





Study of Change in U.S. Public Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims, 2022-2024

Shibley Telhami*, Principal Investigator


As in 2022, Muslim Americans were least likely to be considered as strengthening American society




As in 2022, opposition to a Muslim presidential candidate was more than twice as large as opposition to a Jewish candidate



Favorability of both Muslim people and Islam declined in 2024



Two years later, Republicans still favor officially declaring a Christian nation while support grew among Democrats



*This project was partially funded by the Grand Challenges Grant at the University of Maryland

Study of Change in U.S. Public Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims, 2022-2024

In 2022, we released a [study](#) that, in part, looked at the attitudes of the U.S. public on issues related to racial prejudice and religious discrimination. In 2024, we repeated and expanded our questioning on these issues to study the change over time. We aim to study if there has been an actual expansion in recent years of people holding prejudiced views (which we call horizontal prejudice) or if the increase in [antisemitism](#) and [Islamophobia](#) seen in recent years should be attributed to a vocal minority expanding their activity and opinions (which we call vertical prejudice).


Overall, there were two groups seen as facing the most prejudice in 2024: Muslim Americans and Jewish Americans. Twenty-two percent and 30% of respondents, respectively, said these two groups face ‘a lot more’ prejudice compared to five years ago. The increase in perceived prejudice against Muslim and Jewish Americans is most likely due to the current war in Israel and Gaza and the attention both groups are receiving in mainstream media due to the ongoing protests throughout the US. In 2022, our polling found that respondents said Asian Americans were the group facing the most prejudice and discrimination, which aligned with the unprecedented [increase](#) in Asian-Americans being targeted in hate crimes following the COVID-19 pandemic.

Among White respondents, there was a perceived rise in the degree of prejudice faced by Muslim and Jewish Americans compared to Christian Americans in 2024: 22% of White respondents said Muslim Americans face more prejudice and 33% said the same of Jewish Americans, compared to just 16% for Christian Americans.

Black respondents reported their own race as facing the most prejudice by ten percentage points compared to any other group. Hispanic respondents, on the other hand, perceived prejudice toward Jews (25%), Muslims (23%), and Blacks (20%) to be greater than that against Latinos (18%).

White and Hispanic respondents reported increases in prejudices against Muslim and Jewish Americans as higher than perceived prejudice against their own racial group


Q. Compared to 5 years ago and based on your own experience, including interactions with others, how much racial/ethnic/religious prejudice (such as statements that reveal prejudice against a person because of their race, ethnicity, or religion), if any, would you say exists against each of the following groups in the U.S. today? [Those who said 'a lot']



Compared to 2022, there are overall fewer respondents reporting perceived prejudice against the various racial/ethnic and religious groups, with the exception of Muslim and Jewish Americans (a three-percentage point and ten-percentage point increase among those who said combined 'a lot' and 'a little' more, respectively).

Perceived increases in prejudice faced by many racial and religious groups have declined, with the exception of Muslim and Jewish Americans

Q. Compared to 5 years ago and based on your own experience, including interactions with others, how much racial/ethnic/religious prejudice (such as statements that reveal prejudice against a person because of their race, ethnicity, or religion), if any, would you say exists against each of the following groups in the U.S. today? [Combined 'a lot' and 'a little']




Looking at those who said there was 'a lot' or 'a little' more prejudice, the largest drop from 2022 to 2024 for White respondents was associated with perceptions of increasing

prejudice faced by Asian Americans (13-percentage point decrease), while more White respondents reported an increase of prejudice faced by Jewish Americans (12-percentage point increase) and Muslim Americans (10-percentage point increase). For Black respondents, the largest decrease was associated with Asian Americans (32-percentage point difference) but unlike White respondents, there was also a decrease among perceptions of prejudice against Muslim Americans (15-percentage points). Black respondents still had similar levels of perceived increases in prejudice against Jewish Americans, with 42% saying there was more prejudice in 2024 compared to 43% in 2022. Hispanics were less likely to report increases in prejudice faced by Latino and Black Americans (a 20-percentage point decline for both) compared with responses to the same question in 2022. In addition, compared to 2022, a smaller proportion (by 10-percentage points) of Hispanics perceived increasing prejudice faced by Muslims. In contrast, a larger proportion (by 10-percentage points) said the same about Jewish Americans.

However, while White respondents were more likely in 2024 than in 2022 to say Muslim Americans face increasing levels of prejudice, when asked about whether various racial/ethnic and religious groups strengthened or weakened American society, only 29% of White respondents said Muslim Americans strengthened American society, with 22% saying it weakened society. In comparison, 49% of White respondents said Christian Americans strengthened society, 48% said the same of both Jewish Americans and views about White, Black, and Latino Americans were all above 40% as well.

