[Salon] Fwd: Haaretz, Amos Harel: "Endless War, Not 'Total Victory': IDF Wants to Leave Gaza, but Netanyahu Has Other Ideas " (6/21/24.)



https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-06-21/ty-article/.premium/endless-war-not-total-victory-idf-wants-to-leave-gaza-but-netanyahu-has-other-ideas/00000190-368a-d8bc-abf7-b7ba30d00000

Endless War, Not 'Total Victory': IDF Wants to Leave Gaza, but Netanyahu Has Other Ideas -

Amos HarelJun 21, 2024

The moment of truth – another moment of truth – in the war will likely arrive within a few weeks. The Israel Defense Forces will complete their offensive action in Rafah, under American restrictions and far from inflicting a total defeat on Hamas, and will want to declare a conclusion. The generals will come to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and ask him to help them achieve strategic clarity. 

They will recommend a cessation to the campaign in the Gaza Strip, in the present format. The army will suggest reducing the already limited number of troops operating in the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egyptian border and in the other corridor in the center of the Strip, and to focus on raids against additional Hamas targets and again giving other moves an opportunity.

IDF chief Herzl Halevi in the Gaza Strip, on Saturday.

IDF chief Herzl Halevi in the Gaza Strip, on Saturday.Credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit

Those moves are intended to include an attempt to restart the contacts for a hostage deal and a cease-fire in Gaza. If that works out, and the odds don't look great at the moment, it will be possible to exploit the time to give the soldiers a refresher period, during which the United States will make a final effort to forge a diplomatic agreement in Lebanon geared to distancing Hezbollah forces from the border with Israel. 

Otherwise, preparations will be made for a possible all-out war in the north. Concurrently, a process is supposed to begin of national force-building – a massive investment in upgrading the army's capabilities and readying the domestic front in the event that the grim predictions materialize and Israel finds itself in the future facing a broader, multi-arena confrontation led by Iran.

At the end of last week, 11 IDF soldiers were killed in the Gaza Strip, eight of them from the Engineering Corps when a Namer-model armored personnel carrier blew up in Rafah. But the number of losses in two concentrated days is a misleading index in terms of the scale and intensity of the fighting. In practice, it's evident that Hamas evacuated a large portion of its armed personnel from the city. 

Smoke rises over Tel al-Sultan in Rafah, southern Gaza, last month.

Smoke rises over Tel al-Sultan in Rafah, southern Gaza, last month.Credit: AFP

The IDF this week estimated that 550 Hamas combatants have been killed in Rafah. Many others moved northward and are meant to serve the organization as a reserve force that will reestablish its rule in Gaza after Israel withdraws. Sooner or later, Hamas will have to cope with the anger of part of the population at what Israel fomented, at the organization's instigation, in Gaza. For that, Hamas will need to employ force of arms.

The relatively few armed militants who remain in Rafah are engaged in targeted attacks with the aim of felling Israeli troops. Mainly, they document their efforts in video clips that are posted in the Arab media and on the social networks. The intensity of the combat in Rafah is limited compared to the battles in the northern Strip at the start of the war. 

Israel's Army Radio this week reported the optimistic assessment of Southern Command: Some 14,000 Hamas terrorists, out of a force of around 30,000, have been killed in the war; half of the organization's 24 battalion commanders have been assassinated; the command and control system has been seriously degraded; Hamas is left with a few hundred medium-range rockets capable of hitting Greater Tel Aviv and the Ashdod area. To this an even more optimistic forecast was added: In the northern Gaza Strip, if the degrading of Hamas continues, conditions might arise later for the emergence of an alternative governmental body.

Israeli soldiers in southern Gaza this week.

Israeli soldiers in southern Gaza this week.Credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit

In regard to the hostages, the army doesn't have encouraging news at the moment. The impressive success of the last rescue operation – the freeing of four hostages from Nuseirat refugee camp two weeks ago – is the exception that proves the rule. In the best case, opportunities will crop up for the extrication of a few more, entailing high risk and without freeing a mass of hostages. The Wall Street Journal on Thursday reported that only about 50 of the 120 captives still in Gaza are alive; the IDF's official count speaks of a higher number of living captives.

