Navigating The Terror Threat: Russia And India In Afghanistan – Analysis
File photo of Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov meeting with Afghanistan's Taliban Leaders. Photo Credit: Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
By Shivam Shekhawat and Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash
Since the terror attack at the Crocus city centre in Moscow, allegedly by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), in March 2024, Moscow has intensified efforts to prevent Afghanistan’s resurgence as a terror haven. One way of doing this, as Russian actions suggest is greater engagement with the Taliban.
Recently, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice sent a proposal to President Vladimir Putin to remove the group from the list of terror organisations where it has been listed since 2003. Given that India and Russia cooperate on terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, it is important to understand the new developments in Afghanistan and India-Russia cooperation on counterterrorism.
Securing their interests
Russia’s decision to remove the Taliban from its terror list, while not sudden, is viewed as a ‘limited risk’ scenario. While falling short of recognition, with the group still under the UN Security Council sanctions, Moscow’s decision aims to gain leverage with the Taliban-run Islamic Emirate. Since the fall of Kabul, Russia has engaged with the Taliban—its diplomats stayed back and its embassy remained open.
Moscow also accredited a Taliban-appointed diplomat in August 2022 and accepted a military attaché in February this year. It invited the group for the Moscow Format consultations in 2021 and 2022 and the St Petersburg International Economic Forum twice, in 2022 and 2024. The country’s special envoy recently also hinted at Kabul’s possible inclusion in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), subject to its recognition.
In its 2023 Concept of Foreign Policy, Russia articulated its long-term aim to integrate Afghanistan into the Eurasian space for cooperation. There is, thus, also a strong geoeconomic factor behind Moscow’s overtures to the Taliban and the group’s removal from the terror list is expected to facilitate bilateral economic ties. Projects like the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railroad and the Afghan sector of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas can promote economic activity in Afghanistan, lead to improved regional connectivity, and enhance border infrastructure to check terrorist infiltration. For Moscow, a stable Afghanistan is seen as a firewall to prevent the spread of terrorism to Central Asia, and eventually into Russia.
India has a technical team stationed at its embassy in Kabul since June 2022. New Delhi’s engagement with the group has also increased, with Indian officials meeting IEA’s Acting FM in March 2024 to discuss the provision of aid and the use of Chabahar by Afghan traders. The Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Investment also held an online meeting with the Indian ports Global Limited to discuss the port’s use by traders from the country. Taliban-appointed diplomats have not been formally accredited by India although, the Afghan Republic-era Ambassador and the consul general of Mumbai have resigned.
While highlighting the need for the Taliban to uphold women and minorities’ rights and establish an inclusive government, India has asserted that Afghanistan shouldn’t be used as a haven for terrorist groups, placing the onus to counter the threat on the Taliban. It sees both—anti-India terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and transnational groups—as a major threat to its security and strategic interests. For India, fears about the presence of LeT and JeM in Afghanistan and their ability to destabilise Jammu and Kashmir have been a preeminent concern. The 13th report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team mentioned that the JeM maintains training camps in Afghanistan, with some of them under the direct control of the Taliban and that the LeT provided finance and training support to the Taliban’s operations. For New Delhi, stability in Afghanistan is also important for its outreach to the Central Asian Republics.
A Haven for terrorism?
The past two and a half years of the Islamic Emirate’s rule in Afghanistan have revealed the failure of the commitments made in the Doha agreement to prevent the use of Afghanistan as a haven and a springboard for coordinating transnational terror attacks. The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s January 2024 report highlighted the close relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Al Qaeda also called on the group’s supporters from all over the world to migrate to Afghanistan and emulate the practices of the Taliban to launch a collective struggle against the ‘Western’ and the ‘Zionist’ forces. The group now has a presence in 10 of the 34 provinces and has opened new training camps, madrasas and safe houses in the country. While the Taliban enjoys a cordial relationship with some groups, including Al Qaeda, the increase in the strength of groups like the ISKP poses a significant challenge to their hold on power as well as to the overall security of the region.