White respondents were more split on whether Muslim Americans strengthen or weaken American society


Q. Would you say that, in general, the number of ___ Americans strengthens or weakens American society [Among White respondents]



Overall, respondents were the least likely to say Muslim Americans strengthened American society, and most likely to see the group as weakening American society. Only 28% of respondents overall said that Muslim Americans strengthened American society while 19% said it weakened society. In contrast, 43% of respondents said that Jewish Americans strengthen American society with only 5% saying the group weaken society.

Muslim Americans were least likely to be considered as strengthening American society


Q. Would you say that, in general, the number of ___ Americans strengthens or weakens American society [Among All Respondents]



As expected, party affiliation played a large role in how respondents viewed Muslim Americans, but it was not a large factor with regard to views about Jewish Americans. There was a 28-percentage point difference between Republicans and Democrats who said Muslims strengthen American society but only a 3-percentage point difference when respondents were asked about Jewish Americans. A plurality of Republicans said Muslim Americans weaken society, with 21% each saying ‘has no impact’ or ‘I don’t know,’ and only 16% saying Muslim Americans strengthen American society. Meanwhile, a plurality of Democrats said Muslims strengthen society, with 27% saying they have no impact. In contrast, 47% of Republicans and 50% of Democrats said Jewish Americans strengthen American society with 30% and 27%, respectively, saying they have no impact.

Partisanship played key role in views of Muslims Americans


Q. Would you say that, in general, the number of ___ Americans: [2024]



However, there was significant decrease in 2024 from 2022 among both Democrats and Republicans on how much Muslim Americans strengthen American society, but only a notable decline among Democrats regarding Jewish Americans’ impact on society. In 2022, 66% of Democrats and 21% of Republicans said that Muslim Americans strengthened American society, compared to 44% and 16%, respectively, in 2024. When asking about Jewish Americans, 71% of Democrats said ‘strengthened society’ compared to 50% in 2024. Instead, the number of Democrats who said Jewish and Muslim Americans ‘have no impact’ grew. However, among Republicans there was no significant change from 2022 to 2024 regarding Jewish Americans strengthening American society and or having no impact.

More Democrats and Republicans said Muslim and Jewish Americans strengthened American society in 2022

Q. Would you say that, in general, the number of ___ Americans: [2022]



Effect of Religion on Presidential Candidacy

Throughout U.S. history, there have been concerns about non-Protestant Christian presidential candidates. With President John F. Kennedy, there were [concerns](#) his Catholic faith would make the U.S. susceptible to Vatican interference. With Mitt Romney there were [concerns](#) about his Mormon faith and with President Barack Obama, voters who believed he was Muslim (a misconception [among](#) nearly one in five Americans in 2010) [expressed](#) high levels of discomfort about his religious beliefs.


We found that in 2024, respondents were still considering a presidential candidate's religious beliefs, even if they agreed with the general positions of the candidate. Overall, respondents expressed the highest levels of opposition (32%) with an Atheist candidate in 2024. However, just under 32% of respondents said they opposed a candidate who was Muslim. In contrast, 10% would oppose a Catholic presidential candidate and 12% would oppose a Jewish candidate.

This is similar to the results we found in the [January 2023 report](#), where 32% of respondents opposed an Atheist candidate. While a Muslim candidate was still more highly opposed in 2022 (26% of respondents) compared to a Jewish candidate (11%), the growth in opposition increased around the same rate from 2022 to 2024, 6 percentage points for a Muslim candidate and 5 percentage points for a Jewish candidate. Notably, in 2022, respondents indicated a Jewish candidate garnered the lowest levels of opposition compared with candidates of other religious backgrounds.

Two years later, respondents were about as likely to oppose a Jewish candidate as either a Catholic or mainline Protestant. At the same time, in 2024, respondents expressed much higher levels of opposition to a Muslim candidate than to a candidate representing any other religious tradition.

Opposition to a Muslim presidential candidate was more than twice as large as opposition to a Jewish candidate

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were: [Those who said no]




Looking at the results by party affiliation, we see that Democrats in 2024 were most opposed to a Mormon (29%) and Evangelical Christian candidate (28%), with 16% of Democrats opposing a Muslim candidate and 7% opposing a Jewish candidate. However, this is an increase in opposition to both Muslim and Jewish candidates compared to 2022, when only 9% of Democrats opposed a Muslim candidate and only 5% opposed a Jewish candidate. Republicans in 2022 and 2024 were more opposed than Democrats to a Muslim candidate, and the opposition has grown since 2022. A majority of Republicans (57%) oppose a Muslim candidate in 2024, compared to 44% in 2022. Looking at a Jewish candidate, opposition among Republicans doubled from 7% in 2022 to 15% in 2024.

