Japan cannot afford a global alliance with the U.S.
Masahiro Matsumura is professor of international politics and national security at the faculty of law of St. Andrew's University in Osaka and a Taiwan Fellow at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies in Taipei.
In response to China's unprecedented arms buildup and intensified saber rattling, Tokyo and Washington have rapidly moved toward an integrated security alliance over the last two years.
Last month during a state-level visit to Washington, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida confirmed his commitment to making a great leap from Tokyo's previous gradual approach to progressively increasing coordination and cooperation in foreign and security policy.
While in the American capital, Kishida held summit meetings with U.S. President Joe Biden and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and addressed a joint session of Congress, reinforcing his wholehearted alignment with the current U.S. globalist policy line.
Facing growing difficulties due to its overstretch and the relative decline of its power, Washington's expectations of Tokyo are naturally growing.
As its primary ally in the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. wants Japan to play a central supporting role in supplementing and complementing its power and influence as it seeks to counter China's military challenge and sustain a durable coalition of allies and regional partners.
This, however, would require Japan to bear significantly higher military and strategic risks as a frontline state facing China. It would also force it to absorb more of the financial burden of problematic globalist projects, particularly in terms of supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia.
This is a questionable approach given Kishida's dwindling domestic political support. Public disapproval of Kishida and his cabinet reached a record level of 69% last month, according to Nikkei polling.
The rival Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) swept three parliamentary by-elections last month, but Kishida's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) narrowly remains the most popular party by a diminishing margin, with the Nikkei poll putting the LDP at 28% public support versus 18% for the CDP.
Voters unhappy with Kishida cited complaints with his handling of LDP fundraising scandals and inflation. Such discontent has more than offset any lift from the prime minister's embrace by Washington. The next general election is due to be held by October 2025.
Although it has not offered its own policy program, the CDP has attacked Kishida's adoption of Washington's globalist policy line, warning that it will bring too much military and financial risk.
Yet even amid the rising threat of losing power, the LDP has pushed full speed ahead with its problematic alignment with the U.S. Without securing a wider political consensus or enlisting public support, the LDP's push effort has already included publishing a new security strategy, moving to acquire counterstrike missiles and committing to nearly double annual defense spending.
Plans to fund the military buildup through new taxes have further spurred public opposition, due to the country's constitutional commitment to pacifism and weariness from two decades of stagnant economic growth.
This highlights the fact that in contrast to his activist foreign policy, including lavish support for Ukraine, Kishida has failed to end Japan's persistent economic stagnation or address widening inequality due to policies introduced by his predecessor, the late Shinzo Abe.
In Japan, taxes and mandatory social security contributions now take up almost half of national income due to rising welfare spending because of rapid population aging.
Kishida has held back from lightening the tax burden by lowering consumption taxes, even though this would boost consumer spending, citing the Ministry of Finance's prioritization of reducing the government budget deficit.
Meanwhile, Japan remains the top foreign holder of U.S. Treasury bonds. This financial burden-sharing has been arguably at least as important as defense burden-sharing for the U.S.-Japan alliance in recent decades.
Despite Japan's need for funds, it has rarely sold any of these holdings until now. But given its fiscal challenges, it is high time for Japan to liquidate some of its Treasury holdings to fund its own defense and domestic policy needs. Tokyo and Washington need to strike a new balance of defense and financial burden-sharing.
In the meantime, Kishida's stubborn policy stances are only increasing public resentment which could bring an end soon to his unpopular administration and perhaps even jeopardize LDP rule, which in turn underpins the Japan-U.S. alliance. The party faces a serious structural crisis.