revenge. Apparently preparatory measures for a military response have also been taken.
The defense establishment in Israel went into alert mode immediately, as did the United States. Last week, more time was spent in both the war cabinet and the security cabinet on discussing the tension with Iran than on the negotiations for the hostages.
Israel apparently had reasons for taking out Zahedi. The assassinated general was the key person in the connection between Khamenei and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. He coordinated Iran's interaction with the Lebanese organization and managed the supply chain by which the Iranians provide their proxies with tens of thousands of missiles, rockets and drones.
Mohammad Reza Zahedi
Israel wanted to convey a message that Tehran couldn't go on spurring and equipping the extensive assault on Israel without paying a price. But some sort of conceptual inertia seems to have come into play, based on the assessment that, as in the past, Iran wouldn't respond any differently to the assassination of such a high-ranking figure in the midst of a war.
The basic intelligence take on Iran has long maintained that the regime finds it convenient to fight Israel through its proxies and that Tehran wants to avoid a general regional war that would sweep it in and cause casualties. However, according to the threats and leaks from Iran, this time a direct response against Israel is being considered.
The question is what its intensity will be and whether targets will be chosen that will leave the sides below the threshold of a war. This also depends on the success of Israel's defensive efforts. In the past few days, the defensive coordination with the systems of CENTCOM, the U.S. Central Command, has been tightened considerably.
The scenarios that were put forward this week in the defense establishment dealt primarily with the possibility of an Iranian attack on military bases and strategic infrastructure sites. This was presumably on the assumption that an attack on population centers would be tantamount to a declaration of war. Iran has shown an ability to initiate focused and effective attacks by drones and cruise missiles on oil sites in Saudi Arabia (2019) and on the United Arab Emirates (2021).
In the past decade, Iran also realized the vision of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, who was assassinated by the United States in Iraq in 2020. Soleimani spoke of attacking Israel with a "ring of fire" of militias that the Iranians would be able to activate at will.
The idea was first implemented in the present war. Broader international processes are also underway here, related to a kind of global "coalition of the ostracized" that has formed between Iran and Russia, with the aid of North Korea and some encouragement from China. The vigorous arms trade that is being conducted between Moscow and Tehran amid the war in Ukraine, and more recently the war in Gaza, is testimony to the closer ties.
U.S. President Joe Biden stated on Wednesday night that his country has an "ironclad commitment to Israel's security." That's an important statement, made despite Biden's immense frustration with the behavior of Netanyahu during the war in Gaza. It's comparable to Biden's famous "Don't" speech on October 10, in which he deterred Iran from entering the fray against Israel following the massacre in the south and Hezbollah's joining the campaign by firing rockets into the Galilee. Biden's threat, which was backed up by the dispatch of two aircraft carriers at the head of a task force to the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, had the intended effect.
U.S. President Joe BidenCredit: Matt Rourke/AP
This time the situation is more complicated. From Tehran's perspective, Israel attacked it in a manner that violated the balance of terror between the sides (the more so because the Iranians are describing the building that was bombed as their consulate in Damascus, meaning their sovereign territory). Khamenei's declarations are also locking them into a response.
On the contrary, the Sunni Arab states fear a confrontation that will spark a conflagration in the Middle East and jeopardize their petroleum exports. The Saudi journalist Tariq Al-Homayed, the former editor of the Asharq Al Awsat newspaper, is considered close to the Riyad authorities. In an article this week, he compared the decision that Khamenei is wrestling with to the famous remark by his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, over the 1988 cease-fire agreement that ended the Iran-Iraq War.
Khomeini described the decision to end the war as "drinking from the poisoned chalice," but termed it unavoidable considering the circumstances. Homayed wrote that Iran has maneuvered itself into a position from which it must respond, but that this could be the most difficult decision the regime has made since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
The result, he warned, could be a direct confrontation with Israel and the danger of a regional war. For some reason, he doesn't mention another possibility: that the war will also involve an Israeli or even American move against Iran's nuclear project.
Lost cards
The killing of the Haniyeh family is not disconnected from the previous Israeli attack that stirred international criticism, in which seven aid workers from World Central Kitchen were killed in the bombing of a convoy in Deir al-Balah. In the previous incident, the IDF claimed it was a case of mistaken identity.
