When the U.S. military-built aid delivery pier off the coast of Gaza broke last month, the Biden administration could have used that misfortune as cause to jettison the whole plan.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin had already granted that the project could be a gateway to further U.S. entanglement in Gaza—U.S. service members could return fire if they were attacked on the pier, he said in a congressional hearing. And it's not difficult to imagine other unintended consequences of the project: Beyond the "logistical and operational challenges," DEFP's Michael DiMino told USA Today, "I am very concerned about mission creep and what starts as a pier becomes U.S. Marines on the beach in Gaza."
Instead of taking the out, however, the administration plunged ahead—and not only with the pier, but with a major defense treaty for Saudi Arabia. Both efforts are unforced errors, steps away from a prudent U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East.
Dismantle the pier
The pier has "proven to be a hapless operation," DEFP's William Walldorf argued at TIME. "It could soon turn disastrous":
- Looking beyond accidents and material mishaps, the "landing area near the pier has been attacked on at least two occasions by Hamas. Aid from the pier has also been looted, with only limited amounts of assistance reaching Gazans."
- "The presence of U.S. forces so close to the fighting in Gaza makes them easy targets for Hamas or other militant groups angered by American support for Israel," not least because they can't change location.
- All told, this is a high-risk, low-reward project which is doing little to help desperate Gazan civilians. It should be shut down in favor of more effective, reliable aid delivery mechanisms. [TIME / Walldorf]
Already the Pentagon has had to deny that an Israeli operation near the pier involved the pier, a scenario almost certain to repeat itself as long as the structure is operational.
Cancel the treaty
- The administration is reportedly "close to finalizing a treaty with Saudi Arabia that would commit the U.S. to help defend the Gulf nation." [WSJ / Stephen Kalin and Michael R. Gordon]
- If approved, the treaty would move Saudi Arabia from its current status as a quasi-ally to full U.S. ally.
- "It would be the first time the U.S. concluded a mutual defense pact that would carry the force of law since the 1960 revision of the U.S.-Japan treaty, and the first time it concluded such an agreement with an authoritarian country," Carnegie's Aaron David Miller said. [WSJ / Kalin and Gordon]
- There are many reasons this treaty is a gross strategic error, as Paul R. Pillar has detailed, including:
- "Such an arrangement would further enmesh the United States in Middle Eastern disputes and intensify regional divisions."
- "It would work against a favorable pattern of regional states working out their differences when the United States leaves them on their own."
- "Besides being an authoritarian state," Saudi Arabia "has aggressively pursued regional dominance, most notably with its highly destructive war in Yemen."
- "A U.S. security guarantee could motivate [Riyadh] to engage in even riskier behavior and draw the United States into conflicts in which it has no stake." [Quincy Institute / Pillar]
- As DEFP's Daniel R. DePetris argued a month ago, this treaty, if it leads to an Israel-Saudi normalization deal as intended, may be good for Biden's legacy. "What's good for Biden's legacy, however, isn't necessarily what's good for the United States."
Exit the Mideast
Instead of once more expanding U.S. engagement in a region we should have left decades ago, the Biden administration should be focused on disentanglement, as DEFP's Justin Logan detailed in 2020:
- "The Middle East is a small, poor, weak region beset by an array of problems that mostly do not affect Americans—and that U.S. forces cannot fix. The best thing the U.S. can do is leave." [DEFP / Logan]
- Logan's arguments focused on withdrawal of U.S. forces then still deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other nearby countries. Four years later, many of those lesser-known U.S. footprints are intact and remain just as costly and risky—if not riskier, given the new war in Gaza—than they were then.
- And it's not just the risk incurred and occasioned by keeping U.S. boots on the ground. The larger problem, as Logan writes, is the default U.S. involvement in a distant region with little direct effect on core U.S. security interests, and certainly not sufficient effect to justify ill-considered ideas like the Gaza pier or a U.S.-Saudi alliance.
Read the full explainer: "The case for withdrawing from the Middle East"
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"[Russian President Vladimir] Putin, who in the past has openly broached the prospect of bolstering military collaboration with Pyongyang, could use his time in [North Korea] to move—or at least discuss moving—arms and military technology agreements toward the finish line."
– DEFP Fellow Daniel R. DePetris, as quoted in "U.S. warns North Korea against providing Putin a platform for war aims" [VOA / Christy Lee]
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U.S. arable land and energy production in global context
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"The United States has an ideal geostrategic position," argues DEFP Fellow Christopher McCallion in a recent explainer, and it's not just a matter of friendly neighbors and ocean-scale "moats." Our security is also enhanced by unique resource advantages:
The United States is abundant in natural resources and is incredibly food-, energy-, and mineral-secure. The United States is the largest producer in the world of both oil and natural gas. It's a net total energy exporter and has technological advantages that make it highly competitive in emerging renewable energy sectors. […] The United States is also rich in deposits of various minerals and metals, including untapped deposits of rare earth elements should it need them.
McCallion's full explainer also delves into the strategic implications of U.S. trade positioning and more. Read it here.
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Many Western defense analysts consider D-Day and mistakenly conclude China could never pull off an operation of this complexity. It's true that the PLA will not have had the benefit of practice runs that the Allies had, whether at Sicily or Tarawa. Yet, PLA commanders will also have many advantages that Eisenhower did not have, such as access to satellite reconnaissance, drones, and attack helicopters. Moreover, the PLA will be confronting neither the "Atlantic Wall" nor the Wehrmacht, one of the most experienced and effective armies in history [...]
To avoid the nightmare scenario of a Taiwan contingency, U.S. leaders should strive much more proactively for a diplomatic solution, rather than seeking for desperate military measures aiming to redress the military balance across the Taiwan Strait that disappeared long ago.
Read the full analysis here, or go deeper with Goldstein's examination of Chinese amphibious warfare strategy for the Asian Security journal last year.
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