Thai-US Relations: Amity With Some Caveats
Published 28 May 2024
The US has sought to maintain its traditional line towards Thailand, emphasising democracy and human rights. But geopolitical considerations are changing Washington’s calculus.
When a civilian, elected government was formed in Thailand in late August 2023 and approved by an appointed Senate, the Biden administration voiced its formal “congratulations”. The advent of the new coalition formally led by Premier Srettha Thavisin-led coalition (informally dominated by ex-Premier Thaksin Shinawatra) offered Washington a potentially more stable, albeit semi-elected regime.
This was a significant change, especially given the multiple Thai governments after the 2006 coup, mass protests, direct interference by the military, and subtle intervention by the palace. During this period, Thailand had increasingly tilted toward China. Thus, the 2023 accession of a civilian-led government was a breath of fresh air in Washington. But in May 2024, what is abundantly clear is that Thai policy toward the US, though perhaps more civilian-derived, is a function of realist hedging. This started in 2007, the year that Thailand and China had their inaugural military exercise, and marked Bangkok’ attempt to balance the United States against China to boost state security. Essentially, Bangkok is leveraging on both sides to maximise geopolitical benefits.
For many decades. Thailand and the US had one of the closest defence and economic relationships. Determined by the post-1947 Cold War, anti-Communism, free markets and Thailand’s policy of “bending with the wind,” this linkage remained generally firm until the end of the Cold War in 1991.
Thereupon, American policymakers prioritised democracy and human rights, which led Washington to strongly oppose Thailand’s 2006 and 2014 coups. The US suspended most military assistance, reduced the number of joint military exercises and paused any major new agreements until an elected government returned to office.
However, the rise of China, specifically after 2013 when Xi Jinping took power, affected Thai-US relations. Now, as one senior US diplomat told this author, Washington needs to balance its promotion of democratic norms with the need to retain its geopolitical interests. But Washington’s distancing of Thailand and China’s charm offensive towards the kingdom contributed to Thailand increasingly turning to China for military aid, joint military exercises and military education for Thai soldiers.
Under US President Donald Trump, Washington suspended Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) trade preferences for Thailand in retaliation for Bangkok’s banning imports of US pesticides and pork). In the field of security, however, the US attempted to tilt “hedging” Thailand back from China: Washington’s sanctioning of Thailand diminished and US-Thai relations improved. The thaw was reflected in US weapons sales: 140 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles replaced China’s VN-1s. When Joe Biden succeeded Trump in 2021, he maintained Trump’s policy of prioritising geopolitical interests over democratic values.
In 2022, Bangkok and Washington signed the US-Thailand Communique on Strategic Alliance and Partnership. In 2023, with Thailand investing over US$10 billion in the US, two US congressmen established the US-Thai Alliance Caucus.
In late February 2024, representatives of Thailand and the US met for the 2nd Thailand-U.S. Strategic and Defense Dialogue (2+2), where Washington committed to providing a grant for the Thai military’s modernisation and professionalisation. Meanwhile, despite refusing Thailand’s request for advanced F-35 fighter aircraft, the Royal Thai Air Force Commander is now looking to Washington for new F-16 fighter jets. In March, Srettha met with US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimundo, telling her that Thailand aimed to make the US the leading investor in Thailand. In 2023, China was the top investor in Thailand, with Singapore in second place and the US in third, though in early 2024 Japan was the leader.
Washington has long worried that Thailand might draw too close to Beijing. China is currently Thailand’s leading import partner compared to the US, which ranks fourth. Washington is Bangkok’s top export destination (China is second).
On another front, Thailand has worked ever closely with Chinese police, even tabling a controversial proposal to get Chinese officers to operate in Thailand. Furthermore, though Srettha advertised building a “land bridge” across a part of southern Thailand to compete with the commercial traffic moving through the Straits of Malacca, the Biden administration sees this project as more useful to China, potentially propelling Thailand closer to Beijing.
Geopolitical interest has soundly trumped norms regarding US policy toward Thailand with Washington intent on preventing Bangkok from tilting closer to Beijing.
In 2024, China and the US are leading military suppliers and military educators for Thailand, regularly engaging with Thailand in naval, air force and army exercises. Thai-US drills have been especially robust, including Cobra Gold (26 February to 8 March), Cope Tiger (17-29 March), Operation Enduring Partners (30 April to 10 May), and preparations for Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training drills. Though Thailand conducts annual military drills with China, Bangkok’s exercises with Washington are larger, more frequent, and more intricate.
Meanwhile, some Chinese activities in Southeast Asia have perturbed Thailand: China’s military use of Cambodia’s Ream naval base; increasing numbers of Chinese police boats on parts of the Mekong River near Thailand and the existence of Chinese commercial zones easily accessible by the Chinese military in Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. Perhaps for these reasons, Bangkok has opposed Chinese-led plans to blast Mekong River rapids; and has approved the construction of a vast new US consulate in Chiangmai despite Chinese objections.
According to sources, while the Thai military is divided over support for the US, senior officers in the Wongthewan clique (including ex-Army Commander General Apirat Kongsompong and current Armed Forces Commander Songwit Noonpakdee) are more inclined toward Washington. The Srettha government continues to balance Washington and Beijing though it gravitates toward China for economic reasons. Thaksin himself has preferred Beijing and even Russia, and even expressing an understanding of Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Ironically, anti-Thaksin arch-royalist conservatives have also supported Putin, remaining highly suspicious of the United States. Still, Thailand’s large, politically-progressive Move Forward party (which almost formed a government in 2023) is quite pro-American.
Washington has frowned upon Thai enterprises (for example, PTTEP, United Power of Asia, Allure Group P&E) continuing to collaborate with US-sanctioned companies controlled by the Myanmar junta. But the US is not directly penalising such Thai companies for fear it would drive the Thai elite further into China’s orbit. Washington clearly dislikes the fact that the Srettha government has moved Thailand closer to the China-aligned and US-sanctioned Cambodian government of Hun Sen, with whom Thaksin is personally close. Thaksin’s niece has married Hun Sen’s close aide.
For the future, US-Thai relations will likely be amicable yet sometimes edgy. Thailand gains security and profit by hedging between China and the US, maintaining satisfactory relations with Russia and economically cooperating with its neighbours. Geopolitical interest has soundly trumped norms regarding US policy toward Thailand with Washington intent on preventing Bangkok from tilting closer to Beijing. Ultimately, what will benefit the US most in this regard is China’s aggressive expansion of its military influence across mainland Southeast Asia — a buildup that could in turn make Thailand feel threatened and tilt closer to Washington.
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Paul Chambers is a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Lecturer at Naresuan University (Thailand).