Fighting precision with precision
Israel appears to have destroyed a facility it has long alleged to be a Hizbullah guided- missile factory, demonstrating that the formerly generally stable deterrence relationship between the two sides is eroding.
This blog post was first published on the Military Balance+ on 20 June 2024.
Years after the site became a bone of contention between Israel and Hizbullah, Israel appears to have finally destroyed a facility it has long alleged to be a Hizbullah guided-missile factory in the Beqaa Valley.
The Beqaa Valley site suffered damage in February 2024 and then again in May, when Israel struck and destroyed multiple buildings. This manufacturing facility was of particular concern to Israel as it associated the site with the production of rockets and missiles.
After the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, Hizbullah began a limited military campaign against Israel, calibrated to demonstrate the group’s solidarity with Palestinian groups and bind Israeli forces in the north while avoiding all-out war. While this campaign was first limited to the immediate border area, it gradually escalated with the sides conducting strikes deeper into Lebanese and Israeli territory, respectively.
Satellite imagery indicates that Israel has used its campaign to not only strike tactical targets but also hit important installations such as the alleged Hizbullah missile factory. Between 4–9 February 2024, two buildings at the site designated by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) as the motor-casting and processing facilities appeared to have suffered some damage. Between 14–19 May, the facility, including the alleged motor-production area, logistics and storage facilities, was almost destroyed. Local media had reported heavy airstrikes in the area around Nabi Chit on 15 May, suggesting that the site was likely hit on that day.
Years after the site became a bone of contention between Israel and Hizbullah, Israel appears to have finally destroyed a facility it has long alleged to be a Hizbullah guided-missile factory in the Beqaa Valley.
The Beqaa Valley site suffered damage in February 2024 and then again in May, when Israel struck and destroyed multiple buildings. This manufacturing facility was of particular concern to Israel as it associated the site with the production of rockets and missiles.
After the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, Hizbullah began a limited military campaign against Israel, calibrated to demonstrate the group’s solidarity with Palestinian groups and bind Israeli forces in the north while avoiding all-out war. While this campaign was first limited to the immediate border area, it gradually escalated with the sides conducting strikes deeper into Lebanese and Israeli territory, respectively.
Satellite imagery indicates that Israel has used its campaign to not only strike tactical targets but also hit important installations such as the alleged Hizbullah missile factory. Between 4–9 February 2024, two buildings at the site designated by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) as the motor-casting and processing facilities appeared to have suffered some damage. Between 14–19 May, the facility, including the alleged motor-production area, logistics and storage facilities, was almost destroyed. Local media had reported heavy airstrikes in the area around Nabi Chit on 15 May, suggesting that the site was likely hit on that day.
Satellite imagery analysis by Joseph Dempsey, IISS
Click HERE to open the full-resolution image.
Satellite imagery analysis by Joseph Dempsey, IISS
Click HERE to open the full-resolution image.
For over ten years, Iran has pursued a strategy of enabling its non-state proxies and allies to produce their own artillery rockets and missiles. This approach has played a major role in Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) acquiring rocket arsenals in Gaza and appears to have led to the emergence of domestic missile and rocket manufacturing in Yemen and Iraq as well.
In Lebanon, Iran and Hizbullah seem to have adopted a three-pronged manufacturing strategy. This encompassed producing missiles for Hizbullah's use in Syria, converting older unguided artillery rockets into precision-guided missiles using conversion kits and producing entire missiles directly in Lebanon. While the status of missile-production inside Syria remains unknown, satellite imagery shows that several rounds of Israeli airstrikes between 2017–2020 destroyed the new production site in Masyaf in western Syria that was likely intended for this purpose. The conversion of existing unguided rockets inside Lebanon have likely continued but would be restricted by the size and quality of existing arsenals and their shelf life.
For over ten years, Iran has pursued a strategy of enabling its non-state proxies and allies to produce their own artillery rockets and missiles. This approach has played a major role in Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) acquiring rocket arsenals in Gaza and appears to have led to the emergence of domestic missile and rocket manufacturing in Yemen and Iraq as well.
In Lebanon, Iran and Hizbullah seem to have adopted a three-pronged manufacturing strategy. This encompassed producing missiles for Hizbullah's use in Syria, converting older unguided artillery rockets into precision-guided missiles using conversion kits and producing entire missiles directly in Lebanon. While the status of missile-production inside Syria remains unknown, satellite imagery shows that several rounds of Israeli airstrikes between 2017–2020 destroyed the new production site in Masyaf in western Syria that was likely intended for this purpose. The conversion of existing unguided rockets inside Lebanon have likely continued but would be restricted by the size and quality of existing arsenals and their shelf life.
