New schools and improved learning have brought hope to the poorest
children in Iraq, but the World Bank says more and better investments in
the education sector are needed [photo credit @ICRC]
In a recent analysis for Foreign Affairs, you critique the way
the US is managing its efforts to contain the so-called Axis of
Resistance. I want to ask you what Washington has got wrong. But before I
do, can you just remind us what the Axis of Resistance is.
The Axis of Resistance is a network of armed groups across Iran,
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, groups that see themselves as resisting
or fighting against Israel and American imperialism/colonialism in the
Middle East. So groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq and in Syria, as well as the Huthis in
Yemen. These groups have strong and close ties with Iran and they very
much see themselves as part of the frontline resistance against Israel,
against the US but also in the recent context, especially in support of
the Palestinian cause in the region.
Thank you for that. So what has America got wrong, then?
Well, you know, these groups have existed for quite some time, they
have penetrated and become quite influential in the governments of these
countries, in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen. On the ground, very much in
different ways, they are almost becoming state actors and that is to say
that they have become quite powerful. At the same time, the US,
especially in recent memory, has pursued certain policies that
Washington has hoped would diminish the power of these groups. So
Washington has sanctioned many of their banks and businesses. Washington
has killed many of their leaders, including, for example, the killing
in January 2020 of Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards
Corps Commander who was almost the Godfather for this axis, but also in
the same strike killing Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the leader of the PMF,
the Iraqi group within the axis. So the US has killed leaders, they've
sanctioned banks, they've also tried to create parallel forces in these
countries that could do the work that these groups are doing. But none
of these policies have been working. You know, it's over four years
since that monumental US decision to kill Soleimani and al-Muhandis and
these groups are still there and probably more powerful than they were.
So when I wrote this article for Foreign Affairs, the question I was
trying to tackle was: why is the US just fundamentally unable to really
address these issues? And the answer to that was because there is a
structural problem. And the US just doesn't have the tools to have a
coherent strategy across many of these countries to really move towards
something more accountable in the future for the region.
You end the article by calling for the US and its allies to
support civil society movements. But if we look at Iraq, for example,
the militias - as you pointed out in the article - are so deeply
embedded and entangled in the political and economic structures that
with the best will in the world, how can outside players have any
meaningful impact?
That's the question. So the first point of the article was okay, how
our current policies are not just not fit for purpose but actually
sometimes backfiring and creating an even worse outcome for Europeans
and others interested in building states coherent states. And then the
second point was when you look across these countries we think about the
idea of accountability, because at the end of the day, that is the
problem here. It's not that we have groups that don't look like states
in the way we want to or that have this sort of ideology or that sort of
ideology, the fundamental problem is that these groups have impunity
and they're not accountable, the institutions are not there to uphold
the rule of law. And so that has to be the focus. And really, in the
region, the only groups of actors that we've seen in different ways
trying to bring about accountability in a meaningful way have come from
civil society, have come from the region’s young who see another future
and who are trying in different ways every day still, to change the
course, the trajectory of their countries. And as we're thinking through
solutions, or potential alternatives, really one of the only ways that
we can see accountability emerging in these countries is through the
civil society movements there. And these movements have been repressed
quite violently in some of the countries. So it's not going to be easy
and this is not short term. You know, this won’t happen in a year or
two. But really, it's that demographic and that youth, that is where
we're seeing the biggest signs of genuine, meaningful accountability.
And then we come to 7 October which is complicated in an already
fiendishly complicated landscape. The last time we had you in was just a
few weeks before that attack. So what impact is the Gaza war having? Do
you anticipate that, for example, if Netanyahu proceeds with the Rafah
offensive - and there are all the signs that he will – might the Axis of
Resistance which of course, includes Iraqi PMF militias, kick into a
major offensive of its own?
The post-October 7 environment in the region is very different than
what was before. It is a monumental shift in the trajectory and Hamas’
attack and Israel's response and continued war on Gaza has had ripple
effects, obviously, across the region, first and foremost, of course,
the Palestinians who are being killed every day in Gaza and elsewhere,
but also, of course, in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan; so many countries have
become affected by it. The spillover has been quite significant. And you
have had the heating up of this conflict. On one side, you have the
Axis of Resistance trying to form the front line of the defence of the
Palestinians. And on the other side, you have Israel and its supporters,
the US government, the UK, and European governments defending Israel
and supporting Israel in its onslaught in Gaza. What this means is we've
seen an escalation. We've seen certain things that we haven't really
seen before: direct fire between Israel and Iran. We've seen Jordan for
example shoot down Iranian (drones) stopping them from reaching Israel.
So there's all sorts of dynamics in the Middle East that have escalated
since October 7.
