President Donald Trump with US military personnel during an unannounced visit to Al Asad Air Base in Iraq on December 26, 2018
What do you think the likelihood of a US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria is given that we're in an election year?
I think it's a crucial time to be having discussions like these,
especially in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan where we
witnessed an evacuation rather than a full scale withdrawal strategy.
Now is the time to have a frank and open discussion, and even a debate,
about what a withdrawal from Iraq and Syria would look like, looking at
the security realities, the operational environment and discussing the
security implications that would be left in the wake of a partial or
full scale withdrawal.
Now, when we look at the likelihood for withdrawal in Iraq and Syria
under Operation Inherent Resolve, interestingly, there are right now
discussions with higher military commissions between the United States
and Iraq reviewing the mandate and the mission and really the purpose,
as well as of course, the timeline of the coalition and its presence in
Iraq. However I think that ultimately there's a higher likelihood of the
United States departing from Syria than Iraq.
You mentioned that chaotic withdrawal in Afghanistan which has
really blotted President Biden's copybook. How much has that damaged US
credibility in the Middle East?
I think immensely. There was a reality that the United States was
always going to disengage as it was seeking to bolster its great power
competition capabilities. The United States is increasingly looking to
focus on the Pacific and on countering China; also, of course,
countering Russia as it wages its war in Ukraine. So there was always
this assumed reality. But then once we saw the withdrawal from
Afghanistan, I think it was a lesson that the United States could have
contingency and evacuation plans but when it came down to it, there was
really no plan for mitigating the fallout and the security implications
of this new power vacuum. And I think now many are looking at the Middle
East, looking at Syria and Iraq and the results are almost just as
obvious. In Syria of course, we would have a convergence of powers, both
external actors as well as key players, for example, the Syrian regime.
You would also, of course, have Türkiye, Russia, Iran and Iran-aligned
militias that would all seek to try to salvage and scramble and
establish different areas of influence as well as counter the
(predominately Kurdish) SDF which has been a key partner of the United
States in northeast Syria.
In Iraq, there is a very similar dynamic in that Iran-aligned
militias would deepen their foothold as well as their political
influence. And you would have Türkiye doubling down on its existing air
campaign against PKK insurgents in northern Iraq, particularly in the
Qandil Mountains. You would also likely have other powers like Russia
and China try and see where they could salvage and create an area of
influence and try to fill the vacuum that the United States left behind.
So it's very key to game out these post-withdrawal security dynamics
especially as we're now approaching a dynamic in the Middle East where
escalation is incredibly high. We haven't seen this level of escalation
between Israel and Iran ever. And so because of this, one strike against
a US installation or one error could cost the lives of American
personnel. And with that, there would be immense political pressure that
could induce a very speedy withdrawal or a withdrawal that the
Department of Defense has not planned. And instead, it would look more
like an evacuation rather than a phased, slow and incremental withdrawal
process.
Afghanistan 2.0. A worrying prospect. But can you remind us of
the actual numbers, the military commitment in Syria and Iraq of
American boots on the ground. It isn't that big, is it?
No, it's a very small sliver of US forward posture. In Syria, we have
900 personnel stationed there. That doesn't include contractors, but
that's extremely small. And then when we look to Iraq, it's 2500. Also
not including contractors, but again very small. And even in 2020, the
United States nearly halved its personnel count in Iraq. And then of
course, after the Trump administration's temporary withdrawal and once
they bolstered the United States presence there, we also saw the US
forward posture in northeast Syria dwindle. So it's very small. It's
also a cheap mission in the sense that the United States has a lot of
joint installations. It's an advise and assist mission while, of course,
they have to act in a defensive capacity when they're struck by
Iran-aligned militias. US troops are primarily there to help partners on
the ground conduct anti-ISIS raids and help build capacity amongst
these partners across Syria and Iraq, and really because of this, it's a
very small footprint and a cheap footprint.
ISIS. First of all in Syria, how do you assess their current
strength? And again what are the implications if this small force of
American soldiers pulls out? What does that do because ISIS is much
stronger, perhaps, than a lot of people are aware.
When you look at reports that the Office of the Inspector General
release every quarter to Congress essentially reporting on how our
forces are doing, ISIS is a key component. And in these reports, it's
very clear ISIS is by no means in the position that it was in the
mid-2010s. However, we've seen a series of low level, less sophisticated
but consistent attacks that have been made against civilians as well as
US partners operating in the region. In northeast Syria there’s a very
specific and great concern about potential jailbreaks from ISIS
detention centres as well as widespread recruitment in camps like
Al-Hawl because the facilities are not properly guarded. There's also a
lot of distraction whenever there's a Turkish offensive in northeast
Syria. This creates the perfect storm for an ISIS resurgence, especially
regaining momentum throughout northeast Syria, recruiting en masse,
trying to conduct jailbreaks and then more sophisticated attacks against
both the SDF and US forces. As well there are attacks on communities
and civilians in (ISIS) efforts to regain different swathes of
territory. We've also seen in northeast Syria that ISIS has made
particular gains in the Badiya, the Syrian desert. And there is a
prevailing concern if they had that breakout moment - it's not there yet
- that they would try to connect into Idlib province where they could
coordinate with al Qaeda affiliated organisations operating in the
northwest of Syria. Then, of course they would also try and make gains
into Iraq as well where there are ISIS cells that are actively operating
and conducting attacks.
Let’s look then at Iraq. It’s my sense that Baghdad would like to
see the Americans leave in a phased withdrawal. So what's the situation
with ISIS there?