We originally asked this question in 2016, with just the options of “Evangelical Christian,” “Jewish,” and “Muslim.” We expanded the question to include the additional options in 2020. Looking at this data, we see that in both 2016 and 2020, the level of opposition to a Muslim candidate was similar to 2024, with opposition levels dropping in 2022. However, for a Jewish candidate, opposition remained relatively consistent until 2024, when there was a marked increase.

Opposition to a Muslim candidate briefly decreased in 2022 before returning to pre-2022 levels while opposition to Jewish candidate increased in 2024

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were: [Those who said no]




Looking at the trendlines, we also found the opposition gap between Muslim and Jewish candidates has continued for nearly a decade. In 2016, there was a 24-percentage point difference in opposition to a Muslim candidate compared to a Jewish candidate for respondents overall, with a 41-percentage point difference among Republicans and a 9-percentage point difference among Democrats. In 2020, survey data revealed a 26-percentage point difference in opposition to a Muslim candidate compared to a Jewish candidate. Among Republicans, it was 49-percentage point difference and among Democrats it was a 7-percentage point difference.

When we compared attitudes toward Muslim and Jewish candidates between age groups, a similar gap existed with regard to views about Jewish and Muslim candidates. Looking at respondents under 35 years old and 35 years and older, we found that younger and older respondents were more opposed to a Muslim candidate than a Jewish candidate. Younger respondents were also more accepting of both candidates compared to respondents 35 years and older. However, the change between 2022 and 2024 in levels of opposition to a Muslim candidate was especially among young respondents. There was a 14-percentage point difference across time periods among those under 35, in comparison to the 4-percentage point difference among older respondents. Looking at Jewish candidates, while the levels of opposition stayed relatively the same for younger respondents from 2022 to 2024, among older respondents, opposition dropped.

Levels of opposition to a Muslim candidate increased most dramatically among those under 35 and levels of opposition to a Jewish candidate decreased most dramatically among those 35 years and older

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were: [Those who said no]




While younger respondents were more willing to support both Muslim and Jewish candidates than older respondents, they showed a less opposition to a Jewish candidate and their opposition for a Muslim candidate increased.

Looking at the 2020 data, the level opposition seen in 2024 against a Muslim candidate were similar to the 2020 levels. As seen with the data broken down by party, the drop in opposition against a Muslim candidate in 2022 was reversed in 2024. With older respondents, this is also seen with the Jewish candidate. However, among young respondents, opposition has decreased since 2020, when it was 11%.

While both young and older respondents' opposition to a Muslim candidate returns to pre-2022 levels, young respondents' opposition to a Jewish candidate continue to remain lower than the 2020 levels

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were: [Those who said no]




Looking at the data by both party affiliation and age highlighted the increase in party polarization on these attitudes from even four years ago. In 2020, 12% of Republicans and 10% of Democrats under 35 years old opposed a Jewish candidate. In 2024, 24% of young Republicans and 8% of young Democrats opposed a Jewish candidate. Looking at those 35 years and older, in 2020, 5% of Republicans and 6% of Democrats opposed a Jewish candidate compared to 12% of Republicans and 8% of Democrats in 2024. The same is true for Muslims, 48% of young Republicans and 12% of young Democrats opposed a Muslim candidate in 2020 compared to 55% of young Republicans and 9% of young Democrats in 2024. Among older Republicans, it was 19% in 2020 compared to 57% in 2024 and among older Democrats it was 15% in 2020 compared to 19% in 2024.

Attitudes Toward Islam and Muslims

While favorable attitudes towards Muslims and Islam among respondents were relatively high in 2022 compared to previous years, we see these favorable attitudes decreased dramatically in 2024, reversing an upward trend of favorable attitudes towards Muslims in particular since 2016, which we discussed in our 2023 [report](#) and in a Brookings [article](#) the same year. This sharp change in attitudes toward Muslims and Islam, which holds across party lines, age, and ethnicity/race, is likely related to the war in Israel and Gaza that began in 2023 following the October 7th attacks by Hamas and which saw a [surge](#) in Islamophobia and antisemitism in the United States.

