‘Netanyahu Is Waging Three Wars of Attrition: Against Hamas, Hezbollah and the Israeli People
In the past two weeks, following a lengthy period of escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, a certain decline has been recorded in the scale of hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border. The assassination of Taleb Abdallah, commander of the Shi'ite organization's Nasser Unit, has marked the height of the confrontation to date. Abdallah was killed on June 12 in the village of Jwaya; Hezbollah responded by firing hundreds of rockets over several days, including strikes along the shores of Lake Kinneret. Huge fires were ignited in northern Israel, and the IDF retaliated by attacking targets in the Lebanese Beqa'a
The Muslim holiday of the Feast of the Sacrifice, which fell a few days later, signaled a first downturn in the intensity of the fire on both sides. Hezbollah is continuing to launch rockets, antitank missiles and drones, but appears to be operating at a somewhat reduced level compared to the previous weeks. The Israel Defense Forces are finding it difficult to discern a clear-cut policy on the other side. International warnings may have had some effect: The United States, France and the United Nations are sounding daily warnings to the Lebanese about the devastation their country can expect in the event of an all-out war. Some European countries have called on their citizens who are in Lebanon to leave immediately; on Thursday they were joined by the United States.
Similarly, in a relatively rare media interview, broadcast on Channel 14 at the beginning of the week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu didn't sound eager totest the IDF's capabilities in Lebanon. He maintained that he would first examine a diplomatic solution to the crisis. In the background, it's impossible to ignore Netanyahu's overarching wish to address the U.S. Congress toward the end of July.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin receives Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant at the Pentagon in Washington, on Wednesday.Credit: Kevin Lamarque/Reuters
Netanyahu was preceded in Washington this week by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (the two have barely been on speaking terms for a long time, other than for urgent security consultations). Gallant was given a fine reception by his hosts, who view him as a sane, professional channel, almost the last, to the Netanyahu government following the resignation of the National Unity party's ministers. The administration is also trying to play down the essence of the dispute, which Netanyahu deliberately made public, over the issue of the supply of munitions and combat matériel to Israel.
Gallant is returning more optimistic but still without a clear answer to the key question: Will the U.S. dispatch a ship carrying 3,500 precision bombs for the Air Force? President Joe Biden held up the shipment two months ago, over the disagreement about an IDF operation in Rafah, but the IDF will need the bombs urgently should a full-scale war develop in Lebanon.
At least for the moment – and on the uncertain assumption that Iran and Hezbollah are not engaging in a deception and dissimulation of the sort Hamas implemented in the years before the terrorist attack of October 7 – there are no salient signs of a desire on their part to set off a full-scale conflagration. Iran drew confidence from the events of April 14; although its attack of missiles and drones on Israel was largely thwarted, it did not pay a significant price.
At the same time, Tehran apparently feels that time is on its side, and that it's important to maintain the dialogue with the United States in order not to sustain additional punishment for furthering its nuclear project. A war in Lebanon would overshadow the other developments and could place Iran's strategy in danger.
Fires burn near the city of Kiryat Shmona as a result of Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon into northern Israel earlier this monthCredit: AFP
As for Hezbollah, it's always worth monitoring the comments of the journalist closest to the organization's secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah. Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, explained in an article Thursday that launching a full-scale offensive is pointless and that the "axis of resistance" does not want this. Hezbollah, he wrote, is stepping up its actions and warnings precisely in order to deter Israel from embarking on a war in Lebanon, and this approach is accepted by its Palestinian partners.
Adjusting, but slowly
Gladiola Base is currently the most threatened IDF site on the Mount Dov ridge, in the eastern section of the border with Lebanon. When the Golani infantry brigade soldiers who man it go on furlough, they go part of the way on foot, at unusual hours of the day, to avoid providing targets for Hezbollah's antitank missile squads. For more veteran visitors, that maneuver brings to mind the period of the Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon, from which the IDF withdrew in May 2000. Not that anyone on the base actually remembers being there – the sector's brigade commander was drafted in 2001.
