Rafah Is Not Gaza's Stalingrad. It's Another Manipulation by Netanyahu
In the summer of 2023 – which since October 7 seems like political eons ago – there was endless chatter, speculation, wishful thinking, misinformation, disinformation and real exploration regarding a so-called tripartite U.S.-Saudi-Israeli deal.
The geopolitical logic was there, the ideas were there, the upside seemed like a no-brainer. The political feasibility was never there, however, and given the constitutional coup that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was instigating in Israel, it is doubtful U.S. President Joe Biden was ever convinced such a deal was possible.
There were two elements that generated skepticism: the U.S.-Saudi component that would have included a NATO-like defense pact and a civilian nuclear reactor; and a Palestinian component that the United States, for some obscure and inexplicable reason, thought Israel was ready to entertain.
Relitigating the concept's viability, pros and cons on the basis of pre-October 7terms is now futile. Yet the underlying geopolitical logic of October 6, essentially reconfiguring the Middle East, became more urgent, and arguably imperative, in the wake of the October 7 terror attack and ensuing war.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman speaking in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, last July, as Joe Biden listens in.Credit: Saudi Royal Court/Reuters
Israel is not paying attention, though, nor is it willing or politically equipped to make strategic decisions. It's all tactical. Israel is consumed by justifiable rage, frustration and an impasse on three fronts: in Gaza against Hamas; in Lebanon versus Hezbollah; and, in the outer circle, against Iran.
For weeks, Israel has been half-threatening to launch a massive operation in Rafah, on Gaza's southern border with Egypt. "There are four Hamas battalions there and destroying them is the key to eliminating Hamas" is the official line. The Hamas military wing's center of gravity is in the south, Israel Defense Forces generals explained to their U.S. counterparts in October and November, failing to provide an adequate reason as to why, in that case, Israel was planning an invasion of northern rather than southern Gaza.
Since the war descended into pointless, goalless attrition, Israel has been raising the Rafah invasion as some imaginary tipping point that would end the war decisively. Yet Rafah is not Stalingrad, nor is it the Battle of the Bulge – certainly not from a strategic point of view while Israel is contemplating an offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
But are these Israel's real choices? Is there a strategic road map that would conceivably be a game-changer? Yes. It's called the Biden Plan, and however imperfect or lacking details it may be, it is the only game in town unless Israel willingly wants to sink in the Gazan and Lebanese quagmires.
"This is one of the most fateful choices Israel has ever had to make. And what I find both disturbing and depressing is that there is no major Israeli leader today in the ruling coalition, the opposition or the military who is consistently helping Israelis understand that choice – a global pariah or a Middle East partner – or explaining why it should choose the second," wrote Thomas Friedman in The New York Times on Friday.
Friedman is a seasoned and astute observer of Israeli politics, society and national security. He knows the answer, and that is why "disturbing and depressing" is warranted.
Palestinian children standing amid the debris of a house destroyed by an overnight Israeli airstrike in Rafah, southern Gaza, on Saturday.Credit: AFP
The gist of Friedman's compelling argument is this: Israel has a fateful choice to make – it's either Rafah or Riyadh, meaning an invasion of the southern town that would not only result in a humanitarian catastrophe and casualties in front of a watching, impatient and increasingly hostile world, but it is also doubtful it would "eliminate Hamas" or achieve "total victory" as Mr. Netanyahu disingenuously and ceremoniously declares every day or two. This would be done without a coherent, credible and implementable "postwar" plan to govern Gaza – something Israel has conspicuously refrained from proposing since October 7.
Conversely, Israel can choose to end the war, assist and partner in introducing an Arab peacekeeping force that would govern Gaza, begin a process of normalization with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, engage the Palestinian Authority (which supposedly will be revitalized, reformed and under close watch and mentoring) in a process that would ultimately, but not immediately, lead to a Palestinian state whose characteristics and contours would emerge from negotiations – and be a central part of a U.S.-led regional security alliance to counter Iran.
This is essentially the Biden Plan, which Friedman was the first to report and comment on as early as January 31.
He reiterates the structure of such a deal: an Arab peacekeeping force in Gaza, a U.S.-Saudi defense pact, and an integrated "security architecture" that would include Israel, the Americans, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and the PA.
This, Friedman writes, will effectively be the opposition to the Israeli government's non-policy, an opposition that doesn't really exist in contemporary Israeli politics. This is smart, but there is one major, monumental obstacle: Mr. Netanyahu.
The recent authorization of the $61 billion aid bill to Ukraine was far more important to President Biden than Rafah. His sentimental concern for Israel is genuine and deep, his commitment to Israel's security needs materially and politically abundantly evident, and the political price he is paying for supporting Israel real and burdening, as is the United States' isolation for supporting Israel. But Biden's long-term legacy is the Russia-Ukraine war, the reincarnation of NATO, and the expansion and management of his Indo-Pacific alliance.
Pro-Palestinian demonstrators protesting during a visit by Joe Biden to Warren, Mich., in February. The U.S. president is paying a political price for his support of Israel.Credit: Paul Sancya/AP
With or without a second term, his foreign policy heritage will be assessed in Kyiv and the South China Sea, not Rafah. Yet October 7 became a turning point for America's Mideast policy. Rather than continue the disengagement trajectory, it was pulled back, not because of Gaza but because of the prospects and potential for regional escalation – tested two weeks ago when Iran launched missiles and drones at Israel.
Out of the horrors of October 7, an opportunity arose to reimagine the region's security architecture in a way that perhaps wasn't feasible during the summer of 2023. In order to do that, the United States needs a credible, willing and reliable Israeli partner. Benjamin Netanyahu is not that partner and it is time the Americans realize and internalize this.
Is such a plan good for Israel's national security? Absolutely, without a doubt. Can it be accomplished with Netanyahu? No. Will he deceive and manipulate the Americans into thinking he is on board because "he has no alternative and we reined him in"? Of course. Will he simultaneously assure his coalition that they shouldn't worry because he'll torpedo the plan when it matters? That's a certainty.
Will the United States finally figure this out?