Favorability of both Muslim people and Islam declined in 2024

Q. What is your attitude about the following [Those who said 'favorable']




When we asked respondents in 2024 about the extent to which they have favorable attitudes towards Muslim people, a majority of respondents still viewed Muslim people favorably, while just under a majority viewed Islam favorably. However, there was a twelve-percentage point decrease in favorable attitudes compared to 2022. During the same two-year period, there was a five-percentage point decrease in favorable attitudes towards the Muslim religion.

This decrease held across party affiliation, age, and ethnic and racial background of respondents. Although Democrats held more favorable attitudes toward Muslims and Islam compared to Republicans, favorable attitudes towards both the people and the religion dropped in 2024. However, as noted in a 2015 [article](#), “Americans differentiate between the ‘Muslim people’ and the ‘Muslim religion,’ and they view Islam more unfavorably than they do Muslims.” This was still true in 2024. Both Democrats and Republicans held more favorable views of Muslims than Islam, with there being a 15-percentage point difference for Democrats and a 27-percentage point difference for Republicans.


While Democrats still viewed Muslims more favorably than Republicans, there was a decrease in favorability from 2022 to 2024

Q. What is your attitude about the following The Muslim people



Both Democrats and Republicans viewed Islam less favorably than they view people who are Muslim

Q. What is your attitude about the following The Muslim religion




Further disaggregating results by age and race, in 2024 both younger and older respondents tended to demonstrate more favorable attitudes toward both Muslim people (68% and 66%, respectively) and the Muslim religion (49% and 47%, respectively). In comparison to 2022, there was an 18-percentage point difference in favorable attitudes across the two time periods among young respondents and a 10-

percentage point difference among older respondents on favorability toward Muslims. For Islam, there was a 9-percentage point difference among younger respondents and a 4-percentage point difference among older respondents.

Black respondents were also more likely than White and Hispanic respondents to have favorable attitudes toward Muslims and Islam. Black respondents and Hispanic respondents hold similar levels of favorability (71% and 70%, respectively) toward Muslim people, compared to 66% of White respondents who say they hold favorable views. For Islam, Black respondents hold the most favorable (60%) compared to Hispanic respondents (51%) and White respondents (44%).

Black and Hispanic respondents held more favorable views of Muslim people and Islam than White respondents
 Q. What is your attitude about the following




These results, however, also marked a decrease from 2022, indicating notable changes in attitudes of Americans toward Islam and Muslims over the last two years. There was a 9-percentage point decrease among White respondents, a 17-percentage point decrease among Black respondents, and a 10-percentage point difference among Hispanic respondents in favorability toward Muslims. For Islam, there was a 2-percentage point, 12-percentage point, and 13-percentage point difference, respectively.

The impact of familiarity with Islam and Muslims

We also asked respondents about their familiarity with people who are Muslim. Among total respondents in the 2024 survey, only 16% knew some Muslims very well.

While a majority of respondents knew some Muslims, less than 1 in 5 respondents knew some very well

Q. In your life, how familiar are you with people who are Muslim?



Looking at a combined total of both very well and not very well, 64% of respondents (including 59% of Republicans and 70% of both Democrats and independents) said they knew some Muslims, compared to 36% of respondents who said they did not know any (including 41% of Republicans and 30% of both Democrats and independents).


Knowing people who are Muslim increased favorable views of both Muslim and Islam, but the divide between the people and the religion was still present. Seventy-three percent of respondents who knew at least some people who are Muslim (both not well and very well) had a favorable view of the Muslim people, compared to 62% who said they did not know any. Partisanship still played a large role, with Republicans and Democrats having 34-percentage points difference in favorable views toward Muslims (55% to 80%) among those who knew at least some Muslims. Looking at Islam, there was significantly less favorable views of Islam compared to Muslims among those who knew at least some Muslims, 52%, but among those who did not know any, only 43% held favorable views. In addition, 73% of Democrats who knew at least some Muslims held favorable views of Islam, compared to 61% who did not know any. Among Republicans, familiarity with Muslim people had little impact on their view of Islam, with 27% who knew at least some holding favorable views compared to 25% of those who did not know any.

Are Islamic and Western religious and social traditions compatible?

We also asked respondents if Islamic and Western religious and social traditions were incompatible with each other or if it was possible to find common ground. In 2024, fewer respondents said there was common ground possible than in 2022 or 2021, returning to similar levels as 2016, with nearly one-third of respondents saying the two are incompatible. Two-thirds of respondents felt that people in the West and Islamic world have similar needs and wants and that it is possible to find a common ground, marking a 7-percentage point decrease in the belief that the two traditions are compatible during this two-year period.