The cautiousness, and with it the frequent alerts for incoming fire, are an inescapable part of life here. In April, a missile hit a truck that was about to offload concrete shielding for the base. The driver, Sharif Suad, from the Galilee village of Ras al-Ein, was killed. The remnants of the burned vehicle still lie on the roadside – it's apparently too complicated to remove them at the moment. In the outposts, soldiers move about wearing protective vests against shrapnel – the lighter and more antiquated version of ceramic body armor – both in the heart of the shielded zone and on the way back from the shower. There are some outposts where movement in exposed areas outside is done on the run.
Israeli soldiers training near the northern border, this month.Credit: IDF Spokesperson
The directives here were written in blood, and in the very recent past. Caution reduces casualties. On bases that are slightly more distant from the border, the message doesn't always get through. Not long ago soldiers were documented scurrying to protected areas as a Hezbollah drone exploded above them. Most of the losses incurred from drones, which sometimes fly for a long time before homing in on their target, stem from operational disciplinary hitches among the troops.
On Tuesday morning this week, Golani fighters on Mount Dov, who left the Gaza Strip in February, completed a short, battalion-wide exercise that included charging forward at night in rocky, thicketed, steep terrain. This generation of soldiers has chalked up intensive battle experience, in most cases more than the cumulative experience of the members of the General Staff. The IDF hasn't fought with this intensity, and above all for this duration, since the years immediately after the 1982 Lebanon War. The conversations between the officers refer to a future war with Hezbollah as a foregone conclusion; all that's missing is the date.
But betwixt and between, and without things been voiced explicitly, a different tendency is also discernible at the higher command levels and in the General Staff: The army is learning to get used to and adjust to the new situation of combat at limited intensity. The IDF is acting to reduce losses and improve its ability to strike at the enemy – but these efforts are not being accompanied by the requisite urgency. Residents of the border communities have been out of their homes since October 8, the day on which they were ordered by the state and the army to evacuate. Netanyahu told the war cabinet that there's no reason to hurry and decide that they will return home before the start of the next school year, on September 1. The army also has time.
Scene of a rocket strike near the hospital in Safed, northern Israel, in February.Credit: Gil Eliahu
In the background, appraisals that sow panic among the public are occasionally published, concerning the damage that is likely to be inflicted on the domestic front in an all-out war. As this column has noted for many months, the American plan for resolving the crisis is having a hard time getting off the ground. A cessation of hostilities in the north depends on a cease-fire in Gaza – as Nasrallah is saying explicitly – and there is no exit plan from the confrontation in Lebanon that differentiates it from the fighting in the Strip.
A recent headline was provided by Shaul Goldstein, CEO of Noga, the company that manages the country's electric power systems. In his assessment, "Nasrallah can easily knock out the electricity" in Israel, and "after 72 hours without electricity it will be impossible to live here." In response, the company's board discussed the possibility of removing Goldstein from office, but at least the sellers of generators are pleased.
In the absence of progress in the north, and while waiting for news from the south (see below), the result is management by the government and the state without making new decisions and almost without any policy. Since the dissolution of the war cabinet, following the resignation of ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, Netanyahu has hardly convened the broader security cabinet, which he views, and rightly so, as a superfluous forum for idle chatter.
But the prime minister has also reduced the number of other security consultations he holds. There's stagnation here, which doesn't stem only from his wish to distance National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir from decision-making forums. A considerable part of the efforts are focused on the desire for the coalition's political survival until the conclusion of the Knesset's summer session at the end of the month. At that point, the MKs will recess. The General Staff was perplexed – after all, the war is not going anywhere. It's hard to imagine any senior officer taking a summer vacation, not to mention the combat troops in the regular army and reserves.
Anti-government protesters block the Ayalon highway in Tel Aviv, Thursady.Credit: Tomer Appelbaum
Israel is mired in a war of attrition against Hamas and Hezbollah, but an additional war of attrition is being waged here: by the prime minister against the Israeli public. Netanyahu is acting deliberately in a kingdom of uncertainty, which heightens the public's dependence on the government. The average citizen doesn't know whether to expect that their son or daughter will get another emergency call-up order for reserve duty in the south or north this summer; whether they will have a steady supply of electricity and whether the coming school year will start as scheduled, not to mention the economic concerns.
