These
rapid launches are giving China robust infrastructure for intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications. China “has rapidly
advanced in space in a way that few people can appreciate,” said Maj. Gen. Greg Gagnon, deputy chief of space operations for intelligence, last week.
‘Fast movers’
Yet
there is another aspect of China’s increased space activity that is
adding to the rapidly shifting strategic dynamic in orbit: the
activities of a series of co-orbital inspectors and robotic manipulator
satellites over the last few years, which point to a larger pattern of
planning to observe and even disrupt other nations’ space activities.
Among
China’s new fleet of satellites are several “fast movers”: satellites
that roam the GEO belt, drifting back and forth among the “stationary”
ones. Like ship tenders, they can help assess and repair malfunctioning
satellites. For instance, debris mitigation may have been the primary
mission for the Chinese satellite Shijian-21, which in 2021 grappled a derelict Beidou satellite and boosted its orbit up 3,000 km, into an unusually high and eccentric graveyard orbit
before returning to the GEO belt. But these “tender” spacecraft could
also be used maliciously against other nations’ satellites.
In 2018, Tongxin Jishu Shiyan-3
raised eyebrows when it became apparent that the satellite was not
alone. Its apogee kick motor, which had circularized its orbit, retained
enough fuel to enter GEO itself. The motor and TJS-3 conducted a series
of “rendezvous and proximity operations” maneuvers in an apparent
checkout phase over the first few weeks in orbit.
TJS-3 displayed
new tactics when it left to execute its primary mission. TJS-3 thrusted
away from its original position, taking advantage of the daytime
terminator phase (the period when ground-based telescopes are most
likely to lose track of it). Its motor had maneuvered next to the
primary satellite so that any observer who reacquired it would see the
booster sitting where the satellite was; in effect, a decoy maneuver.
This could allow TJS-3 a few days of unmonitored activity, where it
might be able to get a jump on any target satellite it was heading
towards. This became a pattern, and possibly standard operating
procedure, when Shijian-21 performed a similar feint and scoot using its apogee kick motor shortly after it arrived in orbit in 2021.
Such
capabilities can easily be repurposed to gather intelligence on foreign
satellites, or even to grapple with and neutralize these satellites.
Shortly after it completed its checkout phase, China's Shijian-17
satellite began a series of approaches to
various satellites located in the GEO belt, including French, Russian,
and Indonesian communications satellites. Likewise, according to Satellite Dashboard
data, in 2021, Shiyan-12-01 and Shiyan-12-02 also approached several
foreign communications satellites shortly after they arrived in GEO.
But
China has also found itself on the receiving end of such tactics.
Russia, known for its aggressive earthbound intelligence collection
techniques, appears to be using its satellites to gather intelligence on
those of other nations. Russia’s GEO inspector satellites of the
Luch/Olymp series are believed to
also be signals intelligence satellites, for instance, visiting and
staying near Western communications satellites for extended periods of
surveillance.
This played out in a previously unreported activity
between Russian and Chinese satellites. Weeks after arriving in orbit in
February 2019, China’s TJS-3 and its apogee kick motor were approached
by Russia’s first Luch/Olymp, which came within 30 km, according to tracking data
provided by Satellite Dashboard. While Luch/Olymp had previously
approached Chinese communications satellites, this appears to have been
the first red-on-red approach of one maneuvering satellite by another.
Russia
is not the only party interested in the PRC’s maneuvering assets in
space. The U.S. not only shadows PRC satellites, but pioneered many of
these tactics with its own Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness
Program (GSSAP) series of inspector satellites, begun in 2014. In 2021, for instance, GSSAP-4 approached the advanced communications satellite Shijian-20 (SJ-20) to the chagrin of PRC satellite operators and observers.
In
reaction to these challenges, PRC satellites appear to have developed
active evasive maneuvers. Shortly after reaching orbit in late 2021,
Shiyan-12-01 and -02 were approached by a U.S. GSSAP satellite, at which
point the pair “took off in opposite directions,”
and one even took up an advantageous position to image the GSSAP
satellite itself. Similar behavior occurred when GSSAP-4 approached
SJ-20. As GSSAP closed in on SJ-20, the satellite increased distance to hinder any attempt by GSSAP to gain information about its capabilities.
China has grown openly alarmed at these trends. Researchers in China’s space community have also called the
U.S. GSSAP satellites “a serious threat to high value assets in GEO.”
In turn, despite a closer relationship between the two, PLA commentators
have worried that
Russian RPO satellites could be stealthy anti-satellite platforms able
to “attack with directional explosives, or use lasers, microwaves, or
other means to destroy or render ineffective target satellites.” This
concern has been buttressed by allegations this last week by Mallory
Stewart, assistant secretary for the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence,
and Stability, that “Russia may be considering the incorporation of nuclear weapons into its counterspace programs.”
With
little progress toward a negotiated modus vivendi in space, these
interactions and tactics are inadvertently forming the basis of
spacefaring norms and behaviors through unchallenged precedent. As
increasingly capable multi-role RPO satellites populate high orbit, the
three nations that have them—the United States, Russia, and China—are
learning how to behave or misbehave in the heavens through trial and
error, creating a volatile environment where mistakes could lead to
conflict or disaster.
David D. Chen is a Senior Analyst for
BluePath Labs. He focuses on aerospace, cyber, and cross-domain emerging
technologies and China’s military modernization.