Nearly one-third of respondents said Islamic and Western traditions were incompatible in 2024

Q. Which position is closer to yours?



In 2024, a majority of Democrats (81%) believed in the compatibility of Islamic and Western traditions, whereas Republicans were more divided. There was however, the same decrease in positive views of Islam in 2024 compared to 2022 and 2021 among both Republicans and Democrats.


Republicans were split on whether Islam was compatible with Western religious and social traditions

Q. Which position is closer to yours?

Most people in the West and the Islamic world have similar needs and wants, so it is possible to find **common ground**

OR

Islamic and Western religious and social traditions are **incompatible** with each other



Older and younger respondents did not diverge significantly in their answers to this question, but the percentage of both older and younger respondents who believed in the compatibility of the two traditions declined markedly in 2024 compared to 2022. When analyzing results by race and ethnicity, we also notice a considerable decrease in the percentage of respondents who believe in the compatibility of the two traditions in 2024 compared to 2022. In 2022, a significant percentage of Hispanic respondents (74%) believed that Islamic and Western traditions were compatible, compared to less than two-thirds of Hispanic respondents in 2024. There was also a slight decline among White respondents, from 72% to 67%, but there was almost no change among Black respondents from 2022 to 2024 (73% to 74%, respectively).


Hispanic respondents were less supportive in 2024 than White and Black respondents, but still a majority said it was possible to find common ground between Islam and the West

Q. Which position is closer to yours?

Most people in the West and the Islamic world have similar needs and wants, so it is possible to find **common ground**

OR

Islamic and Western religious and social traditions are **incompatible** with each other



Identifying and Differentiating Antisemitism

In June 2023, we asked respondents to identify which attitudes they thought constituted antisemitism. As reported in a *Brookings* [article](#) in July 2023, while one-third of respondents said they did not know if attitudes against Jews and Judaism constituted antisemitism, a majority said attitude against Jews constituted antisemitism and nearly a majority said the same for attitudes against Judaism. However, nearly two-thirds said they did not know if attitudes against Zionism constituted antisemitism and nearly half said the same for attitudes against Israeli policies, with more respondents saying they did not than did for both.


In 2024, we saw a decrease in the percentage of respondents who said they did not know and an increase in the percentage of respondents who considered the listed attitudes, especially against Zionism and against Israeli policies, to be antisemitic suggesting that the recent war in Israel and Gaza has influenced more of the American public into taking a position.

Over half of all respondents in 2024 said that attitudes against Judaism constituted antisemitism compared to 47% in 2023 and two-thirds of all respondents in 2024 agreed that attitudes against Jews constitute antisemitism compared to 58% in 2023. Similar to the results between Muslim and Islam, and as noted in the 2023 article, respondents still differentiate between the religion and the people with Judaism. This

increase is across party lines, although, Democrats are still more likely to call attitudes against Judaism and Jews antisemitic than Republicans.

More respondents viewed attitudes against Judaism and Jews as antisemitic in 2024


Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?



When asked if attitudes against Israeli policies and Zionism were antisemitic, respondents were still split on whether it constituted antisemitism but there was a significant decrease in respondents saying they “did not know.” There was a 11-percentage point decrease in respondents who said they “did not know” for attitudes against Israeli policies and a 16-percentage point decrease for attitudes against Zionism, with a 10-percentage point and 14-percentage point increase in those who said it was, respectively. In both 2023 and 2024, Republicans were more likely to say that attitudes against Zionism and Israeli policies constituted antisemitism than Democrats or independents.

More respondents viewed attitudes against Israeli Policies and Zionism to be antisemitic in 2024

Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?



Older respondents were also more likely than younger ones to view the listed attitudes as antisemitic. In 2024, 71% of older respondents considered attitudes against Jews antisemitic, compared to roughly half of younger respondents. This was a 10 and 2-percentage-point increase from 2023, respectively. Similarly, for attitudes against Judaism, close to a third of older respondents viewed them as antisemitic, compared to 40% of younger respondents. This marked a 10-percentage point increase among older respondents and a 2-percentage point decrease among younger respondents from 2023.

When it comes to attitudes against Zionism and against Israeli policies, the differences within the 2024 sample and between the 2024 and 2023 samples were also pronounced. In 2024, a third of older respondents said that attitudes against Zionism were antisemitic compared to only 16% of younger ones. Compared to 2023, this marked a 17 and 7-percentage-point increase for older and younger respondents, respectively. However, a substantial percentage of both groups expressed uncertainty in 2024.