That's not necessarily bad for Netanyahu. It's convenient for him to keep the public tensed up. That's also the reason for the excuse to defer his testimony in his trial (his lawyers this week asked the court to wait at least until March 2025) and to avoid holding an election (because "you don't hold an election during a war"), despite the majority of the public's clear opposition to the current government.
The interest of Israel's citizens – who until nine months ago thought they were living in a First World country – is to terminate the state of war fast. It's doubtful whether this is also the interest of their prime minister. In the meantime, he and his family are activating the Likud Knesset faction to reinforce the Shin Bet's protection of them and to warn about the malicious intent of the protesters, while the prime minister's wife explains to the parents of abducted women that the top generals are plotting a military coup against her husband (if they function as they did on October 7, she need have no special cause for concern).
And throughout, their mouthpieces are fanning hatred against the attorney general, Gali Baharav-Miara – this week she was branded a "traitor." Maybe someone needs to grab the lapel of Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar.
Phase 3, six months late
At the beginning of the week, the U.S. and Qatar, the somewhat despairing hostage deal mediators, were still occupied with trying to deconstruct the list of more than 40 objections that Hamas' top people submitted in response to the latest Israeli-American proposal, which was made public in Biden's speech at the end of May.
In a Channel 14 interview on Sunday, Netanyahu moved the negotiation goalposts by saying that he intended to discuss only the first phase of a new deal, one that would see the return of hostages from the humanitarian group (women, the elderly, and the ill), before fighting in Gaza resumes.
A demonstration at Tel Aviv's Hostage Square.Credit: Itai Ron
The next day, in light of furious reactions by the captives' families and heavy U.S. pressure, he was compelled to retract his remark in a Knesset speech, making it clear that his government continues to adhere to the Biden outline, which was coordinated with him in detail.
In the meantime, doubts are also arising in Washington. Administration officials are asking themselves whether it wouldn't be preferable to once again strive for a comprehensive one-phase deal, in which all the hostages, living and dead, will be returned, in exchange for the Palestinian prisoners Hamas is demanding, along with a lengthy cease-fire.
With the negotiations continuing to falter, Netanyahu said in the television interview that the IDF's operation in Rafah is expected to end within a few weeks, along with the "intensive stage" of the war in Gaza. That looks like a late acceptance of the position held by the army, which looks to move – almost half a year late, –to phase three of the campaign's original plan, and this time in full.
The plan calls for a transition to focused raids on Hamas targets, almost without any permanent hold on the ground. As long as there's no hostage deal, Israeli forces will remain in two places: the corridor that bisects the Strip in the Netzarim area, and perhaps also in the Philadelphi Corridor along the border with Egypt in Rafah.
Before the Israeli army entered into Rafah at the beginning of May, Israel and the U.S. argued over the IDF's ability to successfully evacuate the 1.4 million Palestinians who were crowded there, after IDF attacks had rendered most other parts of the Strip almost uninhabitable, and Israel prevented civilians from returning to the northern half of Gaza.
One of the Biden administration's major reasons for opposing the assault in Rafah was concern for civilian lives. Hence the restrictions placed on the use of heavy munitions, and its limitation on the operation of Israeli forces there (in a right-wing government that's proud of its sovereignty, no less) to one divisional headquarters instead of the originally planned two.
In this case, it turns out that the Israelis were right. Palestinian civilians, having plenty of relevant experience, fled for their lives. Soldiers who fought in Rafah relate that they hardly encountered even one civilian.
Humanitarian aid packages are dropped on the Gaza Strip near Rafah on Tuesday.Credit: AFP
Currently, according to the IDF's maps, the density in Gaza is even greater. About 1.9 million people are squeezed into a small area – about 20 percent of the Strip's original size – between the town of Deir al-Balah in the north and the agricultural region of the Mawasi coast adjacent to Rafah in the south. The other 300,000 or so Gazans are still in the northern part of the Strip.
