[Salon] Sudan and a catastrophic war



Sudan and a catastrophic war

Summary: the Sudanese analyst Kholood Khair offers a way forward that could help to end a war the world continues to ignore but that has inflicted a catastrophe on the people of Sudan.

Today’s newsletter is a transcript edited for length and clarity of our 8 May podcast with Kholood Khair. Kholood is a Sudanese political analyst, broadcaster and activist and the founding director of the think and do tank, Conference Advisory. You can find the podcast here.


The Sudanese armed forces conducting an airdrop of military equipment in North Darfur state, April 2024 [photo credit: @Sudan_tweet]

When we last talked to you in early January you described the humanitarian catastrophe then unfolding as the worst in the world. Tens of thousands killed, 9 million displaced 25 million in need of urgent humanitarian aid. What is the situation today?

I think it's fair to say it's gotten much worse in a very short space of time. The famine that we've been warning about for months now has definitely come upon us. There has been a reticence from international organisations particularly the UN to announce a famine. We're hearing heart-breaking stories from IDP camps in Darfur, in the streets of the capital Khartoum and in different parts of the country that people are facing acute hunger and malnutrition, children in particular. The numbers that you have described have only increased. Over 80% of health services are still very much non-functioning, And we haven't got solid numbers the numbers of people dead but estimates reach around 100,000, if not more. This war is becoming far more entrenched and the consequences of it are becoming graver and graver.

Why is the UN hesitant to use the word famine?

Saying the word famine carries responsibilities. According to UN Security Council resolution 2417, the world has a responsibility to act, once food insecurity of this type, once famine of this sort, has been identified. And the UN frankly is uninterested in meeting that responsibility, as are many international actors, bilateral actors, etc. We were hearing in February that the UN was very close to announcing a famine in Sudan and in Gaza concurrently. And neither of those has happened. And the fact is that in the current climate speaking about one conflict invariably leads to conversations about another conflict. And the reason we haven't seen the declaration of famine in Sudan is possibly linked to the fact that the international community does not want to do that for Gaza. Similarly, we're seeing an unwillingness to call the genocide in Sudan a genocide because that would also draw attention to the genocide in Gaza. And so we're seeing this relational aspect of two distinct conflicts. The world has, I think, recognised that the humanitarian legal structures that we once relied on are actually not robust enough to survive the sort of doublespeak we're seeing currently play out in conflicts across the world with the exception of course of Ukraine.

The prism through which this war is explained is, oftentimes, binary. It's a war between two generals, Hemedti, and his Rapid Support Forces and al- Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces. But that ignores outside influences. So let's look at those influences beginning with Hemedti and his backers. Who are they? And who among them are the most influential?

I think the issue about the two generals narrative was something that journalists hung on to very easily at the start of the war because they had very little foundational knowledge of Sudan. And my issue with that framing isn't necessarily that it's wrong. It's just incomplete. Yes, at the centre of this are two generals who were brothers in arms for a very long time and who have since turned against each other in a very Cain and Abel-like story. They were armed actors, both parts of the security state that fought hand in glove against the people of Darfur in the genocide 20 years ago. But since then, they have created and cultivated international relations and engagements that have allowed them to be in a position to wage this current war.

For the RSF the strongest benefactor has been the United Arab Emirates, for several reasons. The RSF has framed itself as anti-regime and therefore anti-Islamist and that chimes in well with the UAE foreign policy in the region. Most importantly, though, I think their relationship is underwritten by gold and the extent to which the United Arab Emirates, the world's largest gold market, is able to tap into smuggled gold from the regions the RSF controls. But it also goes beyond Sudan for the UAE as the RSF opens up an opportunity to the rest of Africa. We think about the RSF as a transnational criminal franchise much more than it is a military force. The UAE, in the RSF, has a guard that can open and pave the way to other African countries, particularly in the Sahel and particularly in West Africa, which it has done. If you look at the way that the United Arab Emirates is engaging in investments across the continent, it is very much working in the regions where non-state actors like the RSF also have influence, where there is a lot of challenges to the state and where the UAE has oftentimes not picked the side of the states but is very much more comfortable working with non-state actors.