The most significant difference between the younger and older respondents was their answers to attitudes against Israeli policies. Younger respondents in 2024 were less likely to view attitudes against Israeli policies as antisemitic, with only 13% thinking they constitute antisemitism compared to 29% of older ones. This is a 6 and 12-percentage-point increase from 2023, respectively.

White respondents were more likely than all other respondents to view these attitudes as antisemitic, they were more likely to view attitudes against Jews and Judaism as antisemitic compared to attitudes against Zionism and Israeli policies. In 2024, a majority of White respondents believed that attitudes against Jews constitute

antisemitism, compared to 45% of Black and half of Hispanic respondents. About two-thirds of White respondents agreed that attitudes against Judaism were antisemitic compared to a third of Black and 40% of Hispanic respondents who shared a similar view. Regarding attitudes against Zionism, roughly a third of White respondents agree that these attitudes constitute antisemitism, compared to 19% of Black and 23% of Hispanic respondents. Concerning attitudes against Israeli policies, only 27% of White respondents agreed that these attitudes constitute antisemitism, while only 19% of Black and 23% of Hispanic respondents share the view. These attitudes in 2024 based on race and ethnicity also marked roughly a 10 percentage-point increase, on average, compared to 2023.

The antisemitic label in American political discourse


When asked how they viewed the label “antisemitic” as being used in the American political discourse, 19% of respondents said it was used frequently to describe people who were genuinely antisemitic, 29% said it was used frequently to delegitimize political opponents and 30% said it was used frequently to delegitimize critics of Israel.

Compared to 2023, there was no change to the total respondents when asked how often it was used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic. However, broken down by party, more Republicans (by 7-percentage points) said it was frequently used and fewer Democrats (by 6-percentage points) said the same in 2024 compared to 2023. Looking at its use to delegitimize political opponents, there was an 8-percentage point increase from 2023 to 2024 for all respondents, with a 4-percentage point increase among Republicans and a 11-percentage point increase among Democrats. For its use delegitimizing critics of Israel, there was a 9-percentage point increase from 2023 to 2024, including a 9-percentage point and 10-percentage point increase among Republicans and Democrats, respectively.

In addition, there was little partisan divide in 2024 on how frequently antisemitism was used as a label. In 2024, the largest gap was a 3-percentage point difference in Republicans and Democrats who said the label was used frequently to delegitimize critics of Israel, 2-percentage point difference on describing a genuine antisemite, and no difference on usage to delegitimize political opponents. In comparison, in 2023, there was a 2-percentage point difference between Republicans and Democrats on the use to delegitimize critics of Israel, a 15-percentage point gap on the label being used to describe a genuine antisemite and a 7-percentage point difference on the label being used to delegitimize political opponents.

From 2023 to 2024 there was an increase in respondents who said the ‘antisemitic’ label was used frequently to delegitimize opponents and critics

Q. What is your impression of how labeling people antisemitic is used in the American political discourse: Used to [Those who said frequently]



Looking at these results by age, we see that fewer younger and older respondents thought the label antisemitism is used “frequently” to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic in 2024 compared to 2023. A relatively higher percentage of younger and of older respondents thought the label antisemitism is used “frequently” in American political discourse to delegitimize political opponents in both years. Regarding whether the label antisemitic is used in American political discourse to delegitimize critics of Israel, 29% of respondents and almost a third of older respondents thought it is used frequently. This marks a 10 and 8-percentage-point increase compared to 2023.

We found a similar pattern when looking at the answers based on the ethnicity/race of the respondents. Twenty-one percent of White respondents said that labeling people as antisemitic is used “frequently” to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic, compared to 15% of Black and 17% of Hispanic respondents who shared a similar view. These results represent a 2- percentage-point increase, 4-percentage-point decrease, and 3-percentage-point decrease compared to 2023, respectively. About a third of White respondents thought that labeling people as antisemitic is used “frequently” to delegitimize political opponents, whereas only a fifth of Black and Hispanic respondents held a similar view. Compared to 2023, these results are an 11, 2, and less than one-percentage point increase, respectively. Among White respondents, a third felt that labeling people as antisemitic is used “frequently” to delegitimize critics of Israel, compared to fifth of Black and quarter of Hispanic respondents. This result marks a 12, 2, and 3-percentage point increase, respectively.