Living conditions in the south are very bad, with a large part of the population in temporary tents. However, the provision of humanitarian aid is improving, and it appears that the reports about the spread of starvation in Gaza are inaccurate. It's doubtful that they were reliable also at the height of the war.
In empty Rafah, Hamas is boobytrapping not only buildings but entire streets, using devices that have been planted deep beneath the roads and are operated from afar. To thwart this, the IDF is trying to trigger the explosive devices itself with soldiers being kept far from danger.
The fighting in Rafah is limited, with Hamas sending in few armed personnel, in order to preserve its forces for the renewed takeover of Gaza it plans for after Israel withdraws. In the meantime, a new raid began on Thursday on the Shujaiyeh neighborhood in the eastern part of Gaza City – a site rife with battles, casualties, and destruction from the first months of the war.
This appears to be part of the "lawnmowing" method, whose goal is to forestall attempts by Hamas to plant new infrastructures in areas that the Israeli army had already evacuated. Last weekend, IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari was subjected to virulent criticism from the right when he dared to say, in an interview to Channel 13 News, that "Hamas is an idea" that cannot be uprooted completely. Just a few days later, the national security adviser, Tzachi Hanegbi, said the same thing in the annual Herzliya Conference on security.
An armored IDF vehicle which was hit by an explosive device in Jenin, West Bank, on Thursday.
While the IDF General Staff talks about lowering the level of Gaza-based terrorism to the more tolerable one of the West Bank, it looks as though the West Bank is closing the gap all by itself. On Thursday, during an arrest operation in Jenin, a relatively complex arrangement of explosive devices was activated against a force from the Haruv reconnaissance unit of the Kfir Brigade.
An officer in the unit, Capt. Alon Sacgiu, 22, from Hadera, was killed in the blast and 16 soldiers were wounded, one of them seriously. One device, which was planted 1.5 meters below a road, went off under a Panther-model armored vehicle, wounding some of its occupants. When forces arrived to extract them, a second device was activated, causing most of the casualties, including Sacgiu.
The presence of more lethal and sophisticated explosive devices in the West Bank has been known for more than a year. Most of them are smuggled in from Jordan via networks run by personnel of Iran's Revolutionary Guards through Syria. Recently, the Jordanians uncovered two large arsenals in Amman, and the IDF announced the thwarting of two smuggling attempts through the Jordanian border. The matériel seized there, which includes roadside devices and IEDs, is highly diverse and destructive.
The Jordanians are apprehensive that Iran and Hezbollah are bent on operating cells of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood on their soil to mount attacks on their security forces and perhaps also against U.S. troops. Iran explicitly threatened Jordan after the latter's contribution to thwarting the missile attack on Israel in April. Concurrently, efforts to flood the West Bank with more advanced weaponry continue, with a dual aim: to undermine the stability of the Palestinian Authority and to exacerbate the confrontation with Israel there.
In this sense, it's being said in the General Staff, there's an indirect and uncoordinated partnership of interests between Iran and Hamas, and members of the coalition in Israel. The far-right wing in the Netanyahu government is also working overtime to ignite the West Bank and topple the government of the Palestinian Authority. Minister Bezalel Smotrich is stepping up his demands to strangle the PA economically and is demanding that Netanyahu allow him to legitimize four settler outposts as punishment against the PA for its involvement in the proceedings against Israel in the international courts in The Hague.
Netanyahu himself has actually moderated his approach to the PA of late, at least outwardly. Television news broadcasts this week quoted comments by Netanyahu in "closed conversations," saying that the PA's positive actions should not be ignored and that toppling its rule is not in Israel's interest at this time.
According to another report, Netanyahu's circle is hinting that he intends to include in his speech to Congress a slightly more positive message regarding the two-state vision, in the hope of still being able to integrate Israel somehow into the American-Saudi deal, even though Washington expects the deadline for that to be at the end of the month.
As the U.S. presidential election approaches, the Democrats will have a hard time enlisting Republican senators and members of the House in a move that will hand President Biden a rare foreign policy achievement and will likely anger his opponent, Donald Trump.