Wholescale production inside Lebanon would have likely appeared promising to Hizbullah, at least initially. Unlike in Syria, facilities in Lebanon would be protected from attack by a relatively stable deterrence relationship between Israel and Hizbullah. Producing solid-propellant motors domestically could help Hizbullah avoid having to smuggle into the country large and heavy motors that could not easily be disassembled for transport, thereby limiting imports to smaller, easier-to-conceal items such as guidance kits and their components. Therefore domestic production could enable Hizbullah to acquire far more missiles than through smuggling larger components.
In 2017, reports surfaced about a potential Hizbullah missile factory in the Beqaa Valley. Two years later, in 2019, Israel published imagery of what it stated was a Hizbullah missile factory near the Beqaa town of Nabi Chit. Annotations provided by the IDF indicated that the facility was designed to produce solid-propellant motors and warheads, making it significantly more important than the smaller missile-related workshops Israel had previously exposed, which might have been limited to mere missile conversion or component manufacturing. Satellite imagery suggests major construction of the facility began as early as 2014. Hizbullah denied the claim.
In 2017, reports surfaced about a potential Hizbullah missile factory in the Beqaa Valley. Two years later, in 2019, Israel published imagery of what it stated was a Hizbullah missile factory near the Beqaa town of Nabi Chit. Annotations provided by the IDF indicated that the facility was designed to produce solid-propellant motors and warheads, making it significantly more important than the smaller missile-related workshops Israel had previously exposed, which might have been limited to mere missile conversion or component manufacturing. Satellite imagery suggests major construction of the facility began as early as 2014. Hizbullah denied the claim.
Satellite imagery analysis by Joseph Dempsey, IISS
Click HERE to open the full-resolution image.
Hizbullah’s acquisition of precision-guided missiles sparked concern among Israeli decision-makers, who feared that longer-range improved-accuracy missiles could be used by Hizbullah to effectively target critical infrastructure and military assets. The nature of the guidance upgrades remains uncertain. In 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel would ‘continue to act against the threat of precision-guided rockets’ and ‘do whatever is necessary to defend Israel at sea, on land, and in the air’. The IDF asserted in 2021 that Hizbullah’s precision-guided missiles were the largest threat to Israel after Iran’s nuclear programme and that an arsenal of 500–1,000 of these weapons would constitute a red line and force Israel to take action.
While Israel did act against Hizbullah’s missile-production programme, the effort initially took the form of sabotage and interdiction rather than direct military action against targets in Lebanon. In August 2019, an explosive-loaded quadcopter struck a truck in southern Beirut. Press reports indicated the attack targeted an industrial mixer for use in solid-propellant manufacturing, thereby hitting a critical bottleneck in the missile-production effort. Later, Israeli naval commandos reportedly attacked a ship carrying a second mixer as a replacement, while other strikes targeted missile-manufacturing equipment being transported via Syria.
It remains unclear whether the alleged missile factory ever began production or if some equipment might have been removed as clashes between Hizbullah and Israel intensified. Therefore, the overall impact of the strikes on Hizbullah’s precision project remains uncertain. However, the strikes do indicate that the previously broadly stable deterrence relationship between Israel and Hizbullah has been eroding. Whereas Israel once opted for covert action against Hizbullah’s missile programme to stay below the group’s red lines, it now sees little reason not to strike a key site it claims is associated with the programme.
Hizbullah’s acquisition of precision-guided missiles sparked concern among Israeli decision-makers, who feared that longer-range improved-accuracy missiles could be used by Hizbullah to effectively target critical infrastructure and military assets. The nature of the guidance upgrades remains uncertain. In 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel would ‘continue to act against the threat of precision-guided rockets’ and ‘do whatever is necessary to defend Israel at sea, on land, and in the air’. The IDF asserted in 2021 that Hizbullah’s precision-guided missiles were the largest threat to Israel after Iran’s nuclear programme and that an arsenal of 500–1,000 of these weapons would constitute a red line and force Israel to take action.
While Israel did act against Hizbullah’s missile-production programme, the effort initially took the form of sabotage and interdiction rather than direct military action against targets in Lebanon. In August 2019, an explosive-loaded quadcopter struck a truck in southern Beirut. Press reports indicated the attack targeted an industrial mixer for use in solid-propellant manufacturing, thereby hitting a critical bottleneck in the missile-production effort. Later, Israeli naval commandos reportedly attacked a ship carrying a second mixer as a replacement, while other strikes targeted missile-manufacturing equipment being transported via Syria.
It remains unclear whether the alleged missile factory ever began production or if some equipment might have been removed as clashes between Hizbullah and Israel intensified. Therefore, the overall impact of the strikes on Hizbullah’s precision project remains uncertain. However, the strikes do indicate that the previously broadly stable deterrence relationship between Israel and Hizbullah has been eroding. Whereas Israel once opted for covert action against Hizbullah’s missile programme to stay below the group’s red lines, it now sees little reason not to strike a key site it claims is associated with the programme.