The Israeli media barely dealt with the hostages this week. The demonstrations for their rescue are not succeeding in sweeping up large numbers of the public. Washington attributed responsibility for the stalemated talks to Hamas, which rejected the latest American-Israeli proposal. In these circumstances, there is no real leverage on the government to move fast. Cynics will say the problem of the captives is diminishing on its own. In the meantime, the coalition can concentrate on attempts to advance the legislation of jobs for rabbis and prepare the law for the evasion of military service by the Haredim. 

In the north of the country, there were two and a half days of relative relief from Hezbollah's attacks. That wasn't due to the IDF's determination but to a Lebanese decision to take the foot off the gas pedal during the Eid al-Adha holiday. The shelling resumed its intensity when the holiday ended. The IDF is continuing its campaign of assassinating Hezbollah field commanders, some high-ranking, others less so. In the background, a spate of arrogant threats is being voiced by politicians and officers about Israel's ability to strike at the Shi'ite organization and at the failed Lebanese state.

Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah speaks during a televised address at a memorial service for a top commander, in Beirut's southern suburbs, Lebanon, June 19, 2024.

Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah speaks during a televised address at a memorial service for a top commander, in Beirut's southern suburbs, Lebanon, June 19, 2024.Credit: Mohamed Azakir/ REUTERS

Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah on Wednesday delivered another combative speech, perhaps his most forceful since the start of the war. Fundamentally, Nasrallah is sticking to his perception of Hezbollah as an auxiliary force in this war: Hamas is leading the campaign, while Hezbollah is attacking in the north and pinning down large numbers of Israeli soldiers, but is not transitioning into a ground assault phase.

Nasrallah also threatened to strike at Cyprus, claiming that the island nation intends to allow the Israel Air Force to attack from its territory in the event of a large-scale war. But more important is what's concealed between the lines: Nasrallah apparently suspects that Israel is heading for a general war and is preparing his organization for that possibility.

During the week, Amos Hochstein, the envoy of U.S. President Joe Biden, once again shuttled between Beirut and Jerusalem. Reports were that Hochstein conveyed threatening messages from Israel to Lebanon. Hezbollah responded with a signal of its own. The organization posted images taken by a drone over Haifa Port, showing Israel Navy vessels anchored in their base like in a parade ceremony, as though no danger exists of an attack from the north.

Fires rage on Israel's northern border with Lebanon, last week.

Fires rage on Israel's northern border with Lebanon, last week.Credit: Gil Eliahu

The basic picture is that there has been no substantial change lately on either front. The government and the army are not succeeding in extricating themselves from the deep strategic trap in which they have been caught since October 7. No target date looms on the horizon – not for the return of the hostages, not for the collapse of Hamas (a goal almost impossible to achieve) and not for the Israelis who lived along the northern border to return home.

Speak, Halevi, speak

Netanyahu, who is aware of the army's view, isn't inclined to accede to it. He continues to declare that the all-out war against Hamas will continue for as along as it takes. He's again scattering promises of total victory to his supporters (despite the vigorous marketing of this message on Channel 14, the streets aren't exactly flooded with the caps on which this slogan is emblazoned). In reality, what we have is a war that looks more eternal than a victory that's total.

Netanyahu's supreme goal remains survival: to get through the Knesset's summer session and wait in the hope that Donald Trump will be elected U.S. president in November. That's preferable for him compared to the alternative of a permanent cease-fire in Gaza (along with a hostage deal), an effective admission of failure to achieve the goals of the combat, and the almost certain resignation of the extreme right parties from the coalition and the collapse of the government. 

With political survival as the supreme goal, other likely implications of prosecuting an endless war are reduced in importance; namely, an increasing load on the combat troops in the regular army and in the reserves, a deepening crisis with the Biden administration and an erosion of international legitimacy for Israel's actions.

