The trauma of the Simhat Torah massacre has yet to dissipate and Israelis are already sitting down to the Passover seder without the 133 hostages who are still captive in Gaza, many of them no longer alive. Two-hundred days of a criminally mismanaged war in Gaza and a series of unforced and easily foreseen errors have been added to the original failure of October 7.
The source of most of these failures is , a prime minister who is trying to evade responsibility and refusing to offer any clear ideas or strategy, just empty slogans. But his partners in the war cabinet and governing coalition, as well as the generals in the , shoulder major portions of blame as well.
On , Israel was forced by Hamas into war, a justified one from its perspective. But in the time that has elapsed between Simhat Torah and , its leaders have inflicted plague after plague on the Israeli people...
The rushed evacuation of tens of thousands of residents from the towns and kibbutzim near the Lebanese border was carried out without any military or civilian planning. Nothing was done to allay the understandable fears of those living there that Hezbollah's elite Radwan Force unit was about to commit a similar massacre to that of Hamas – even though by nightfall on October 7, there were entire IDF brigades stationed on high alert on the border to prevent such an eventuality.
Neither the government nor the IDF tried to reassure the civilians and instead ordered an evacuation. This created the space for Hezbollah to launch its daily missile strikes without having to worry about forcing Israel into a devastating response. Six months later, the evacuees have yet to return, many are planning their futures elsewhere and the government, instead of trying to come up with a strategy, is still hoping the Biden administration can somehow deliver a diplomatic solution.
The Plague of Gaza First
The decision to begin the ground offensive three weeks after the Hamas attack with a massive assault, involving three entire divisions on Gaza City and its surrounding townships, was aimed at dismantling Hamas' military structure and destroying the symbols of its government. The optimistic expectation was that they would be so shocked at seeing the IDF in the heart of Gaza City, reaching previously untouchable targets like Al-Shifa Hospital, that this would cause Hamas' military and political wings to collapse.
Instead, Hamas simply reverted to its origins as a jihadist guerrilla group, with its leaders and thousands of its fighters disappearing down south and into its tunnel network, which was much more extensive and well-equipped than the IDF's intelligence had assessed. When this became evident within a few months, instead of changing tack and trying to cut Hamas off from the south in Rafah, as it should have done originally, the IDF continued regarding Hamas as a "terror army," becoming addicted to pointless body counts and statistics of "Hamas battalions dismantled" – which failed to convey Hamas' true situation. Israel destroyed Gaza City but Hamas, despite losing as much as half of its fighting force, has survived.The Plague of No Strategy
Over half a year since the war broke out, Israel still doesn't have a day-after plan for Gaza. The day after is now here. The IDF's divisions have left Gaza City and Khan Yunis. Hamas is back. Not only is there no alternative force being prepared to take over the Strip; there isn't even a decision on who this force will be.
Netanyahu has vetoed the suggestions for the security establishment to install a police force affiliated with the Palestinian Authority. More than two months ago, he presented the cabinet with a set of principles for "the day after Hamas," without any clear plan or milestones on how to achieve them. No real discussion has been held since then.
The IDF deployed nearly its entire force to Gaza, spent months fighting, sacrificed hundreds of soldiers and, while it boasts of killing 10,000 Hamas fighters and seems to have killed double that number of civilians, it has no real return to show for its operation. Hamas is weakened but still active, the fate of many of the hostages has been sealed. There is no outcome in sight. We still don't even know what that outcome will look like.
The Plague of Abandoning the Hostages
The original aims of the war, as stated by the government, were destroying Hamas' military capabilities and removing it from power in Gaza. Rescuing over 250 hostages captured on October 7 was added later as an afterthought, and only due to public pressure. It has remained the lesser priority throughout.
A man carrying an Israeli flag next to photographs of hostages in Tel Aviv last week.Credit: Hannah McKay/Reuters
That was the case in the early days of the war, when Hamas' Qatari patrons were eager to broker a deal to release the women and children. It took Netanyahu and the security establishment seven long weeks to agree to that deal. And even though, after a week of staged releases of hostages, there was still the prospect of getting more out, the IDF was quick to resume the fighting. Since then, in every round of negotiations, saving more hostages has been less and less urgent.
The abandonment of the hostages has also had an effect on the tactical level, as was tragically proven when IDF soldiers mistakenly shot three who managed to escape their captors but failed to convince their fellow Israelis that they were hostages. Yes, Hamas is to blame for kidnapping and holding them, but Israel is to blame for abandoning its people. Hamas is going nowhere and, meanwhile, the hostages are dying in captivity.
The Plague of the Humanitarian Crisis
You didn't have to be an expert on Gazan affairs or international humanitarian law to see from the war's start that invading Gaza would cause catastrophic shortages of food, water and medications, and that the IDF as the occupying power would be held responsible by the world, including Israel's allies.