Thus, many in the international community see establishing some sort of engagement with the Taliban as necessary to counter this threat. Moscow’s proposal to remove the Taliban from the proscribed list is also seen as an incremental step to have more space to manoeuvre. But whether the Taliban is capable and willing to effectively establish control over these terror groups is still anybody’s guess. The ISKP is putting a renewed emphasis on South and Central Asia, expanding its outreach to these regions. The group has criticised the Taliban’s engagement with India with some instances of both the ISKP and Al Qaeda commenting on the internal developments in New Delhi.
India’s cooperation with Russia is seen as providing New Delhi a gateway to engage with the Taliban. India’s meetings with some members of the Emirate last year are seen to be fructifying because of Russian assistance. Last month, Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s Special Envoy to Afghanistan, visited India at New Delhi’s invitation. The timing of the visit—in the aftermath of the attack in Moscow—indicated both Moscow and India’s shared concerns about the terror threat.
In the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the trifecta of Iran, Russia, and China stepped up their engagement in the country, united with the mutual aim of keeping the US out of the region. Even though the US publicly refrains from seeing Afghanistan as a platform for strategic competition with Russia, the latter views it that way. Last month, Moscow and Beijing reaffirmed their resolve to prevent any attempts by the US or NATO to set up military infrastructure in the country and committed to increase cooperation in Afghanistan.
As discussed above, both India and Russia share common concerns in the country which provides them space to work together through both bilateral and multilateral channels. Experts deem the importance of the SCO- Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO-RATS) framework—to counter the terror threat in Afghanistan, by allowing for the sharing of information about certain groups and individuals inimical to the member countries’ interests, tackling drug smuggling, conducting joint anti-terrorist exercises, etc.—as an important means to enhance cooperation.
However, while India engages in a few initiatives led by Russia and is a member of the SCO, Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan engage through groupings which exclude India. Their engagement with the group is also distinct from that of New Delhi, which is relatively more cognisant of balancing its commitment towards the interests of the Afghan people with its own strategic interests. Despite these differences, New Delhi must work with Russia to have a stake in how the security situation develops in the country.
Taliban’s counter-insurgency role
The Taliban has refrained from acknowledging the full extent of the threat from the ISKP, with its senior leaders downplaying it in public meetings and denying any need for external support. As per the UN, the Taliban’s priority is majorly managing the internal threat the ISKP poses to their power rather than looking at the group’s external actions. The Taliban increased its counter-insurgency efforts in February last year but the reduction in the number of attacks by the ISKP was not because of the effectiveness of the Taliban’s counter-terror capabilities but probably because of the ISKP’s own strategy shift.
Meanwhile, the Taliban has also failed to address China’s concerns about the presence of the Turkestan Islamic Party (also called the ETIM) on its border or the TTP’s unceasing attacks in Pakistan. While in the initial months, Russia did appreciate the Taliban’s efforts at countering the ISKP it has highlighted that the group will have to do more. There were reports about the perpetrators of the attack in Iran and Türkiye receiving their training in Afghanistan. The close links between the Haqqani network and the ISKP are seen as one of the reasons why the group has failed to counter ISKP’s growth.
Conclusion
Taliban’s reluctance or inability to deal with Afghan-based terror outfits for public posturing has now led to the international community increasing its engagement to pre-empt the instability that could arise in a situation where the Emirate is unable to manage the different groups. But greater engagement risks granting legitimacy to the group, even as there is no surety of any tangible counter-terrorism measures taken by Kabul and any movement towards implementation of promises of broad basing governance and women’s rights and freedom.
So far, China, Russia, Iran, Türkiye and others have been attempting to fill the vacuum caused by the sudden and chaotic withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan in 2021. For India, while certain differences with Russia on the degree of engagement with the group and the latter’s growing bonhomie with China will persist, it will continue to maintain the momentum of its cooperation, to keep its foot in the game, as the two share mutual concerns security-related and economic stability concerns in the country.
About the authors:
- Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
- Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation.
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.