Without downplaying the spirit of combat and the dedication of the fighters and commanders on the ground, the IDF General Staff understands the pressing need for a change in Israel's strategy. 

FILE PHOTO: IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagar.

FILE PHOTO: IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagar.Credit: Hadas Parush

When this is reported publicly – in Haaretz's headline on Tuesday and in a Channel 13 interview with IDF Spokesman Daniel Hagari the next day (the idea that Hamas can be destroyed is "throwing sand in the public's eyes," he said) – the response is a Bibi-ist counterattack. One of the leading mouthpieces was even sent to accuse IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi of wanting to leave Hamas' rule in Gaza intact.

Since midweek, the Prime Minister's Office and the IDF Spokesperson's Unit have been sparring in the form of official statements in passive-aggressive style. This development serves Netanyahu twice over. First, every round of ping-pong like this diverts attention from the double failure that occurred under his responsibility: the October 7 massacre and the faltering management of the war. Second, it provides a perfect alibi for Israel's not meeting its self-set war goals. There's always someone else to blame: the army, the left-wing demonstrators who are supposedly receiving foreign funding (as Netanyahu claimed this week in a memorial ceremony for those killed in 1948 aboard the Altalena), President Biden.

Halevi, still state-oriented, rationalistic, wary of emotions, is gradually losing his patience. He is freeing up maneuvering space for his spokesperson and in some cases gets swept into harsh exchanges with politicians himself. This week, confrontations from security cabinet meetings he had with the far-right ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir were leaked. The chief of staff's tone was sarcastic and included comments about a lack of military experience (Ben-Gvir was disqualified for army service because of his activity as a youth in the Kach movement; Smotrich did late and abbreviated service). 

Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar, IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, in the command center earlier this month.

Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar, IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, in the command center earlier this month.Credit: Shin Bet 

The chief of staff is walking on the edge, but there are some officers who would like to see him be even bolder. Hard times call for sharp remarks: Present a concluding mechanism for Rafah, demand progress toward a hostage exchange, coordinate with the public as to what can be expected in the rear in the event of a general war in the north. Speak, Halevi, speak. 

On one day this week, in trips between the south, the Kirya (defense establishment HQ in Tel Aviv) and the north, the chief of staff met with the parents of the abducted female soldiers and with residents of Nir Oz, the small kibbutz in which a quarter of the population was murdered or abducted on October 7 before the IDF reached it after 2 P.M. or fired even one bullet. 

The conversations were charged, tough. A veteran kibbutz member related how the long hours in which he hid in the safe room, as terrorists went on a rampage of slaughter outside, reminded him of his mother's accounts of the Holocaust. A hostage who had been released drew a comparison with the Yom Kippur War. It took her husband, she said, less time to get from the western Negev to the battles in Sinai on that Saturday afternoon than it took the IDF to get to the kibbutz, despite the bases and camps located all around.

Kibbutz Nir Oz after the Hamas attack.

Kibbutz Nir Oz after the Hamas attack.Credit: Hadas Parush

Halevi promised to start summing up the army's investigations of the war and to present the conclusions to the public at the beginning of July (the investigation of the massacre in Kibbutz Be'eri will apparently be wrapped up in the second week of that month). Hovering over the two meetings was the issue of the hostages. 

Thirty-five members of the kibbutz are still being held in Gaza, of whom 22 are considered to be alive. Without their return, the wound in the relations between the residents of the communities adjacent to Gaza – and actually between the entire public – and the army and state will not even begin to heal.

Extreme brinkmanship

In his search for an alibi, Netanyahu this week ignited a calculated, planned quarrel with the United States. On Tuesday, amid the storm over the legislation to create jobs for rabbis, Netanyahu released a new video in English. Contrary to the rules of the diplomatic game, he attacked President Biden. 