What about al-Burhan the general who runs the SAF, the Sudanese Armed Forces. Who's backing him?

The SAF, headed by al-Burhan, is much less about the personality at the top and much more about the institution. The SAF is really the only remaining institution in the country and that is of course by design. And the SAF has attracted the kind of supporters that are very much in favour of backing state institutions. So for example, you have the Egyptians who have been steadfast supporters of SAF, the institution. Similarly, the Saudis have claimed a preference for the SAF mostly because they also favour working with the institution. And you have other entities in the region, the Algerians, the Qataris, the Turks, who yes may have some sympathy towards the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic ideological connections that the Sudanese Armed Forces has. But mostly it's the favouring of the central institution. And that can be seen as a much more profitable, much more robust guarantor of their foreign policy.

Currently, the biggest prize in Sudan today is the Red Sea coastline. And so the Sudanese Armed Forces, which controls the coastline is able to get a lot of support, particularly from Iran. And, to some degree, from the Saudis who are only across the water from Sudan's coastline. And historically the SAF has support from the Russians. And because the war of attrition that has been waged since the beginning seems to be becoming more and more entrenched, I think different actors, both within the region and further afield are seeing that there is this increasingly Libya-style scenario where the Sudanese Armed Forces will be in charge of the Red Sea coastline, while the RSF will be much more in control of the western part of the country closer to the Sahel. This means depending on what your foreign policy interest in the North East Africa region is, whether it's linked to the Red Sea or to the Sahel is how you will choose your preferred Sudanese security guarantor.

What's interesting, I think, is three countries in particular have been able to cultivate relationships with both SAF and the RSF and have historically done so in order to be able to have access to both of those things. The Russians have mastered this. The Kremlin has remained very close to Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces while the Wagner group has been very close to the RSF and has secured their interests in the Sahelian region.

And the other two countries? 

Israel is a notable one; we have seen how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been very close to Burhan and Burhan of course, met with Netanyahu initially to start the normalisation process a few years ago. And at the same time, we see Mossad has historically been closer to the RSF. And there were some conversations around the degree to which there would be security engagement and exchange between the two.

And until very recently, the United Arab Emirates was very good at doing this. The UAE is not a monolith. You have several members of the greater royal family as well as, of course, the different monarchies of the different emirates within the UAE. And either they had been closer to Burhan or to Hemedti which allowed the UAE as a country to be able to engage with both of them. Now, because gold is Sudan’s biggest export and the UAE is effectively the world's biggest gold market both SAF and the RSF had been doing business with the UAE on gold. What we're seeing now is the UAE’s inability to maintain ties to both the SAF and the RSF. It's dogged support of the RSF and the way that it has helped the RSF to humiliate the Sudanese Armed Forces on the battlefield has meant that Burhan and the SAF have pulled away from relying so much on the UAE economically speaking. Just in the past week we have seen that the Sudanese Armed Forces have opened up a channel with the Qataris who are not on very good terms diplomatically and politically speaking with the UAE and they've opened up that pathway to help them process their gold, very much the service that the UAE was doing.

When you were here last time you spoke about the role civilians in the midst of this war are playing: civilian resistance committees, emergency response rooms. Talk about those civilians, the ordinary Sudanese who are showing extraordinary courage and resilience in the face of this horrific conflict.

Absolutely, I think the resistance committees, in particular, the emergency response rooms are by far the greatest hope we have in the country. You know we have a very young population in Sudan and a population that remembers the December Revolution of 2018-2019. And it's a population that despite everything they've been going through in this war has demonstrated huge resilience. Part of that is that there has been a reliance, not on formal political structures, not on two belligerent sides, but a reliance on community cohesion. That is critical, not just for the delivery of aid but for the peaceful coexistence that needs to be at the forefront right now to help heal this very acute trauma of an unprecedented nature. It’s bone deep at this point. And people are finding it very difficult to overcome that. Many of the stories we're hearing now are of people dying within a community space or dying in proximity to armed actors related to, for example, somebody being considered to be from an ethnic group loyal to another group. And that's (what) suspicion breeds, a sort of a Rwanda-style scenario that I hope we very much avoid. But increasingly, the characteristics are there that tell us perhaps that is a way that we're going and the biggest defence we have against that is the sense of community woven by these volunteer groups. It is not by politicians, it is not by the belligerent parties trying to exonerate themselves from their atrocities, it is absolutely by these volunteer groups. And for that reason, they are being targeted by both sides in very different ways. They're either being put in prison or being killed. But what I think is very encouraging is that those of them who have left the country still continue to organise and still continue to support and try to send financial help or help of another nature from outside of the country and that gives me the greatest hope.

