Don’t Panic US: China’s Nuclear Power Ascendancy Has Its Limits
May 16, 2024 By Matthew WillisLike bamboo sprouts after the rain, nuclear reactors are going up quickly across China. There are 36 reactors under development, and Beijing can approve as many as 10 new ones a year. Within a decade, China will likely pass the United States—which has 93 operating commercial nuclear reactors at 54 power plants—as the world’s biggest generator of nuclear power.
Nuclear projects in China require significantly lower capital investment and seldom experience timeline overruns — two critical strengths making them successful compared to often delayed and costly US projects. American policymakers are concerned China’s increasing dominance could lead to large-scale reactor exports that create dependencies and undermine US relationships abroad.
After 15 years with billions of dollars in delays and cost overruns, two new nuclear reactors at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant in Georgia were connected to the grid in 2023 and 2024.
However, US policymakers should not panic and reactively bolster support for the domestic nuclear industry. Nuclear power in China is not as indomitable as it might seem. The contribution of nuclear to power generation in China will be dwarfed by the massive deployment of renewables and slowed by inland construction barriers and safety uncertainties. These domestic conditions paired with international obstacles are slowing Chinese companies constructing dozens of nuclear reactors abroad.
China’s Drive to Invest in Nuclear Power
China’s leadership has supported nuclear because it supplies strong baseload power that balances intermittent renewables, offering an attractive low-carbon alternative to coal. Thus, nuclear power helps ensure energy security and fulfills the government’s ambitious carbon neutrality pledges.
Additionally, they have strategic interest in nuclear to showcase global energy leadership. China’s nuclear sector features highly integrated supply chains, specialized labor, and advanced manufacturing capabilities, exemplified by its commercialized Hualong One reactor. By positioning itself at the forefront of the industry domestically and building reactors overseas, China signals it is an international player in this space.
However, several challenges could undercut China achieving its target for nuclear to constitute 10% of its electricity mix by 2035.
Wind and Solar Throwing Shade on Nuclear Power
Solar and wind power are scaling massively in China, with a recent projection estimating renewable installations will nearly triple current 2030 targets. Technological advancements have helped lower costs, making both sources easier to deploy than nuclear. The buildout of nuclear has paled in comparison.
Grid and power market issues complicate the picture for wind and solar. “China is struggling to enhance its grid to accommodate more renewables, whose integration can significantly increase the needed provision of ancillary services for efficient power transmission and distribution,” explained Cory Combs of Trivium China in an interview. This helps explain how nuclear can contribute to China’s net-zero transition; off-grid reactors could power an industrial park or district heating without needing as much integration as renewables.
However, nuclear will contend with improved grid integration and dispatching of renewable energy. China invests more in power transmission than the rest of the world combined. Energy storage capacity almost quadrupled in 2023. Entrenched fossil fuel interests remain, but Beijing has increasingly prioritized reforms to support renewables and establishing a unified national grid. As these grid upgrades and reforms progress, nuclear will see its comparative advantages diminish and remain a low contributor to the power mix.
Inland Construction Barriers and Safety Shortfalls
China imposed a moratorium on inland nuclear construction following the 2011 Fukushima accident, which impedes nuclear from hitting the 10% of power generation goal.
While surveys show nuclear has public support, Chinese citizens have more negative views towards building reactors inland. “Considering current social and economic pressures, the Chinese government probably deems it too risky to lift the inland nuclear moratorium and agitate the public further,” commented Philip Andrews-Speed of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies in an interview.
China’s leaders are also wary of how inland construction could impact water resources. Current nuclear reactors consume billions of gallons of water annually. This makes them difficult to site in provinces like Sichuan and Yunnan, where waterways already fuel hydropower, supply thirsty industries, and are increasingly under threat due to climate-change induced droughts.
All Chinese nuclear reactors are built along the coast with 21 in the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas. Across both deltas, six reactors are under construction and plans exist for ten more. These developments are intensifying water competition in the Pearl and Yangtze deltas.
Non-water-dependent reactors are largely experimental and small-scale, leaving nuclear relegated to coastal areas and limited in scope. As more non-water-dependent reactors commercialize, inland construction could become more feasible, but competition with renewables and public opinion would still be challenges.
