The recent political upheaval in Vietnam has dramatically reshaped its elite leadership. Recent attention has been focused on two high-profile replacements — General To Lam’s promotion to state president and Tran Thanh Man’s elevation to become the chair of the National Assembly. This is warranted, given that Vietnam’s collective leadership centres on the so-called “Four Pillars” – the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), the president, the prime minister and the chair of the National Assembly.
It is crucial, however, to assess the new faces who have been recently promoted to the Politburo and Secretariat, the most consequential political agencies in this one-party state. Given the timing of the appointments as well as their criteria, they will likely remain at the top echelon of the country’s leadership after the 14th Congress in 2026.
At the CPV’s 9th Plenum on 16 May, four new Politburo members were elected to replace the six leaders ousted since 2021. They were Le Minh Hung, former CPV Central Committee Chief of Staff; Bui Thi Minh Hoai, Central Mass Mobilisation Commission Head, Do Van Chien, Vietnamese Fatherland Front Chairman, and Nguyen Trong Nghia, Central Propaganda Commission Head. Vice Minister of Public Security Luong Tam Quang was voted to head the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), a Politburo-level position, suggesting his imminent promotion to the Politburo.
The CPV Secretariat, which manages daily party affairs, saw a restructuring at the top. General Luong Cuong, the Head of the General Politics Department of the Vietnam People’s Army, succeeded Truong Thi Mai as the new Permanent Member of the Secretariat. General Trinh Van Quyet replaced Cuong, making him eligible to join the Secretariat. These reshuffles significantly boost the Army’s presence in the CPV’s top institutions, with three Politburo members (Luong Cuong, Minister of Defence Phan Van Giang, and Central Propaganda Commission Head Nguyen Trong Nghia) and two Secretariat members (Trinh Van Quyet and Nguyen Trong Nghia, who holds this position concurrently with his Politburo membership). This will help balance the power against the public security apparatus, which is dominant in the elite institutions. In another notable promotion, Vice Minister of Public Security Nguyen Duy Ngoc has become the CPV Central Committee’s Chief of Staff. This hints at his likely elevation to the Secretariat soon.
… the diminished technocratic expertise among top leaders raises concerns about Vietnam’s capacity to tackle multifaceted challenges, from economic issues to energy transition and foreign policy.
While further additions might follow, such as the promotions of a new vice Prime Minister and vice National Assembly’s vice Chair, these new appointments have filled nearly all vacancies left by the ousted leaders in the anti-corruption campaign. This has stabilised the system after the recent turbulence. This is particularly important as it is less than two years until the 14th Party Congress, when a new leadership transition begins.
A noticeable trait among these seven new leaders is their background in either the party apparatus or the police and military. Only Le Minh Hung, former governor of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), qualifies as a technocrat – that is, someone with technical or economic expertise. This makes two technocrats (along with Hanoi’s Party Secretary Dinh Tien Dung) out of 16 Politburo members, compared to seven out of 16 in the 12th Congress (2016) and five out of 19 at the start of the 13th Congress in 2021. This is the lowest ratio of technocrats in the Politburo since 1997. The party often adheres to the principle of “both red and expert” (vừa hồng vừa chuyên) – meaning one must be both committed to communist ideology and technically excellent – when choosing leaders. This emphasis has now decisively tilted towards the former.
Second, the CPV appears to be re-balancing regional and gender representation in its top ranks, evident in the promotion of a female member (Bui Thi Minh Hoai), an ethnic minority member (Do Van Chien), and a Southerner (General Nguyen Trong Nghia). This effort suggests a desire to maintain certain norms despite recent disruptions.
Third, the promotions of Generals Luong Tam Quang and Nguyen Duy Ngoc, long-time aides of President To Lam at MPS, are significant. In a sense, both are “special” cases, as they do not meet the formal criteria for promotion, which requires them being at least full-term Central Committee (CC) members. Even more strikingly, they were among the “exemptions” in the 13th Congress when first elected to the CC in 2021, being over the age limit for first-time members. Along with General Vu Hong Van’s elevation to the Central Inspection Commission last November, these moves suggest President To Lam is consolidating power within the party-state system, potentially positioning himself for the general secretary role in 2026.
While the full impact of these personnel changes remains to be seen, significant shifts in Vietnam’s economic governance or foreign policy are unlikely. Performance-based legitimacy will continue to underpin the regime’s stability, while trade openness, ideological considerations, and China wariness will sustain Hanoi’s “bamboo diplomacy” with China and the United States.
However, the diminished technocratic expertise among top leaders raises concerns about Vietnam’s capacity to tackle multifaceted challenges, from economic issues to energy transition and foreign policy. Additionally, the new leaders, barring the two vice ministers of public security, are more “thinkers” than “doers,” lacking significant achievements that justify their promotions. This reinforces the belief that in the uncertain context of the anti-corruption campaign, it is wiser for bureaucrats to play safe by doing less and survive rather than taking risks. This hardly encourages cadres to “dare to think and dare to work” to solve the current bureaucratic paralysis. The term was coined by General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to protect and motivate party cadres.
On a positive note, the mass promotions might signal a reduction in internal infighting as different factions settle their differences. With two years until the next Party Congress, President To Lam appears to have emerged as the ultimate winner in the fiercest game of thrones in the CPV’s recent history. While the long-term trajectory of Vietnam remains uncertain, this newfound stability might provide a respite after years of turbulence at the top. This would help prepare the party for the upcoming leadership transition.
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