"The war must end with total military victory over Hezbollah," Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said last month, sharing his strategic thinking. "We must give it a public ultimatum – stop shooting completely and withdraw all forces beyond the Litani River, and if it doesn't comply in full, the IDF must launch an offensive deep inside Lebanon to protect northern communities, including a ground operation and an Israeli military takeover of southern Lebanon."
This isn't a minority view. The feeling that we now need a decisive blow to destroy Hezbollah "once and for all," and if necessary, Lebanon's infrastructure as well, in order to allow residents of the Galilee to return to their homes is increasingly emerging as the sole and inevitable strategy.
It's enough to listen to the panelists who flooded the television studios following Tuesday's assassination of Taleb Abdullah, "the most senior Hezbollah commander" killed to date, to understand how and where such a strategy is born.
The funeral of Hezbollah commander Taleb Abdullah who was assassinated by Israel, in Beirut, this week.Credit: Mohamed Azakir / Reuters
Some proposed a swift, fierce action that would last for some three weeks, instead of the running in place that has characterized the escalating conflict to date. Others understood that a single blow wouldn't suffice and, like Smotrich, said Israel would be forced to maintain a "security zone" in southern Lebanon for quite some time.
And Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland, father of the doctrine of starvation and total destruction in the Gaza Strip, contributed the novel idea he has advocated in the past with regard to Hamas. Granted, he rejected the idea that Israel could defeat Hezbollah, saying that even if it is dealt a severe blow, it would soon recover.
Nevertheless, he added, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah "very much fears a war that would bring destruction down on Lebanon, because he has built up his status as a Lebanese patriot and a party leader who is concerned not only for the Shi'ite community, but for all Lebanese. If and when Lebanon's energy, transportation and communications infrastructure is destroyed and central Beirut looks like central Gaza City, then Nasrallah will understand that it's preferable to end the war. From a military standpoint, these are easy goals to achieve and don't require a complex ground maneuver."
It would be interesting to know what infrastructure he is talking about. Lebanon's transportation infrastructure is already destroyed. Its power is supplied by thousands of private generators, since its national electric company is de facto bankrupt. Beirut has already suffered a massive explosion of its port, and massive destruction of homes would simply lead hundreds of thousands of Lebanese to either emigrate or flee to the mountains.
A forest fire near the city of Safed as result of launches from Lebanon, on Thursday.Credit: Gil Eliahu
In short, Lebanon is already officially on the brink of bankruptcy. There doesn't seem to be any economic damage left to be done to it, much less damage that would make Hezbollah reconsider its decisions.
But it's fascinating to watch how moldy old strategies get rejuvenated. Even Eiland's doctrine isn't original. Similar things were said by Dan Halutz, the Israel Defense Forces' chief of staff during the Second Lebanon War of 2006. But back then, he ran into the wall of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who vehemently opposed waging war on all of Lebanon rather than merely Hezbollah.
In an article titled "In Retrospect: The Second Lebanon War" that was published in March 2014 on the Institute for National Security Studies' website, Olmert wrote the following:
"One of the most important elements that must be understood – and I say this not only in retrospect about the Second Lebanon War, but also to invite thinking about what some people want to see happen in the future – is that Israel is a strong country with tremendous power. We have tools that few states have. We have capabilities that few countries in the world have. However, we cannot take action unless we also establish a broad foundation of international legitimacy. Anyone who thinks that we can act without international legitimacy has a faulty perception of reality and understanding of Israel's status, position, and relationships..."
"What would have happened had we attacked Lebanon's infrastructures at a time when the Western world, first and foremost the United States and Europe, believed that there was a chance of cooperating with the Siniora-Hariri government in a way that would change the situation, and demonstrated true concern for it and for its future? It is very possible that the war would have ended within forty-eight hours and Hezbollah would have continued to fire missiles, harass the northern border, and disrupt the way of life of the entire population in Israel's north."
What Olmert wrote then is even more true today. The war in Gaza has already proven that a serious collapse of Israel's international legitimacy dictates military moves and changes strategies. And that's even when there is sweeping international agreement, even among Arab states, that Hamas is a terrorist organization whose military capabilities in Gaza should be destroyed.
Lebanon and Hezbollah are in a completely different situation. Today, even Israel is no longer demanding Hezbollah's disarmament, but only that it be moved further away from the Israeli border. Moreover, unlike Gaza, Lebanon is a sovereign country. Granted, it doesn't control all of its territory and is run by caretaker government, but it enjoys international legitimacy, and its army receives American aid despite the fact that it takes orders from a government of which Hezbollah is a member.
Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani, in Beirut, this week.Credit: Mohamed Azakir / Reuters
The Lebanese government doesn't need to be convinced through military pressure to agree to a cease-fire. Its declared policy is not getting dragged into an all-out war, reaching an agreement with Israel and demarcating a final border between the two countries, and implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War.