I'll make two comments on that: with ISIS in Iraq, I think, it really
depends on where we're operating. When you look at northern Iraq and
when we're talking about the Kurdish security forces, they are reporting
back more effective counter-ISIS missions, sometimes ISIS not making
much progress at all. Whereas when it comes to parts of southern Iraq,
or even along the Syrian-Iraqi border, that's where you have much more
of a need for consistent counter-ISIS missions. And that is primarily
with the ISF (Iraqi Security Forces) and the CTS (Iraqi Counterterrorism
Services.) That being said when we talk about whether Iraq wants the
United States to conduct a full withdrawal, I think it's important to
remember that Prime Minister Sudani is in very much of a bind. He was
elected with the help of a framework and a coalition that is primarily
affiliated to and aligned with Iran. And because of that, Iran also has a
major security influence through the Popular Mobilization Forces which
have received an increased budget as well as the ability to recruit more
members. They've also received a swathe of different (government)
contracts which is very important for them to expand their footprint. Of
course Sudani also enjoys the support of a number of other actors
operating in this political space. But he knows that the pressure that
has been mounted by the Iran-aligned actors is only going to increase
unless he tries to induce a military withdrawal from the United States.
That being said, Washington provides millions in security assistance as
well as humanitarian assistance. They are a major influence in Iraq's
security infrastructure as well as their governmental structure. And
Sudani doesn't necessarily want to lose that. So if the United States
were to conduct a withdrawal, he would have a much harder time,
scrambling to gain political approval and backing from a number of
different coalitions both within the Sunni community as well as the
Kurdish community who are key to averting the political crises and
paralysis within the Iraqi political landscape that we've seen in years
past. And so Sudani is in a very difficult spot. He doesn't quite want
the United States to leave but he does want to achieve some sort of
quick political win that keeps key blocs at bay. And because of this, we
might see a shift in the nature of the mission that might satisfy a
number of these different political coalitions but that might also
result in a partial withdrawal. But I don't necessarily see Iraq pushing
for a full-scale quick withdrawal unless these Shia militias are able
to wield even more influence.
And of course, if there was a withdrawal from either Syria, or
Iraq, Tehran would declare that as a big win, as I suppose ISIS would
too. So there's that at play. But let us assume that Biden does not pull
US forces out before November. And let us also assume that he wins the
election. Beyond backing Israel, do you see a coherent Middle East and
North Africa strategy emerging? Because honestly, Caroline, I'm finding
it hard to find one in his current term.
No, I don't think that the United States has a coherent Middle East
strategy. I think that from the Trump administration onward, it's been
put on autopilot in the sense that we scrambled together these
normalisation deals, we were trying to diversify our relationships
beyond the security sphere and ultimately work on disengaging from the
region. And I think that the past year has been a very important reality
check to the United States, as well as its partners looking to
disengage. And it demonstrates that you really cannot have your cake and
eat it too. You cannot wish to be an influential actor in the
diplomatic space and convene a ceasefire deal while also constantly
talking about how you wish to disengage from the region. The United
States needs to stay engaged in the Middle East; it needs to remain a
proactive and active actor in this space, regardless of how its security
posture looks. I think that in the United States, we assumed that the
Palestinian issue was something of the past and that regional solidarity
with Palestinian communities was waning. I think the United States also
discarded any sort of crisis happening between Israel and Palestinian
actors, as well as (underestimating) regional support for Palestine. And
I think that's why we've seen such a prolonged, really catastrophic
offensive happen in Gaza. And of course, this resulting humanitarian
disaster as well.
Let me put another assumption to you. Donald Trump wins. A quick
pull out of US forces in Iraq and Syria, a veering towards a position of
grand isolationism? What would a Trump administration mean for the
Middle East and North Africa?
So a great question. And this is something I've been trying to
grapple with. I think that there are actually two possibilities with the
Trump administration. You could see full scale isolationism, which of
course resulted in the strategies that we saw in Syria in 2018 and Iraq
in 2020, that is really scaling down the United States forward posture.
However we also would have an administration that - at least judging by
the last Trump administration - is extremely aligned when it comes to
Israel and I think we could potentially see the United States really
commit itself with this Gaza offensive and double or even triple our
arms sales to Israel. And additionally, you could also see a potential
strategy that commits US troops and more personnel and not only in the
Mediterranean and Red Seas, but potentially on the ground. This is
especially, I think, also contingent on how many Iran hawks are
positioned in a Trump administration. With the last Trump
administration, we saw a lot of Iran hawks. And if that is the case, and
if we do see continued Iran-Israeli escalation and shared strikes that
could be a possibility worth exploring. So with a Trump administration,
we need to consider that we could have two very opposite sides of the
spectrum when it comes to a policy in the Middle East.
In a recent BBC interview, John Bolton when he was asked the same
question said, ‘I don't know. All I know is that whatever Trump does
one day to the next is based on only one thing, which is what is best
for Donald Trump. He doesn't have a foreign policy agenda, he doesn't
have a foreign policy. In his mind, he doesn't think that way.’ For the
Middle East and for the rest of us that is a scary scenario.
Yes it is. And it's worth remembering, too, that the Trump
administration really engaged with Israel and, of course, ushered in the
Abraham Accords. That's something that I think will be a centrepiece of
his administration trying to commit itself and commit increased US
support behind Israel. I think that is a no-brainer, no matter whether
they would militarily disengage or decide to bulk up US personnel in the
region.
And as you say, with the Abraham Accords, Trump did something
that no other president had done. He moved the needle, he shifted things
in a way that hadn't been shifted in decades. My goodness, we're living
in interesting times, aren't we, Caroline?
Very much so and it's very sad too. I think that there was a lot of
progress being made just under a year ago and now with this new reality,
we're seeing unprecedented escalation. And at the end of the day, it's
these communities on the ground that are suffering and experiencing the
implications. So it's a very sad reality. And it's been a very sad year
in the Middle East indeed.