The New Rules of Geopolitics in Africa
Washington should foster coalitions that can offer a better value proposition than competing revisionist powers.
By J. Peter Pham - May 19, 2024
Published in coordination with the 2024 Global Security Forum, of which Defense One is a media partner.
The
forced closing of two U.S. military bases in Niger and the hasty
withdrawal of a much smaller group of special operations forces
personnel from neighboring Chad are notable setbacks for the
counterterrorism effort in the Sahel and for broader U.S. interests in
the region. But even more significant is what these developments portend
for the “new rules of the game” of geopolitics in Africa: amid emerging
realities, America and her allies must adjust their approach.
At
stake is the course of increasingly deadly conflicts and violence
running across the African continent from the West African states on its
Atlantic coastline to Sudan and Somalia on the Red Sea and Indian
Ocean. As the 2024 Global Terrorism Index Report underscored, the
epicenter of terrorism has shifted from the Middle East and North Africa
to Sub-Saharan Africa, concentrated in the Sahel region, which now
accounts for almost half of global deaths from terrorism. But beyond
this immediate security concern there is also the reality of an Africa
that is not just economically vibrant—it is home to nine of the 20
countries that the International Monetary Fund expects to experience the
fastest growth rates in 2024—but, thanks to its abundance of metals and
other critical minerals, is indispensable for the energy transition and
new technologies. To cite just one example, cobalt is the key
ingredient for the manufacture of electrodes for rechargeable batteries.
Slightly more than half of the 11 million metric tons of total global
reserves of cobalt are found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
which accounts for nearly 75 percent of overall production of the metal,
according to the most recent data from the U.S. Geological Survey.
If
Africa is more important than ever to the strategic interests of the
United States and its international partners, then they must adapt their
approach to the continent and its nations to make themselves more
relevant to the priorities of Africans.
First, African countries
nowadays have multiple options to choose from and their leaders know it.
This might seem trite, but as the recent spectacular failure of a
high-level U.S. delegation to Niger whose head was publicly accused by
the country’s authorities of having a “condescending attitude” toward
her hosts indicates otherwise. When countries like Niger and Chad, which
tied for fourth from the bottom on the most recent Human Development
Index, can tell the United States to go, can there be any doubt that the
dynamic has shifted and that lectures from Washington (or Paris or
London or Brussels) are not only ineffectual, but downright
counterproductive?
Second, in making their choices, many African
governments will prioritize their immediate needs over longer-term
interests. In most cases, they are aware of the tradeoffs, but, as one
post-coup head of state told me last year, “I know what I would do if I
was certain that I have five or ten years, but I have to focus on
today’s challenges just to be sure that I have tomorrow.”
Reform
programs and development initiatives to which international financial
institutions and Western governments devote considerable resources may
eventually be effective, but they rarely deliver quick political wins or
even basic regime security. Some even destabilize precarious societal
balances, at least in the short term. Consequently, competitors like
Beijing and, more recently, Moscow and even Teheran, have exploited
this. In late 2021, Russia’s Wagner Group gained entrée to Mali after
Biden administration appointees denied that country’s regime an export
license for a transponder needed for a military transport plane.
Third,
it is not just African regimes prioritizing security over other
concerns: increasingly, so do the masses. Witness by the outpourings of
popular support that have greeted the juntas which have seized power in
Africa’s eight successful coups since 2020. While one can debate whether
military rule can ultimately deliver the sought-after stability, for
now Western lectures on democracy and governance will fall on deaf ears
with populations beset by the failure of governments to curb mounting
violence. In 2023, Burkina Faso saw deaths from terrorism rise 68
percent and account for nearly one-fourth of terrorists’ global
casualties.
Finally, rather than trying to force African
interlocutors to make “us-vs.-them” choices, Washington would do better
to focus on building coalitions, and not just with its historic Western
allies (in which group I would include Japan). U.S. officials should
look to regional powers such as India, the Gulf Arab states, Morocco, or
even Turkey that might be like-minded or at least have complementary
interests in Africa, to see if together these ad hoc partnerships can
offer a better value proposition than competing revisionist powers. An
example is the tacit understanding between the Washington and several
Gulf Arab states for their sovereign wealth funds to buy stakes in
strategic mining assets in several African countries. This tack is
helping the Arab states’ plans to diversify their economies by
processing and trading critical minerals as well as building up
high-tech industries, but is also helping to ensure American access to
strategic metal supply chains not dominated by China.
The
geopolitical (and geoeconomic) stakes in Africa have never been so high,
the challenges remain myriad and complex, and the competition is stiff,
but the potential returns are, quite literally, for the United States
and its allies as well as for African countries and people themselves,
the century itself.
Ambassador
J. Peter Pham is former U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes and
Sahel Regions of Africa and a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic
Council.