Christian Nationalism

In May 2022, we asked Americans if they thought the U.S. Constitution would allow for the U.S. to be declared a Christian nation and then we asked, regardless of the U.S. Constitution, would they support the U.S. being officially declared a Christian nation. As reported in our [2022 Politico article](#), most Republicans, including three-quarters of Republican Evangelicals, supported the U.S. being declared a Christian nation, even though a majority also said it was unconstitutional. In 2024, we asked these two questions again and found there was little change in the degree of Americans' support for declaring the United States a Christian nation.

A majority of respondents in the January-February 2024 poll said the U.S. Constitution would not allow the U.S. to be declared a Christian nation, including 57% of Republicans and 81% of Democrats, the exact same percentages as in 2022.

Americans still say it is against the Constitution for the US to be declared a Christian nation


Q. Do you think the U.S. Constitution would or would not allow the U.S. government to declare the United States a Christian nation?



Similarly, there was no significant change among Republicans when asked if they favored the U.S. being declared a Christian nation, with 60% of Republicans being in favor compared to 61% in 2022. Overall, 60% of respondents opposed the U.S. being declared a Christian nation, compared to 62% in 2022. However, there was a slight decrease in Democrats opposing the concept of a Christian nation, from 83% in 2022 to 76% in 2024, with a small increase among those saying they would favor a Christian nation, going from 17% in 2022 to 23% in 2024. Notably, this increase in support among Democrats for a Christian nation contrasts with the unchanged view among Democrats that the U.S. Constitution does not allow for the U.S. to be declared a Christian nation.

Two years later, Republicans still favor officially declaring a Christian nation and support grows among Democrats

Q. Would you favor or oppose the United States officially declaring the United States to be a Christian nation?




In addition, while Americans under 35 were less supportive of the U.S. being declared a Christian nation compared to older Americans, twice the proportion of Democrats under 35 favored the U.S. being declared a Christian nation in 2022 (7%) compared to 2024 (14%). There was little change among both younger and older Republicans from 2022. Among independents, older respondents were less favorable in 2024 than in 2022.

Young Americans are less supportive of declaring a Christian nation than older Americans but show growing support in the past two years for a Christian nation, especially among Democrats

Q. Would you favor or oppose the United States officially declaring the United States to be a Christian nation?

[Those who "favor" declaring the U.S. a Christian nation]




However, among Democrats who said the Constitution would not allow for the U.S. to be declared a Christian nation, only 13% favored an officially Christian nation, with 86% opposed. In contrast, among Republicans who said it was not allowed, 39% still favored an officially Christian nation.

As reported in our [2022 Politico article](#) and our [January 2023 report](#), Evangelicals are more supportive of an officially Christian nation. This remains true in 2024, with 74% of Evangelicals supporting the U.S. being declared a Christian nation. Among Democrats who identify as Evangelicals, 61% supported an officially Christian nation compared to 57% in 2022.

Support for officially declaring a Christian nation among Evangelicals remains unwavering

Q. Would you favor or oppose the United States officially declaring the United States to be a Christian nation? [Among Evangelicals]



Republican Evangelicals were also slightly more supportive of officially declaring the U.S. a Christian nation than they were in 2022 and Evangelicals who identify as independents increased from 60% in 2022 to 69% in 2024.

Conclusion

Overall, we found that while there is a large empathy gap among respondents regarding their view of Judaism and Jewish people compared to Islam and Muslims, with more respondents expressing favorable views of the former. But even with this large empathy gap, we also found that respondents' favorable views of both Jewish and Muslim Americans declined in 2024 from recent years, even while respondents acknowledged that there was an increase in prejudice against both groups. This decline in favorable views is most likely an effect of the war in Israel and Gaza, which has been a [divisive](#)

issue for the United States. However, perhaps of additional concern, a significant minority of Americans remain supportive of an officially Christian nation in recent years. This support for declaring the U.S. a Christian nation would deeply impact Muslim and Jewish Americans as shifting away from religious freedom could lead to further discrimination and prejudice against Muslim and Jewish Americans.

Methodology

May 2022

The survey was carried out May 6-16, 2022, online from a nationally representative sample of Nielsen Scarborough's probability-based panel, originally recruited by mail and telephone using a random sample of adults. The national poll was conducted among 2,091 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 2.14%. Overall, the sample was adjusted to reflect population estimates (Scarborough USA+/Gallup) for Americans. The survey variables balanced through weighting were: age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, level of education, census regional division, and political party affiliation.