Potential nuclear accidents pose another threat to inland plans. As of 2020, the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) had only 1,100 employees, only a third of the workforce employed by the US nuclear regulator. NNSA did not meet the State Council Research Office’s recommendation of quadrupling its workforce by 2020. A strained workforce in a fast-growing sector increases risk of a serious accident which could damage public confidence and political support for nuclear.
Boundaries of China’s Nuclear Exports
As renewable integration improves and nuclear faces various domestic obstacles, China’s industry could seek to export more reactors abroad — mirroring strategies other countries employed during periods of domestic nuclear power stagnation.
Nonetheless, nuclear projects have encountered hurdles in developing countries where substantial financial support, technical oversight, and design adaptations to local conditions are often required. Moreover, China has rarely mobilized its vast financial resources to support nuclear abroad.
Even ignoring prospective stagnation at home and the unlikeliness of that leading to major exports, China’s nuclear sector will be preoccupied with domestic commitments for some time.
These constraints, paired with the Belt and Road Initiative’s focus on other energy projects and the failure of past bilateral nuclear agreements, make it unlikely China will build 30 or more reactors overseas by 2030. Beijing will finance only so many projects abroad, especially with current high debt levels and other economic headwinds.
Competition with China Should Not Drive US Nuclear Power Policy
American policymakers should resist the drumbeat of some advocates pushing a boost of the US nuclear industry to “keep up” with China’s nuclear construction. China’s domestic nuclear constraints and lack of overseas expansion means increased US nuclear support for competitive reasons is not warranted.
The NuScale advanced nuclear project was meant to be built on land at Idaho National Laboratory, but construction never began. Despite receiving $1.4 billion in government cost-sharing pledges, the project was terminated because cost overruns and delays led utility companies to renege on buying 200 MW from the six prospective small modular reactors.
Nuclear is a minor player in reducing carbon emissions, and research and development of advanced reactors merits some government support for now. But heightening nuclear power will not help the United States achieve current net-zero targets given how unproven newer nuclear technologies are. Instead, the United States must enhance grid infrastructure and storage systems—areas with longstanding shortfalls—and build on recent policy to further reduce bureaucratic hurdles for proven renewable technologies.
A sustainable approach to achieving net-zero should carefully balance costs, carbon, and time. More support on top of what is already provided for nuclear neglects two critical aspects of this equation – cost and time – vital for an effective energy policy as we race to rein in greenhouse gas emissions.
This blog is part of the Wilson Center East-West Center Vulnerable Deltas project that is diving into climate, plastic waste, and development threats in three Southeast Asian and two Chinese deltas. The project is also taking deep dives into China’s overseas investments more broadly. The project is supported by the Luce Foundation.
Matthew Willis is a spring 2024 research intern at the China Environment Forum. His research interests include energy policy, political economy, and US-China relations. He is an undergraduate student at the University of Texas at Austin majoring in International Relations, Government, Japanese, and East Asian Studies.
Sources: American University, Associated Press, Bloomberg, Brookings, CarbonBrief, Center for Strategic and International Studies, China Atomic Energy Authority, China Water Risk, CNBC, DNV, E&E News, Energy Information Administration, Energy Monitor, Foreign Affairs, Green Finance & Development Center, Greening the Grid, House Financial Services Committee, Idaho National Laboratory, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, Institute For Energy Research, International Atomic Energy Agency, JD Supra, Journal of World Energy Law & Business, MDPI, Medium, National Nuclear Safety Administration, Nikkei Asia, Nuclear Energy Institute, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Reuters, Renew Economy, ScienceDirect, Senate Committee on Energy & Natural Resources, Sixth Tone, Smart Water Magazine, The Diplomat, The Economist, The Energy Mix, The New York Times, The South China Morning Post, The White House, University of Colorado Boulder, US Department of Energy, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Utility Dive, World Nuclear Association, World Nuclear News, World Resources Institute, Wood Mackenzie.
Header Photo Credit: Nuclear reactor in Lianyungang, China. Courtesy of Craig Hanson/shutterstock.com
Second Photo Credit: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant in 2013. Courtesy of Denton Rumsey/shutterstock.com
Third Photo Credit: Zhejiang Haiyan Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant. Courtesy of dajingjing/shutterstock.com
Fourth Photo Credit: Idaho National Laboratory sign. Courtesy of Michael Vi/shutterstock.com