This time, the identities of the targets were known, but according to the army's account, no one thought to raise a red flag for the higher-ups. Both cases reflect a professional problem that is becoming more acute. The army is worn down from the protracted combat – not only the troops on the ground, but also the officers, many of them reservists, in the rear command posts.
UN staff members inspecting a car used by World Central Kitchen aid workers that was hit by an Israeli strike in central Gaza.Credit: AFP
The General Staff's control over the events on the ground and in the command posts is constantly weakening, and the result is a departure from the procedures and the orders, which has adverse implications for the IDF's performance in the war.
Added to this is growing Israeli indifference to human life on the Palestinian side. Its origin lies mainly in the feelings of revenge that were provoked by the massacre, and it has by now become routine in some of the army's units.
A widespread phenomenon in this regard is the disparities in the way orders are carried out in the various brigade command posts. The directives from above are identical, but how meticulously they are implemented, along with the need to ascertain that the targets are military, varies greatly from one unit to the next. This is related to the organizational culture in each brigade, but also to the spirit of the commander that is dictated to the personnel.
The fact that Hamas deliberately hides behind the civilian population in Gaza and displays absolute indifference to civilian losses further complicates the circumstances and provides some commanders and fighters with an excuse for not carrying out the directives to the letter.
The orders themselves also require a discussion. Initially the IDF allowed high "collateral damage" calculations (newspeak for the number of civilians expected to die in an attack on a terrorist target). This happened in light of the war's intensiveness, and from the moment the ground troops entered Gaza, also due to the need to protect them during their movement without taking risks. At this stage of the fighting, which is relatively static, it's also a matter of inertia – and, in many cases, indifference to the lives of the enemy's civilians.
The killing of the Haniyeh family members was the major event during a week in which Israel hardly mounted a ground assault other than in a brigade operation that began on Thursday on the outskirts of the Nuseirat refugee camp in the center of the Strip.
Last Saturday evening, the last of the forces left Khan Yunis, at the IDF's initiative, since the top ranks felt that the operation there had played itself out. Only one Israeli infantry brigade remains on the ground in Gaza: the Nahal Brigade, which is holding the corridor south of Gaza City that splits the Strip into northern and southern parts.
Israeli soldiers in Gaza.Credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit
It's worth mentioning again that Israel, at its initiative, passed up a card that it might have played in the hostage negotiations: removing forces from Gaza in response to Hamas' demands. In parallel, it's being compelled to give up the humanitarian card: the number of aid trucks entering Gaza has almost been tripled under American pressure in the wake of the killing of the aid workers.
One main card remains: clearing the corridor. Hamas is demanding unhampered crossing of the corridor for Palestinian civilians who want to return to their homes, most of which have been destroyed, in the northern Gaza Strip. Israel is haggling over the degree of control it will have over the passage of Hamas personnel and the number of Palestinians who will be allowed to return.
The additional pressure Israel currently wields is merely theoretical: Netanyahu's frequently voiced threats to conquer Rafah. Preparations for that operation are not proceeding quickly. It looks as though weeks will pass before the IDF is ready for that move, which will entail a serious dispute with the United States and the need to forcefully evacuate a vast civilian population (part of which will now leave in an attempt to return to the ruins of Khan Yunis).
Before attention shifted to the Iranian threats, U.S. officials frequently assailed Netanyahu for the serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and his refusal to involve the Palestinian Authority in future solutions.
Biden said in an interview to a Spanish-language television network that Netanyahu is pursuing a mistaken policy in Gaza and that Israel needs a cease-fire. The president is not backing away from his commitment to free the hostages, some of whom are American citizens, but it appears that the condition drawn by the administration between a cease-fire and the release of the hostages is now being emphasized less. This has to do with the total disgust Washington feels toward the current Israeli government, though in the meantime, this fortunately hasn't adversely affected Biden's approach to the new Iranian threat.
Palestinian women visiting temporary graves in Gaza on Thursday.Credit: Mohammed Salem/Reuters
Still, despite the feeling of security that the U.S. support vis-à-vis Iran is creating in Israel, it mustn't be forgotten that this is a gift with a bitter aftertaste. For the second time in six months, Israel needs U.S. backing to cope with a threat that could turn out to be too big for it.