Palestinian women sitting on the rubble of a residential building housing their apartments in Nuseirat, central Gaza Strip, last week.Credit: Doaa Rouqa/Reuters
There were enough officers in the IDF who warned of this, but months of refusal by the politicians to address the situation led to Israel being dragged slowly, every step of the way, to yield to the international pressure. Instead of having a plan for humanitarian supplies as part of the overall war strategy, Israel was portrayed as intentionally starving Gaza, giving credence to accusations of genocide.
Hamas made good use of the vacuum. It hijacked the aid convoys when they came in and used the situation to make tougher demands in the hostage negotiations, while Israel's legitimacy to continue fighting was massively eroded.
The Plague of False Unity
Benny Gantz's decision to join an emergency government along with his colleague Gadi Eisenkot was necessary to distance the far right from the war cabinet. It produced positive results in the shape of blocking an attack on Hezbollah that would have started a second all-out war, and also the hostage release agreement at the end of November that Netanyahu, and initially also the security establishment, had opposed. But it helped Netanyahu and his cohorts build the false narrative of unity that was meant first and foremost to shield him from criticism.
The government's "Together we will win" slogan was cynically manipulated to brand any critic as "harming national unity" and aiding the enemy. Soon, this was broadened to a smear campaign that blamed the prewar protest movement of creating a "divisive discourse" and "weakening the IDF" – when it was Netanyahu's coalition who created the divide with their policies aimed at eviscerating the judiciary and Israel's fragile democracy.
Israel after October 7 remains a deeply divided and polarized society, and the efforts to paper over this in the name of "unity" (while Netanyahu's proxies are smearing his critics) only serves one side: the one that is trying to evade responsibility for the situation it created.
The Plague of the War Budget
Billions of shekels had already been pillaged from the state budget by the coalition parties before the war for invented ministries of "Jewish identity" and "national missions," funding the narrow interests of the ultra-Orthodox and settler communities. The immediate need for tens of millions to fund the war caused the coalition to make only cosmetic changes to its budget.
The allocations for their constituencies continued and even grew, while the funds for the rehabilitation of tens of thousands of Israelis uprooted from their homes and support for the families of the reservists and hostages were delayed for months.
The price for the coalition's refusal to deliver a war budget defined by true national priorities, the growing deficit, rising taxes and downgraded credit ratings will be paid by Israeli taxpayers for decades to come.
The Plague of Indiscipline
It took the IDF's chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Herzl Halevi, over four months from the start of the war to issue a detailed order calling upon his soldiers "to take care not to use force where it is not necessary, to distinguish between a terrorist and someone who is not, not to take anything that is not ours … and not to make revenge videos."
IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzl Halevi, center, walking with other officials in Gaza last month.Credit: IDF/Reuters
Up to that point, Halevi and the rest of his generals assumed that a large army of conscripts and reservists traumatized by October 7 would just go into Gaza and spend months there impeccably observing orders. The deluge of videos filmed by the soldiers themselves (despite the order not to bring cellphones into the war zone), in which they boasted of destroying private property, mistreating detainees and blowing up civilian buildings, caused damage 10 times worse than anything Al Jazeera has ever broadcast.
The lack of discipline in observing the IDF's procedures was also exposed by the investigation into the killing of the seven aid workers from World Central Kitchen who were in Gaza with the IDF's blessing. Forget the claims of being the "most moral army in the world"; the top brass of what was supposed to be one of the most tech-savvy armies in the world didn't even realize the power and potential for harm in the soldiers' own smartphones.
The Plague of Total Victory
From the moment Netanyahu coined the hollow phrase "total victory," it was clear that this was another desperate attempt to revive his image as the only leader who could promise victory, and part of his escape from responsibility.
The phrase didn't catch on and even became the stuff of ridicule. But it still succeeded in influencing the discourse for the worse. Netanyahu's political rivals as well as the IDF generals were scared to be seen as "defeatists," and resisted explaining the painful and complex truth to the Israeli public. There is no "total victory" in any war. Certainly not in this one.
In order to deal with the war's bitter results and begin building a better future for Israel, there was the need to recognize this instead of making empty boasts. As long as Israel isn't confronting reality, any talk of "victory" remains an illusion.
The Plague of the Damascus Strike
The attack on the Iranian Embassy compound on April 1, in which seven senior Revolutionary Guards officers were killed, was carried out on the strategic and intelligence assumption that Iran would stick to its decades-long policy of trying to harm Israel through its proxies. This was a major mistake for which the blame should be divided between the intelligence community – especially the IDF's Military Intelligence branch – and the politicians, led by Netanyahu, who considers himself an expert on all things Iran.
People holding a big banner as they attend a protest against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government, in Tel Aviv earlier this month.Credit: Hannah McKay/Reuters
The elimination of the Iranian generals wasn't worth opening yet another front for while Israel is still stuck in Gaza and on the northern border. For now, thanks largely to a surprising international coalition (for which credit is due mainly to U.S. President Joe Biden), the damage caused by Iran's counterstrike was minimal and Israel's own retaliation (thanks again to Biden's pressure) didn't cause further escalation. However, the strategic balance with Iran has fundamentally changed and Israel hasn't got any answers.