It might be tempting to imagine that geography is all but irrelevant for defense in our era of instantaneous global communication and rapid transit. This is the age of drones and planes and ICBMs, after all, not that of pitched battles and armies marching on their stomachs. What does geography matter anymore, especially for a superpower with the mobilization capacities of the United States?
Quite a lot, actually, argues DEFP's Christopher McCallion in a new explainer in our series on grand strategy. Proximity, land borders, natural resources, and other geographic factors remain crucial for a prudent foreign policy and must inform defense strategy in Washington.
Why geography still matters
- "While vulnerability to attack is magnified by proximity, distance imposes barriers to attack."
- "Proximity between states magnifies their mutual vulnerability by putting their dearest interests within range of each other's military forces at their highest concentration and effectiveness."
- "Distance continues to provide benefits to defense while raising the costs of offense, especially for those states seeking to sustain territorial conquest."
- "[T]echnological advancements have not eliminated the importance of distance as is often claimed."
- Modern technology speeded communication and transit but also "increased the 'strategic distance' over which states attempt to project military power."
- Distance can "offset imbalances in material capabilities or aggregate military power, allowing relatively weak defenders to hold off more powerful but distant aggressors."
- It "also directly affects the balance of resolve," as "attackers' objectives tend to be less vital the farther they are from home." [DEFP / McCallion]
Related reading: U.S. policymakers should remember China's limits
The U.S. geostrategic position
- The U.S. has the "ideal geostrategic position," McCallion contends:
- "It is the wealthiest and most powerful state in the world" and "the only great power in the Western Hemisphere."
- "It has a vast, resource-rich interior and a large population" as well as just "two political land borders," both with friendly trading partners.
- "To its east and west, the United States is flanked by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, separating it by thousands of miles in either direction from the other major military and economic powers of the world."
- The U.S. is also "abundant in natural resources and is incredibly food-, energy-, and mineral-secure" and "the largest producer in the world of both oil and natural gas."
- This positioning is an enormous asset for U.S. defense—but positions us poorly to play global hegemon. [DEFP / McCallion]
Related reading: As American global hegemony ends, multi-alignment rises
The geographic advantages of restraint
- All told, geography affords the U.S. "a relatively benign security environment."
- "There are neither compelling security imperatives nor credible means for the United States to enforce a system of global hegemony by projecting power far from home into the backyards of other great powers."
- Geography still matters for China and Russia, too, and both countries' chances of becoming a Eurasian hegemon are slim.
- Washington would be wise to "scale back its forward military presence in Eurasia," which would lower threat perception all around and be "a boon for U.S. peace and security."
- That does not preclude off-shore balancing, retaining a "command of the commons," and maintaining both nuclear and conventional deterrence. [DEFP / McCallion]
Related reading: It's not too late for restrained U.S. foreign policy
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"[W]hat's critical to understand is the asymmetry in interest. To put it plainly, [Beijing cares] a lot more about [Taiwan] than we do, and than we ever will, and frankly, than we should. To my estimate, this is a small island off of China with some complex history. It is not, in my estimate, the crucible on which we should bank the future of U.S. national security. So, I'm advising caution, even extreme caution."
– DEFP Director of Asia Engagement Lyle Goldstein, speaking with Nonzero's Robert Wright in a recent podcast episode about the prospect of a war over Taiwan. Listen or watch here, or read transcript excerpts here.
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U.S. defense infrastructure in the Pacific
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"[T]he United States has access to some 71 different air and naval installations spread throughout the breadth of the ocean," DEFP's Mike Sweeney notes in a recent explainer. "Not only are Chinese forces blocked by the First Island Chain, but they are at a massive disadvantage to U.S. forces in terms of logistics and basing once they finally reach the open waters of the Pacific."
That's not to say China isn't militarily formidable, or that a U.S.-China war wouldn't be catastrophic. But it's vital to have an accurate conception of the real impediments to regional—let alone global—hegemony for Beijing.
Read Sweeney's full explainer here.
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After decades of strategic drift and costly acquisition failures, the U.S. Navy is sailing straight into a storm it can't avoid. Despite the Defense Department's lip service about China being the "pacing challenge," decades of deindustrialization and policymakers' failure to prioritize among services and threats have left the Navy ill-equipped to endure a sustained high-intensity conflict in the Pacific.
The United States is unable to keep pace with Chinese shipbuilding and will fall even further behind in the coming years. Where does that leave the U.S. Navy and the most critical U.S. foreign-policy imperative: deterring a war in the Pacific?
Read the full analysis here.
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