A Dissenting View from Israel: Nuclear Iran, IAEA and the International Arena
Perhaps a little surprisingly, in the past year, the Iranian nuclear threat had been pushed off the main headlines in the Israeli media. This is in spite of the IAEA reports on the acceleration and expansion of Iran’s nuclear program that have brought Iran to the status of a nuclear weapons threshold state. The latest IAEA board of governors meeting has revived the Iranian nuclear discourse in Israel. Journalists and commentators excitedly reported on the IAEA decision censuring Iran. The clock is now ticking towards the transfer of the issue to the UN Security Council. In an official Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, Foreign Affairs Minister Israel Katz welcomed the IAEA’s condemnation of the “Iranian nuclear violations”. The term “violations” appears four times in the text. My reading of the Iranian nuclear issue is different. In this article, I will try to analyse the latest developments on the issue as I see them.
So, what do we have? The IAEA board of governors approved and passed a decision initiated by the E3 the three European countries who are signators to the JCPOA - the United Kingdom, France and Germany – censuring Iran for its “persistent refusal to cooperate in good faith with the IAEA” regarding traces of uranium found at two undeclared sites. This is in contradiction to Iran’s NPT obligations under the Safeguards Agreement. Only Russia and China opposed the resolution. The US who in the beginning had opposed the censure resolution, agreed to it at the last minute. The US did this in order to maintain unity with its NATO allies, and the credibility of the IAEA on the issue that is at the core of the Agency’s goals: the IAEA inspection rules designed to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials for the purposes of nuclear weapons. It should be noted that the IAEA inspectors entered the sites in accordance with the Additional Protocol and took environmental samples. What Iran is refusing to do in recent years is to provide the IAEA with satisfactory answers regarding the traces of uranium found at these sites.
It is possible that the fact that at the last minute the US joined its allies and supported the censure resolution contributed to the lowering of the flames of the nuclear crisis. Uncharacteristically, Iran reacted in a moderate manner to what it termed “an unconstructive political decision”. The previous censure decision of November 2022 led to the 60% uranium enrichment at the underground fortified site at Fordow. The new censure resolution presents the possibility for “additional steps” vis a vis Iran if it persists with its refusal, but it does not say that Iran is in violation of the NPT. This would have obliged the IAEA to pass the Iranian file to the UN Security Council. The US refrained this time from quoting the IAEA Statute clause as it did in the November 2022 resolution in which it hinted at a situation of “non-compliance” that necessitates the transfer of the issue to the UN Security Council. Furthermore, in the conclusion of the censure resolution, the US and the western countries confirm that satisfactory answers from Iran to the IAEA would bring about the closing of the Iranian file.
The censure resolution relates only to the “open files” with the IAEA on the issue of the two undeclared sites. The US is aware of and concerned about the seriousness of the general Iranian nuclear picture presented by IAEA Director Rafael Grossi. Particularly regarding the level of high enrichment uranium (both 60% and 20%), the serious damage to the monitoring capability following the suspension of the Additional Protocol for the inspection of undeclared sites, and the removal of the monitoring cameras at the centrifuge sites. This has resulted in the IAEA’s “loss of the continuity of knowledge” and has damaged its ability to fully monitor the nuclear sites. Recently, a new concern had been added with the public declarations by former senior Iranian officials regarding Iran’s technological capability to rapidly “assemble nuclear weapons”, and a possible change in its nuclear doctrine towards open deterrence. This would oblige Iran to withdraw from the NPT and to expel the IAEA inspectors from its territory. It is worth noting that the nuclear statements by former senior Iranian officials began before the direct missile war between Iran and Israel in April 2024.
The larger picture of the Iran nuclear situation, and not just the “open files” regarding the undeclared sites, is what led the US Ambassador to the IAEA Laura Holgate to emphasize that the censure resolution should be the first step in a wider strategy “aimed at achieving a sustainable, effective solution to Iran’s nuclear program”. We can see a hint here at the US attempts to renew diplomatic dialogue to reach a new nuclear agreement. From hints given by IAEA director Rafael Grossi we can assume that the secret back-channels that have existed continuously between Iran and the US (via the Swiss Embassy in Teheran, and meetings in Oman) since the beginning of the October 2023 Gaza war, also deal with the Iranian nuclear program. These would be a continuation of the Understandings Agreement between the Biden administration and Iran (summer of 2023) to freeze at this stage the level of uranium enrichment so that it would not exceed the 60% level.
