Turkey’s Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East – Strategic Partnership with Iraq
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is on a roll, highlighting Turkey’s (Türkiye) standpoint and increasing initiative in regional affairs, at a crucial time for the region as the Gaza crisis starts escalating into a wider conflict. Turkey’s rising profile, ambitious agenda in regional affairs and its realignment towards the Middle East has been going on for sometime. Under Erdogan the country has been pursuing a foreign policy of ‘zero-problems with neighbours,’ and it is in that spirit that Erdogan arrived in Iraq on April 22, for his first official visit in thirteen years.
Turkey and Iraq might be neighbours but they haven’t always been friends that may now be changing. Erdogan’s highly anticipated visit, postponed from last year, certainly builds on recent gains in the bilateral relationship. His trip to Baghdad and Erbil in northern Iraq couldn’t come at a more volatile time, with Israel and Iran stepping back from the brink of war.
A strategic framework agreement was signed covering a wide range of issues from security to economic cooperation. It is the culmination of productive high level meetings between the two sides. Furthermore Erdogan’s first trip to Iraq since 2011 also marks the signing of a key preliminary agreement between Turkey, Iraq, the UAE and Qatar that could transform the region’s connectivity.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani and President Recep Erdogan addressed a joint press conference in Baghdad. It was announced that a quadrilateral memorandum of understanding between Iraq, Turkey, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates has been signed to establish the necessary frameworks for implementing the Strategic Development Road project. As per the memorandum the four signatory countries have committed to establish the necessary frameworks for implementing the project, and begin work on an overland route between Europe and Gulf Cooperation Countries. A US$17 billion road and rail project, the ‘Development Road’ stretching 1,200 kilometres (745 miles) across Iraq, aims to connect by 2030 the northern border with Turkey to the Gulf in the south. Work on the Development Road will be carried out in three phases, with deadlines set for 2028, 2033, and 2050. The Development Route also includes a rail network project linking Iraq’s southern Grand Faw Port with Turkey’s Port of Mersin, which was announced in April 2023.
Alongside the Development Road Project MoU, Iraq and Turkey signed a total of 26 MoUs focusing on collaboration in key areas such as water and energy security, transport and infrastructure, free trade and investment, science and medical research, defence and military training, security cooperation, youth and sports, agriculture, education, tourism, and culture, including archives and religious affairs.
Terrorism is a priority issue for both nations. Iraq used to criticise Turkey’s military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party(PKK), a Kurdish a violent terror organisation based in the mountainous Kurdish-majority regions of southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Since the late 1970s, the PKK has sought Kurdish autonomy in Turkey. After intensive Turkish diplomacy Iraq had formally recognised the PKK as a “terrorist” organisation, last March.
In their latest agreement Turkey and Iraq have signed a strategic security pact against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Gulen Movement. Further highlighting this at the press conference PM Sudani announced, “We will not let anyone launch attacks on the neighbouring countries from our territories, and we will not let anyone breach our sovereignty.”
It may be pointed out that the security agreement was preliminary to any enhanced bilateral relations between Baghdad and Ankara. Both are aware that any development in terms of connectivity must ensure that the routes are secured from Kurdish violent extremism. Additionally it is in Baghdad’s interest to resume Iraqi oil exports, via the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline which was shut down for over a year over legal disputes and technical issues. About 450,000 barrels per day of crude once flowed through Iraq’s northern oil export route via Turkey, and its closure has led to the loss of roughly $11 billion to $12 billion for Iraq. Additionally, this oil export was previously independently handled by the autonomous Kurdistan region through the Turkish port of Ceyhan without the approval or oversight of the central administration in Baghdad. Iraq has been keen to resume its northern oil exports to Turkey bypassing the Kurdistan region’s oil pipeline.
During his Iraq visit Erdogan also met with Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani and Prime Minister Masrour Barzani in Erbil. The improvement of ties between Turkey and Iraq are contingent upon Baghdad-Erbil relations. The Kurdistan regional government in Iraq is allied with Turkey and it has trained Peshmerga since the 90s.
Both Erdogan and Sudani called for an end to Israel’s indiscriminate war on Gaza and also called for de-escalation in the Middle East region. Days before his trip to Iraq, in a significant diplomatic move, Erdogan held a meeting with Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Istanbul. According to reports, the meeting lasted for over two and a half hours, indicating the importance of the discussions. During the meeting, Haniyeh was accompanied by key members of Hamas, who were received at the historic Dolmabahce Palace, which symbolises the significance of the encounter. The details of the discussions remain undisclosed, but the meeting highlights Turkey’s ongoing efforts to play a role in regional diplomacy.
As the war in Gaza unfolded Erdogan has accused Western nations of double-standards for allegedly speaking out against Iran over its drone attacks on Israel but not condemning Israel for targeting the Iranian consulate in the Syrian capital, Damascus, earlier.
Considered together these developments like realignment in its neighbourhood, its rejection of the Western position on Gaza, Erdogan government’s populism, mark a complex transformation in Turkish foreign policy.
Given the growing divergence between Ankara and Washington, Turkey has been less dependent on the Western community and more comfortable developing closer economic ties with its neighbours. Turkey’s major security concern is the PKK threat, which it now believes can be resolved better by working in coordination with its Arab neighbours than through the NATO alliance or with Tel Aviv.
Under Erdogan’s leadership Turkey clearly feels incentivised to pursue its strategic priorities through cooperation at the regional level, and by adjusting its security needs outside of the US led political agenda.