June 2023

The survey was carried out June 21-27, 2023 among 1,439 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 2.9%. The survey was conducted using Ipsos' KnowledgePanel®, a probability-based online panel designed to be representative of the U.S. population. Initially, participants are chosen scientifically by a random selection of telephone numbers and residential addresses. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in the web-enabled KnowledgePanel. For those who agree to participate, but do not already have Internet access, Ipsos provides at no cost a laptop/netbook and ISP connection. People who already have computers and Internet service are permitted to participate using their own equipment. Panelists then receive unique log-in information for accessing surveys online, and then are sent emails throughout each month inviting them to participate in research.

January-February 2024

The survey was carried out January 29-February 5, 2024 among 1,891 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 2.4%. The survey was conducted using Ipsos' KnowledgePanel®, a probability-based online panel designed to be representative of the U.S. population. Initially, participants are chosen scientifically by a random selection of telephone numbers and residential addresses. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in the web-enabled KnowledgePanel. For those who agree to participate, but do not already have Internet access, Ipsos provides at no cost a laptop/netbook and ISP connection. People who already have computers and Internet service are permitted to participate using their own equipment. Panelists then receive unique log-in information for accessing surveys online, and then are sent emails throughout each month inviting them to participate in research.

Leadership for the Critical Issues Poll



Shibley Telhami is the Director of the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll. He is also the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Before coming to the University of Maryland, he taught at several universities, including the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his doctorate in political science. He has authored and edited numerous books, including one forthcoming book: *Peace Derailed: Obama, Trump, Biden, and the Decline of Diplomacy on Israel/Palestine, 2011-2022* (co-authored). His most recent book is a co-edited with contributions volume, *The One State Reality: What is Israel/Palestine?* which was published in March 2023 with Cornell University Press. He has advised every U.S. administration from George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama. Telhami was selected by the Carnegie Corporation of New York along with the New York Times as one of the "Great Immigrants" for 2013 and the Washingtonian Magazine listed him as one of the "Most Influential People on Foreign Affairs" in both 2022 and 2023. He is also the recipient of many awards including the University of Maryland's Distinguished Service Award and the University of Maryland's Honors College Outstanding Faculty Award.



Michael Hanmer is the Associate Director of the Critical Issues Poll. He is also the Director of the Center for Democracy and Civic Engagement and a professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. He earned his PhD in Political Science at the University of Michigan in 2004. He specializes in American politics with an emphasis on voting rights, civic engagement, public opinion, and political methodology. He is the author of *Discount Voting: Voter Registration Reforms and Their Effects* (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and the co-author of *Citizens of the World: Political Engagement and Policy Attitudes of Millennials across the Globe* (Oxford University Press, 2023) and *Voting Technology: The Not-So-Simple Act of Casting a Ballot* (Brookings Institution Press, 2008). His current research investigates the expansion of voting rights, the intersection of sports and politics, how mobilization influences the use of new voting methods, vote over-reporting, how individuals evaluate the responsiveness of political leaders, and question-wording effects in surveys.

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Antoine Banks is Professor and the Chair of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. His research interests include racial and ethnic politics, emotions, political psychology, and public opinion. His book, *Anger and Racial Politics: The Emotional Foundation of Racial Attitudes in America*, published by Cambridge University Press, explores the link between emotions and racial attitudes and the consequences it has for political preferences. His articles have appeared in journals such as *American Journal of Political Science*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *Political Behavior*, *Political Analysis*, and *Political Psychology*.



Ernesto Calvo is the Director of the Interdisciplinary Lab for Computational Social Science (iLCSS) and Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. His research centers on the study of comparative political institutions, social media, political representation, and social networks. His work lies at the intersection of big data, survey experiments, and institutions. He is the author of a number of books on comparative institutions and social media, including *Non-Policy Politics: Rich Voters, Poor Voters, and the Diversification of Electoral Strategies* (Cambridge University Press 2019) with María Victoria Murillo. Calvo has authored over 70 publications in the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe. His research has been recognized by the American Political Science Association with the Lawrence Longley Award, the Luebbert Best Article Award, and the Michael Wallerstein Award.



Janelle Wong is Professor in the Departments of Government and Politics and American Studies and a core faculty member in the Asian American Studies Program. Wong authored two books, *Immigrants, Evangelicals and Politics in an Era of Demographic Change* (2018, Russell Sage Foundation), *Democracy's Promise: Immigrants and American Civic Institutions* (2006, University of Michigan Press) and co-author of two books on Asian American politics, including *Asian American Political Participation: Emerging Constituents and their Political Identities* (2011, Russell Sage Foundation), based on the first national, multilingual, multiethnic survey of Asian Americans. She was a co-principal investigator on the 2016 National Asian American Survey and on the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation). Wong is a Senior Researcher with AAPI Data.