Two diplomatic proposals have been submitted to Israel and Lebanon, one French and one American. Both involve a phased implementation that could produce a long-term cease-fire agreement and neutralize at least some of the pretexts for conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.
Among other things, they include a withdrawal of Hezbollah forces to 10 or 15 kilometers from the Israeli border and an increased deployment of both UNIFIL peacekeepers and Lebanese army troops along the border. Not only is Hezbollah familiar with these proposals, but it has even approved them in principle.
The main obstacle, which currently seems insurmountable, is the linkage Hezbollah has created between a cease-fire in Lebanon and an end to the war in Gaza. In other words, as long as Israel doesn't cease its fire in Gaza, Hezbollah won't cease its own fire.
Hezbollah also said that as long as the war in Gaza continues, it won't be willing even to consider the proposals. But this hasn't stopped its representative in parliament – Mohammed Raad, whose son Abbas was killed in an Israeli bombing in November – from holding direct talks with Jean-Yves le Drian, French President Emmanuel Macron's special envoy, about a plan for appointing a new Lebanese president, and along the way, about France's cease-fire proposal as well.
Alongside all the discussion of and proposals for a cease-fire, a long list of countries, led by America and France together with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have been engaged for months now in an effort to extricate Lebanon from its political crisis and secure the appointment of a new president after two years in which the country has been without one.
This is critical, because only the president can appoint a new prime minister to replace the caretaker premier – someone who could move forward on vital economic reforms, without which Lebanon can't obtain the billions of dollars is needs to rehabilitate its economy.
Unlike the war with Hamas, an all-out offensive against Lebanon would be seen by Arab countries, including those who have signed peace agreements with Israel, as an attack on a sister state, with all the ominous diplomatic consequences that entails. And to the West, it would constitute an attack on a country that is still defined as pro-Western, or at least as one that must be salvaged.
One might wonder what basis those who advocate war with Lebanon have for believing that devastating military force might compel the government to dictate a cease-fire to Hezbollah, or alternatively cause Hezbollah to lay down its arms and send a letter of apology to the Lebanese.
For starters, the Lebanese government has zero ability to make crucial decisions due to the internal power struggles between its main political forces. These are largely divided between the bloc of Hezbollah's supporters – including the Shi'ite Amal party led by Nabih Berri, the powerful speaker of parliament who is running the talks with the Americans and French on Hezbollah's behalf – and the Christian parties. The latter include the Lebanese Forces party led by Samir Geagea, the Phalanges party (also known as Kataeb) led by Samy Gemayal and the Free Patriotic Movement led by Gebran Bassil, which used to be a Hezbollah ally but has become a rival due to their dispute over who the next president should be.
The major Druze party, the Progressive Socialist Party – which was headed until June 2023 by the charismatic Walid Jumblatt, a fierce opponent of Nasrallah – is now trying to push a new plan for appointing a president to whom Hezbollah would consent. But for now, the manner and pace of the talks on appointing a president might lead an observer to think that there is no war in Lebanon, that tens of thousands of Lebanese haven't been displaced from their homes, that thousands of dunams of orchards and fields haven't been abandoned and that the explosions can't be heard north of the Litani River.
Would a large-scale Israeli attack on Beirut, the destruction of public buildings and terrible damage to civilian infrastructure cause a political revolution that would make Hezbollah throw up its hands and agree to a cease-fire for fear of losing its most important asset, its political control over the country? Or would it do the opposite – make even its rivals close ranks around it and turn it back into Lebanon's sole protector, whose forces are the only ones able to defend the country and contend with the enemy?
Granted, Hezbollah is Lebanon's dominant political force. It has nurtured and enhanced this position primarily through its military, which gives it the ability to "recruit" Israel to act against Lebanon. But Hezbollah and its partners don't have a parliamentary majority, and the current political power struggles once again show that Nasrallah can't run Lebanon and realize his political ambitions without a supportive coalition. Nevertheless, its rivals also have an inbuilt weakness – they cannot make decisions in defiance of Hezbollah's position.
Unlike the situation in 2006, when Lebanon had a strong government supported by the international community, Lebanon today is run by a shell government. In 2006, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora could submit a seven-point proposal for ending the war to the UN Security Council with American backing, force it on France, force Hezbollah to embrace it in defiance of Iran's position, and ultimately have it adopted as Resolution 1701. Today, Prime Minister Najib Mikati doesn't have the power to do anything but draft press statements.
Mikati, his government, and the Lebanese parliament are all well aware of the enormous destruction Lebanon will suffer if Israel decides to attack it. But they have no salvation to offer. Israel, in contrast, has already agreed to a cease-fire in Gaza, which would lead to a cease-fire in Lebanon and distance the threat. Would an all-out war on Lebanon lead to a more successful outcome?