Can you provide a snapshot of the resistance committees, how they came about and what they do?

So let's go back a little to when the revolution started in 2018-2019, there were a series of neighbourhood resistance committees, which function at the community level, at the neighbourhood level, going door to door spreading the word about protests, about the need to end the military regime of Omar al-Bashir which by that point had lasted 29 years. And they were able to get a lot of support from within the neighbourhoods but they were also able to work within networks across the entire country. The neighbourhood resistance committees were absolutely the backbone of the revolution. And after the coup in 2021, they were really the backbone of the resistance as well. And when the war started last year in April, they immediately - having already had those structures in place - set up neighbourhood emergency response rooms which basically had groups of volunteers focused on a key area be that nutrition or protection or evacuating people or setting up shelters within schools or soup kitchens for the community. And really, they're the only ones right now delivering aid to any great degree. It's not your usual international NGOs, who have largely left, particularly urban areas like Khartoum, it is absolutely these emergency response rooms and they pull together their resources much of which comes from the diaspora.

 What are the steps that need to be taken right now to move towards ending this brutal war in Sudan?

Well, I think it is complex in that it's multi-layered and the actors are so many. I wouldn't say we're exactly at proxy levels right now but I would say that increasingly the war in Sudan is behaving as a proxy conflict. However at the heart of it we have to also look at the domestic elements. Can these different belligerent groups - and there are not two anymore - can they get to a place where they reach some level of consensus that the war must end? And once they do, can the international actors that support them also get to that place? And potentially can those international actors be more persuadable and get to that place before them and help to convince them to put down their weapons. So the first step for me has to be building consensus. If there is no diplomatic effort being put to building the consensus that the war must end we won't get into a position where the war has any chance of doing so. Of course, we won't get everybody, this whole mosaic of different actors, to agree. But I think a critical mass on both sides should be enough to at least get the conversation started. Once you have this consensus, the next step would be to build an incentive structure and a disincentive structure and leverage to be able to make this consensus into something more tangible, into the beginnings of an agreement that discusses what do you do with the main triggers of this war, issues of impunity and transitional justice, issues of what happens with the money and who has access to it? And who has control over the state finances and other natural resources? And what happens with the troops? Should they be integrated or not? These are the real questions that unless they are dealt with, there will be no end to this war. And in order to be able to have sufficient answers to those questions, there needs to be much more attention put to what will the different sides agree to, what will communities agree to victims.

That's going to take a lot of work to figure out what all these moving parts want. Where we are with the leverage being put into position, how long for some of these processes to take place? What exactly constitutes transitional justice? Is it Burhan and Hemedti being sent to the ICC? Or is it much more of a collection of different transitional justice instruments such as truth and reconciliation commissions, etc. Once that is all figured out, and that will take some time, then you can formalise them into a mediation platform. And really work out the kinks and make sure that the different constituency groups are represented and ensure that the international community, those that support the war but also those who support the peace, are able to get on board. Now, for those three things to happen you need to have a strategy on Sudan, which no country, or no institution, including the African Union, IGAD (East Africa Intergovernmental Authority) or the UN has.

You need to have sufficient diplomatic weight being brought to bear and we haven't really seen that, we've seen very little diplomacy, not just in Sudan but in the entire Horn of Africa region. We have to ensure that there are enough resources being put into this. We have several envoys on the file right now who don't have a team, who don't have staff, who don't have resources to be able to fly around, etc. So it takes a lot of investment, it takes a lot of intentionality to get those three steps in order and we don't have them. You know, what we've seen right now is at least five different mediation platforms. We've all gone straight to step three, straight to the mediation phase, without having locked out a. the consensus and b. the leverage incentive structures. And that is a reason that every single one of them has failed.

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