This constitutes an erosion of Israeli deterrence – which is being felt vividly in the region's capitals, from Tehran to Riyadh to Beirut. The old American mantra held that the U.S. is committed to supporting Israel, which will always be able to defend itself with its own forces. That is not the case when American warships are intercepting missiles fired by the Houthis at Eilat, or when Biden finds it necessary to threaten Khamenei again.
Despite the losses Hamas has sustained in the fighting in Gaza, it's hard to talk about the full rehabilitation of Israel's deterrent capability in the region. Israel's neighbors – friends and foes – are undoubtedly following the developments in Israeli society, from the gradual erosion in the ranks of the IDF (despite the high motivation displayed in the conscript army and in the reserve units) to the internal rift that is now resurfacing. The attacks in Gaza, which raised a furor, did not happen in a vacuum.
As the intensive combat fades, the army is becoming immersed in tension over the investigations of the war and the anticipated wave of resignations, followed by a round of new appointments in its wake.
If no all-consuming flare-up with Iran and Hezbollah occurs, the date is approaching for senior officers on whose watch the October 7 disaster occurred to translate their general assumption of responsibility since the beginning of the war into a resignation.
In a manner that even now can only be described as astonishing, Netanyahu doesn't see himself as bearing any responsibility for the debacles. According to all the signs, he intends to hold onto power with all his might. There is no evidence that five brave coalition members who are needed to unseat him will raise their hands to do that anytime soon.
The man will stay in office and continue to disrupt every possibility for the state and society to emerge from the calamitous situation we find ourselves in, for which he is largely to blame.
Realistic objectives
In light of the government's stubborn refusal to discuss day-after scenarios, others are trying to fill the vacuum. The Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies has published an article on what to expect at the end of the war. It says that "brave decisions" will be needed.
Members of an Israeli tank crew in the north.Credit: Gil Eliyahu
According to the institute, which is headed by former Military Intelligence chief Tamir Hayman, "The war against Hamas is waning, as was expected at this stage, and even an operation in Rafah will not significantly change this trend. This decline in the war can lead to weariness, accompanied by discouragement, disappointment, and frustration."
According to the article, Israel is in danger of sliding into a war of attrition in the north and south that will weaken Israeli society and postpone the "renewal of periphery communities" – tens of thousands of Israelis have been displaced. In the longer term, Israel's image could be eroded, along with the weakening of deterrence against Iran and its allies. There could also be a serious eruption in the West Bank, ostracism of Israel and a missed historic chance for a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia.
The INSS adds that Israel can start demanding quid pro quos; at the moment it's paying a price without getting anything in return. The authors admit that normally they would not recommend such moves, but there are no better alternatives.
Hayman and his colleagues justly note a clear disparity between the withdrawal of forces from Gaza and Netanyahu's empty promises of "total victory." They call for realistic objectives in ending the war: restoring security on the borders, reducing the damage abroad, shaping a regional system as a counterweight to the Iranian axis, and creating a political horizon in the Palestinian arena.
Humanitarian aid being dropped into Gaza on Thursday.Credit: Eliyahu Hershkovitz
The INSS recommends a hostage deal that would include a cease-fire in Gaza, which presumably would be unlimited in time (the authors realize that Hamas might violate this). Like the U.S. administration, the INSS believes that the cease-fire in the south must be exploited to achieve a political settlement on the Lebanon border, removing the threat of invasion by Hezbollah and its firing of antitank missiles into Israel.
In this period, massive humanitarian aid would be sent into Gaza, including from Israeli territory, and would be distributed by the PA under the aegis of an Arab and international coalition (an ambitious goal that Hamas of course would do everything to foil). The authors add that Israel must strive to hermetically seal the Philadelphi route at Rafah in close cooperation with Egypt and the United States. A military operation in Rafah would take place sometime in the future.
It's safe to assume that at least some of these ideas have been discussed by our military leaders. Hayman has actually headed another team that has advised Defense Minister Yoav Gallant since the start of the war.
But two main obstacles block a serious consideration of day-after scenarios. The first is that Netanyahu, who is locked into the far-right coalition he chose to form, is deliberately avoiding such deliberations, fearing that they will weaken him politically. The second lies in the military response that Iran is planning for the coming days. In an extreme scenario, such a response could upend the region and thrust Israel into a new situation more complex than we've known.