[Salon] Why are the Palestinians not being asked who they want to govern in Gaza?

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240516-why-are-the-palestinians-not-being-asked-who-they-want-to-govern-in-gaza/

Why are the Palestinians not being asked who they want to govern in Gaza?

Middle East Monitor 5/16/24

When the Israeli war against the Palestinians in Gaza ends, as it no doubt will, questions will be asked about who will reconstruct the devastated territory, who will govern it, and how. At the moment there are no answers, not least because Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has no idea about “the day after” and is in a state of denial that prevents him from imagining that day, which inevitably means the humiliating end of his political life.

The problem with “the day after” is that all of the options are difficult, and perhaps impossible to achieve. The idea of Hamas returning to govern as it did before 7 October is rejected by its opponents. The Palestinian Authority in Ramallah is paralysed and probably unable to manage the Gaza Strip as well as govern its Oslo-allocated territory in the occupied West Bank, as some international parties want it to. The tribal rule that Israel favours is a failure in advance, and simply reproduces other experiments that were stillborn.

One of the ideas proposed is the deployment of international forces to handle security in the Strip, with the participation of an Arab force. At first, the Arab countries rejected this option, especially the countries that were hinted at possibly participating in the supposed international forces. UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed denounced Netanyahu’s talk about Abu Dhabi’s possible participation in managing the Strip. We have learned in this region that if an Arab official denies news or information, we know that it is true or on the way to becoming so. Last Monday, the Financial Times mentioned Arab flexibility that did not exist before and quoted Arab diplomats talking about the willingness of some regional capitals to participate in potential international forces. The newspaper said that this proposal is one of a set of ideas recently submitted to the Biden administration in Washington.

The diplomats who spoke to the newspaper did not mention specific countries, but it is easy to imagine that they would not be outside the circle of Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco.

Theoretically, and far from the complexities of the Palestinian situation and Gaza, the proposal seems ideal, as there is nothing better than a homogeneous Arab force for a mission like this on Arab land. However, on the ground, the proposal would be a perfect recipe for disaster, and another major regional failure.

It is not unfair to the Arab armies for one to say that they are fit for anything apart from war or imposing peace.

These armies were humiliated during their wars with Israel. They have also demonstrated their serious failure in other field situations, such as the war to liberate Kuwait, where Egypt, for example, deployed two armoured divisions, but the US marginalised them quickly when they were unable to deal with limited resistance from the Iraqi army. The Saudi army has been immersed in the Yemeni quagmire since 2015, despite continuous US support. There is nothing to suggest that there has been a change for the better, despite the exorbitant sums that the Arab states have spent on arms and joint military exercises.

The problem was never financial, though. Estimates by the Economist magazine indicate that spending by the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, along with Egypt and Jordan, on armaments and military services last year amounted to $120 billion, which is a third of what the 30 NATO countries combined spent in the same year. Despite all of this obscene expenditure, when they are faced with a serious military or strategic test, Arab governments rush to seek help from the US and UK.

The essence of the problem lies in the fact that Arab military spending often goes to buy loyalty in Western capitals and winning the favour of influential groups and lobbies there. This is why purchases often include equipment and weapons that are not needed or are outdated because the will of the political decision-maker overrides the experience and opinion of the military commander; the politician agrees to deals without referring back to the military commander or even informing him. This imbalance will extend to Gaza, with the opinion of the politician sitting in a luxurious palace overriding the opinion of the military man who faces the security, political and psychological complexities in the field.

Before any talk about practical and technical details, it must be said that the biggest obstacle to implementing the idea is moral; the moral shame that accompanies it. In practice, talking about peacekeeping forces requires the presence of two warring parties, but what is expected is that Israel will not be present in Gaza after the current war, so what conflict can be feared when the Israeli threat no longer exists? Is it intended to maintain public security and order? This means that the decision-makers fear the presence of irregular entities disturbing public security. Do they mean Hamas, or even Daesh? Is there fear of social unrest for the sake of bread, dignity and freedom of movement? In this case, will the proposed force confront the Palestinians in Gaza if they protest against their living conditions? That would be more than tragic as the Arab “peacekeepers” will then simply be replicating the oppression of the Israeli occupation forces.

When it comes to maintaining public order, what Arab army (or even police force) possesses the experience and skill to do this effectively and without bloodshed?

Another obstacle is that Israel has not shown any interest in the issue of international forces from the Arab world. As leaks in its local media suggest, the occupation state prefers that some tribal leaders from the south will assume the administration of civil affairs in Gaza.

The biggest obstacle is that the Arabs, due to their complex circumstances, deep-rooted differences, and fragility, are not qualified to be a leading force that imposes its opinions and decisions. Not to mention the fact that the Arab armies do not have any experience in keeping peace in the way the UN has. As such, it is most likely that the Arab force will have a bit-part role within a larger international force, as it was in the Gulf War and elsewhere.

No matter how we look at it, the result is the same: we are facing a colonial project for Gaza that relieves Israel of its daily headache. It is a trap that the US has set for the Arabs after the trap of financing the reconstruction of the Israeli-devastated territory. If the idea comes to light, Israel will be satisfied with the luxury of controlling the air, while the US assumes control of the sea, via the floating port that is being built. Meanwhile, others, including the Arabs, will bear the consequences of the daily confrontation with the people of Gaza, who will not forget that this force is the fruit of a cruel American deal.

Arab armies are usually made up of ordinary members of society in whose hearts the Palestinian cause and suffering resides. This makes it difficult for an Arab soldier to accept finding himself in a confrontation with the people of Gaza.

The least we owe the Palestinians in Gaza, after the horrors they continue to experience, is the right to choose who will govern them. Why is that option not even being considered?

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.