The motif of returning to a cooperation outline in place of the current situation of confrontation in the nuclear field appears in a surprising comment by the US Ambassador to the IAEA: it was important to the US representative to refute the claim that the US is the one who, for political reasons, caused the failure of the outline for the renewal of the limits of the old JCPOA in the summer of 2022. The Ambassador emphasized that Iran was the one who brought about the collapse of the process with “unacceptable demands beyond the scope of the JCPOA”. She did not say that Iran is not interested in a new nuclear agreement. The Ambassador was referring to the Iranian demands (apparently the final remaining obstacle) to close the IAEA open files on the issue of the undeclared sites. This is something that the US and the superpowers cannot accept. The vicious circle prevented a reasonable possibility of the renewal of the JCPOA as proposed by the superpowers and the EU (the body responsible for the coordination of the nuclear talks) in August 2022. The renewal of the JCPOA has been one of the central goals of the Biden administration since President Biden entered the White House.
There was another surprising comment from the US Ambassador during the board meeting: among all the data on the worrying acceleration of 60% enriched uranium, she made an additional comment to the effect that Iran had reduced 5.9 kilograms from its total of 142 kilograms. Although the quantitative reduction is small, it has great importance. It is a signal by Iran, not through speeches or declaration, of its readiness for dialogue and restrictions on uranium enriched to a high level. This is a non verbal signal to which intelligence analysists attribute high credibility. The Ambassador’s words show that the signal was well received by the US. Both sides are aware of the need for a new JCPOA.
The positive signs that I have brought here from the IAEA board of governors meeting were expressed in IAEA director Grossi’s remarks in May at the end of his visit to Teheran. In the framework of his visit, there were discussions about a new launching of a common Statement (March 2023) to double the number of inspectors at the Fordow centrifuge site, and the renewed placement of monitoring cameras at the centrifuge sites. In an interview to the Financial Times (14 May 2024) entitled “Iran is Open to Serious Dialogue”, IAEA director Grossi said that for the first time in over a year, Iran asked to reduce tensions with the US, to enter into serious dialogue with the IAEA, and to discuss concrete steps. Unfortunately, the dialogue between senior IAEA technical teams and Iran was cut off with the death of the Iranian President and Minister of Foreign affairs in a helicopter accident (19 May 2024).
Regarding the central point of contention that has prevented the renewal of the JCPOA – traces of uranium that were found at undeclared sites, and the resulting fear that there is a secret nuclear program – I would like to make a number of points that are sometimes forgotten in the discussion but are important for understanding the big picture. These old sites, which were once secret but are not today, belonged to a nuclear program which was closed down 20 years ago. IAEA inspectors visited that sites and brought back soil samples. According to the most competent bodies responsible for the subject, there are no nuclear weapons in Iran. Since 2007, the US DNI Annual Threat Assessment reports, which are binding on the US President, have assessed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was closed in 2003 and has not been renewed. The latest Annual Threat Assessment Report (March 2024) assesses that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device”. IAEA director Grossi said in his latest interview to the Financial Times that “there is no evidence to suggest that Iran has moved or is moving, or is planning to move, to a weapons programme”.
The Iranian nuclear issue is complex and multileveled. Its technical details and diplomatic nuances are of great importance. The issue of a continued nuclear crisis has existed for over two decades. The question of the Iranian motives for their nuclear program has not been fully resolved. Is it defensive, for the deterrence necessary to ensure the survival of the regime? Is it for offensive goals? In order to get back onto the path of diplomatic dialogue with Iran, to prevent undesired dangerous scenarios of a full nuclear weapons state like North Korea, the US will have to, as a first stage, find a creative solution to the voices from the past whispering about the undeclared sites from the old program that was closed 20 years ago.
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Shemuel Meir is an independent Israeli strategic analyst. Graduate of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a former IDF and Tel Aviv University researcher.