The background was a prolonged delay in the shipment of 3,500 precision bombs for the Air Force. Biden ordered the delay in May, in light of reservations about Israel's actions in Rafah. The administration believes that the damage caused by one-ton bombs in densely populated Gaza is simply too heavy. But the more worrisome implications of the decision apply to Lebanon: If an all-out war breaks out there, Israel's warplanes will need those bombs very badly.

An administration spokeswoman responded publicly by saying that she didn't know what the prime minister was referring to. After all, the U.S. has been sending huge arms shipments to Israel since the start of the war. That's a half truth, at best. Irrespective of the earlier shipments, a slowdown in American emergency aid has been apparent in recent months – and there is the specific problem of the precision munitions. 

A few hours after the clip was posted, the administration cancelled an important strategic meeting with senior figures from the Israeli defense establishment, which was to have dealt with the worrisome developments regarding the Iranian nuclear threat. On Friday (June 21) a different meeting will take place in Washington, in a reduced format.

It's difficult to escape the impression that strategic damage is being caused to Israel's special relations with the United States for narrow political reasons. Israel is immensely dependent on the Americans. It's not just a matter of munitions, spare parts and stocks. If the U.S. wants to disrupt an Israeli offensive in Lebanon or in Gaza, it knows exactly which buttons to press. If needed, Netanyahu promises to fight alone, with fingernails. That's not an encouraging thought when you break it down into details.

In another month, Netanyahu is scheduled to deliver a speech in Congress. It's possible that, despite the obvious tension with the administration, the prime minister has an interest in reaching that prestigious destination in peace. In the meantime, a new crisis is set to develop over humanitarian aid to Gaza, precisely after international organizations casted doubt the allegations that Israel is causing hunger in northern Gaza, citing inufficent data.

The temporary pier to deliver aid to Gaza, in May.

The temporary pier to deliver aid to Gaza, in May.Credit: U.S. Central Command via AP

The affair of the American pier is turning out to be an irreparable fiasco. The temporary pier that was built is intended to function in quiet lagoons more than in the turbulent waters of the shores in the Middle East. After an investment of almost $300 million, the U.S. is leaning toward ending the pier's operation soon. Instead, they will seek to move massive aid convoys into northern Gaza via the port of Ashdod and the Erez Crossing. Security-wise, that is a convenient set-up for Israel, which will allow it to control the arrangements. Politically, the far-right members of the government will likely encourage attempts to interfere with and torpedo the movement of the trucks, as has occurred off and on throughout the war.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, last month.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, last month.Credit: Oren Ben Hakoon

These are not the only political potholes on the government's road. It's clear that Netanyahu's remaining associates in the coalition – the Haredim and the ultra-right – have entered a mode of grab whatever you can. Ben-Gvir this week demanded a place in the war cabinet; Netanyahu announced that this forum was being dissolved after the resignation of the National Unity Party ministers, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, and lectured Ben-Gvir about the need to refrain from leaks. The Haredim are continuing to press for the enactment of laws critical for them and thereby to pour fuel on the flames of the protest movement.

At least in the matter of the draft, the army is no longer apprehensive about expressing its opinion. Halevi frequently speaks about sharing the burden and even revealed that the IDF needs 15 new battalions, in light of those killed and wounded in Gaza, and the increase in the load of the security tasks. He is talking about a plan to create three Haredi brigades which will fill the vacuum that was created. 

That plan is unlikely to be realized anytime soon, given the opposition of the Haredi rabbis, but the army maintains that it is able to mark potential recruits from the Haredi population, if the High Court of Justice strikes down the existing legislation and the government decides somehow to renew the effort to broaden the draft among the Haredim.

Netanyahu in the Knesset, last week.

Netanyahu in the Knesset, last week.Credit: Olivier Fitoussi

In security, in politics, in Israel's foreign relations, Netanyahu continues to pursue a policy of brinkmanship, and in a way that has become far more extreme during the war. After the events of the last week, it's more difficult to know whether the coalition will get through the Knesset's summer sitting without falling. And if it does collapse, it's impossible to predict how Netanyahu will behave under the threat of an approaching election while heading the most extreme transition government in the country's history.



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