On the question of what this means for the Axis of Resistance,
there's a tension; many of the groups within the axis are domestically
inclined. And what I mean by that is, yes, the Palestinian cause is
ideologically an important symbol. But in real terms, what they are
interested in is the day to day governing within their countries. So
Hezbollah is concerned, first and foremost, with how to maintain (its)
public authority in Lebanon; the PMF are interested, first and foremost,
in how to govern today in Iraq; likewise to some extent, as well, the
Huthis in Yemen. So the post- October 7 reality has meant that these
groups have to present themselves in this transnational way of fighting a
conflict that goes beyond their borders but still they don't want the
instability because instability can impact what they're doing
domestically. And that tension is very real. And that has led to an
almost reluctance to get into a direct war. Of course, none of them want
to get into a direct conflict with Israel. But nonetheless, they have
to be seen as responding when Israel attacks them. And they also have to
be seen as attacking the US and Israel to maintain the ideological
point that they are defending Palestinians. So it's a very delicate
balancing act. But what we've seen really, I think, is that the domestic
is still ,to most of the groups, far more important than the
transnational Palestinian cause or even the axis cause.
Let me just move away from Gaza, if I may and back to Iraq where the challenges
are obvious. The solutions, as you say, are difficult. But there are
solutions and yet Iraq’s governance structure, this corrupt system is
such that the solutions are not forthcoming. Is that a fair take? Or am I
just being another negative naysayer?
You've been watching, anyone who has been watching Iraq over the last
20 years would probably reach a similar conclusion, a country that has
been engulfed in cycles and cycles of conflict and corruption and
ultimately violence in so many different ways to its people; that seems
to be the trajectory. But I think there's something interesting going
on. I've just returned from Baghdad, and I was in Sulaymaniyah as well
as in other cities. And I think right now Iraq is going through a
moment. The oil price is high. In general terms internally, there isn't
an insurgency or the kind of terrorist attacks that have become so
common in the last 20 years. And you have a government that's just
pushing through with development. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia'
al-Sudani and his government are taking the money that's there and
investing in building bridges, building a metro, building all of these
ideas. And, so far, it seems like people are approving this, people are
saying, wait a minute, is this different? Can this government actually
take us on a different trajectory. Erdoğan, the Turkish president, was
in Baghdad just days ago and there were all of these agreements signed.
Sudani also went to DC a few weeks ago and reached agreements, as well
as (deals with) Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia. You have a lot of
development happening, almost a corridor being built, that could connect
the region in a very interesting way. And at the heart of that is Iraq
and so, we think and we question, is this the opportunity to divert Iraq
off of the trajectory which we've known for the last 20 years and onto
something different?
So I would say that we are in a moment here. But of course, to go
back to your point on the negative naysayer, many of the roots of the
conflict, whether it is the corruption or it is the fact that the Prime
Minister is unable to control the sovereignty of his country, the fact
that even a few days ago, a Dana (UAE company) gas field
was hit by drones killing workers, coming likely from Iran-allied
groups, the fact that the corruption is still rampant, the fact that
internal dynamics between the Kurds, the KDP, and the central
government, or between the Sunnis and the Speaker and the Baghdad
government, those tensions are still there. So fundamentally, this is a
country on autopilot because of a high oil price. But those roots of the
problems still remain. And so the question really is how can the
government escape that trajectory?
In last autumn’s Iraq Initiative Conference that you chaired at
Chatham House there was a mood of daring to believe that matters were
starting to move, possibly, in the right direction. I'm hearing that
again from you. And there was muted optimism that the government of
Prime Minister Sudani was on that optimistic road. So six months on how
is he doing because, my goodness, he's got huge obstacles in his way.
Yes he does. And he's taking the approach of someone who doesn't want
to get lost in the web of politics and instead just wants to keep his
head down and almost like a project manager start building, start
engaging with projects, building bridges, building infrastructure and
hope the politics can sort itself out. And that's very much his
approach. And as I say, because the price of oil has been high,
fundamentally, things are moving in a direction that I think he is happy
with and the government is moving in that direction. But, you know,
we're not seeing much change. So even though the price of oil is high,
there isn't thinking about economic diversification; the government is
still primarily giving out public sector jobs each year and that is a
massive challenge moving forward. We're not seeing genuine anti-
corruption drives, we're seeing anti-corruption, certainly in a
politicised way. But we're not seeing as much of a cleaning up as we
would have hoped for from an accountable state. And there are many other
trends that I think, if you dig deeper into, you'd begin to see that it
very much still is a government gambling that the price of oil will
stay high for the next few years, which would allow it to try and buy
its way out.
You are just back from Baghdad and you picked up on this mood of optimism. You can build on people's optimism can’t you?
That's right. Even if right now, things aren't great, people are
seeing that there is hope, that there is something in the future,
whether it's a new bridge or it's a new metro system. There are signs
that make people think, is this different to the past, to the corrupt
leaders that we've had? And so there is certainly a sense of optimism.
It kind of reminds me of 2008/ 9/10, when again, at that time, it was
post-civil war, the price of oil was high. Nouri al-Maliki was prime
minister and was celebrated in a way, really supported by the US and
others, but also domestically and there was a window. So the point here
is that you do have these windows that emerge in this history of Iraq
which since 2003 is not linear but it's cyclical. And in our
conversations, and for anyone who is working with the Prime Minister and
the government right now, I think the question is how do we divert
course and ensure that any progress we make right now, any optimism we
have right now, how can we channel that into positive change that
address the roots of conflict?
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