In the wake of Iran’s attack on Israel in response to the April 1 bombing of its consular annex in Damascus, it’s important to keep the facts front and center:
- Iran launched
185 one-way attack drones, 36 cruise missiles, and 110 medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in a multi-phase attack that last several
hours, likely intended to probe U.S. and Israeli air defenses, determine
radar saturation points, and demonstrate Tehran’s capability to reach
Israel with its arsenal. But given the telegraphing from Iran, diplomatic backchanneling, and good intelligence collected in advance of the attack, it’s clear Tehran calibrated this strike as an easily anticipated “Goldilocks”response meant to leave room for an off-ramp toward de-escalation.
- Iran only used a small portion of its missile and drone arsenal. Iran has tens of thousands of drones, and at least 3,000 ballistic missiles, though perhaps as many as twice that number. The fact that Iran chose to employ older missile variants, like the Emad—launching
them in smaller salvos that would not overwhelm air defenses—means one
should be cautious about what lessons to draw from Saturday. Iran,
thankfully, did not show a “maximum effort,” as some have suggested.
- While primarily U.S. air defenses successfully neutralized Iran’s drones and missiles, the evidence shows replicating such a performance would be operationally difficult and logistically costly
for the United States, especially if another attack occurred in short
order, with much less or no notice, and at a greater scale. The total
cost of this single operation—to defeat less than 3 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal—likely exceeded $1.5 billion.
- Iran’s total defense budget amounts to just 5.17 percent of what America spends on our military. It’s wrong to inflate the Iranian threat, but policymakers should acknowledge the real dangers Tehran’s missiles and drones—which have already killed three American soldiers since October 7—pose for the U.S. and Israel, and we should deliberately avoid escalation. Iran is a fourth-rate military power with an antiquated air force, a small navy, and an army that hasn’t conducted large-scale maneuver warfare in decades. It is not a burgeoning regional hegemon, nor does it have the hard power necessary to become one. It can, however, use proxy forces and asymmetric capabilities to exact high costs on the United States and our partners in the region.
As Tel Aviv decides how it will respond, U.S. analysts and policymakers should appreciate that more escalation means a greater likelihood that Iran’s next attack won’t be as easily thwarted.
The roughly 40,000 U.S. troops still in the Middle East will no doubt bear the brunt of further escalation between Israel and Iran and remain targets of opportunity for local militias. U.S. interests are only undermined by direct conflict with Iran.
U.S. policy should avoid any escalation that might lead to regional war, and the United States remains overly invested militarily in the Middle East—a region of limited and diminishing strategic importance. You can find compelling analysis here, here, and here from DEFP experts on rightsizing U.S. commitments in the region, as well as additional commentary at defp.org.