Night of the Long Knives Revealed: Shocking Secrets Exposed!
Hitler and the Sturmabteilung (SA).
Amidst the annals of history, President Paul von Hindenburg bestowed the mantle of chancellor upon Hitler on January 30, 1933, In the ensuing epochs, through the intricate maneuverings recognized as Gleichschaltung, Hitler obviate the necessity for the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic as a legislative entity and obliterated all oppositional political factions in Germany. By the midstream of 1933, the nation metamorphosed into a unipolar political entity under Hitler’s dominion. Despite the expeditious consolidation of political ascendancy, Hitler didn’t wield unassailable command. In his capacity as chancellor, his sway over the military was deficient, as it remained formally under the stewardship of Hindenburg, a distinguished veteran field marshal. Although many military officers were enticed by Hitler’s pledges of an expanded army, the reinstatement of conscription, and a more assertive foreign policy, the military clung to its traditions of autonomy during the embryonic years of the Nazi regime.
To a diminished extent, the Sturmabteilung (SA), a paramilitary organ of the Nazi Party, maintained a modicum of autonomy within the party structure. The SA originated from the vestiges of the Freikorps movement in the post-World War I milieu. The Freikorps, predominantly comprising disenchanted German combat veterans, had been enlisted by the government in January 1919 to counter the specter of a Communist uprising in times of scant loyalist troops. Many Freikorps members felt betrayed by the November Revolution of 1918 and opposed the nascent Weimar Republic, pejoratively dubbing its founders as “November criminals.” Captain Ernst Röhm, initially affiliated with the Bavarian Freikorps, later ascended to command the SA. In the 1920s and 1930s, the SA functioned as a private militia, intimidating adversaries and disrupting the gatherings of rival political parties, especially the Social Democrats and Communists. Termed as the “brownshirts” or “stormtroopers,” the SA gained infamy for their street skirmishes with the Communists, contributing to the destabilization of the Weimar Republic. In June 1932, a month marked by heightened political tumult, over 400 street conflicts erupted, culminating in 82 fatalities.
The designation of Hitler as chancellor and the extirpation of all parties aside from the Nazis did not assuage the tumult of the stormtroopers. Deprived of Communist assemblies to disrupt, they sporadically rampaged through the thoroughfares post-night revelry, assaulting pedestrians and resisting law enforcement. Grievances of “overbearing and loutish” conduct by the stormtroopers became commonplace by the midstream of 1933. The Foreign Office even documented instances where brownshirts maltreated foreign diplomats.
On July 6, 1933, at a convocation of high-ranking Nazi dignitaries, Hitler declared the triumph of the National Socialist, or Nazi, takeover. With the NSDAP now in command, he underscored the imperative to consolidate authority, articulating, “The stream of revolution has been undammed, but it must be channeled into the secure bed of evolution.”
Hitler’s oration signaled his intent to rein in the SA, whose ranks had burgeoned in the early 1930s. This undertaking proved formidable, as the SA constituted a substantial segment of Nazism’s most zealous adherents. The SA’s precipitous growth was partially ascribed to the Great Depression, which left many Germans jobless and disillusioned with traditional institutions. While Nazism wasn’t exclusively a working-class phenomenon, the SA gratified the yearning for class solidarity and nationalist fervor among the unemployed. Discontent set in when the Nazi regime failed to implement radical economic measures as anticipated by many stormtroopers.
Hitler’s actions were geared not only towards neutralizing Röhm and the SA as a latent threat but also fortifying his connections with the Wehrmacht, the German armed forces, which perceived the SA as their primary competitor, at times outnumbering the military in manpower.
Proponents of Ernst Röhm (Röhm-cult), such as the Strasserists, constituted one of the ideological factions within the Nazi Party at that juncture.
Conflict between the army and the SA.
Amidst the ranks of the SA, none fervently championed “a continuation of the German revolution” more than Ernst Röhm himself. A pivotal figure in the early days of the Nazi Party, Röhm played a crucial role in the Munich Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, Hitler’s daring attempt to wrest power through force. A seasoned veteran of World War I, Röhm recently proclaimed his willingness to exact reprisals — 12 executions for every fallen stormtrooper. For Röhm, violence was not merely a means to an end; it was a political instrument. He took the socialist tenets of National Socialism seriously, pressing Hitler and other party leaders to implement sweeping socialist reforms in Germany.
Not content with leading the SA in isolation, Röhm lobbied Hitler to appoint him as Minister of Defence, a position occupied by the non-Nazi General Werner von Blomberg. Despite earning the moniker “Rubber Lion” from certain army critics due to his allegiance to Hitler, Blomberg, as a non-Nazi, served as a conduit between the army and the party. Numerous officers, Blomberg included, hailed from the Prussian nobility and perceived the SA as a disruptive influence jeopardizing the army’s revered standing in German society.
While the regular army looked askance at the SA, many stormtroopers reciprocated, viewing the army’s commitment to the National Socialist revolution as lackluster. Max Heydebreck, an SA leader in Rummelsburg, censured the army among fellow brownshirts, asserting, “Some of the officers of the army are swine. Most officers are too old and have to be replaced by young ones. We want to wait till Papa Hindenburg is dead, and then the SA will march against the army.”
Despite this mutual animosity, Blomberg and military leaders perceived the SA as a fertile pool for potential recruits to bolster an expanded and rejuvenated army. Röhm, however, harbored aspirations of dismantling the Prussian aristocracy’s dominion in the military, envisioning the SA as the nucleus of a new German military force. As SA membership swelled beyond three million men by early 1934, surpassing the Treaty of Versailles-mandated limit of one hundred thousand soldiers, tensions mounted. In January 1934, Röhm presented Blomberg with a memorandum demanding that the SA supplant the regular army as the nation’s ground forces, relegating the Reichswehr to a supplementary role in SA training.
In response, Hitler convened a gathering on February 28, 1934, involving Blomberg, the SA, and SS leadership. Pressured by Hitler, Röhm reluctantly signed a pledge acknowledging the Reichswehr’s supremacy over the SA. Hitler asserted that the SA would function as an adjunct to the Reichswehr, not the other way around. However, following the departure of Hitler and most army officers, Röhm defiantly declared his unwillingness to take orders from the “ridiculous corporal,” a derogatory reference to Hitler. Although Hitler did not immediately act against Röhm for his defiance, it further strained their association.
Growing pressure against the SA.
Despite an initial alignment with Hitler, Röhm tenaciously clung to his vision of forging a novel German army with the SA as its linchpin. By early 1934, this vision starkly contradicted Hitler’s strategy to consolidate power and enlarge the Reichswehr. The clash in their military blueprints posited Röhm’s potential triumph at the expense of Hitler’s dominion. The Reichswehr not only perceived the SA as a menace but also key associates of Hitler — Hermann Göring, Joseph Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, and Rudolf Hess — found Röhm’s escalating influence and restlessness troublesome. This set off an internal power tussle within the party, with Hitler loyalists positioning themselves against Röhm. Despite both being veterans of the Nazi movement, Röhm stood out for exhibiting independence rather than blind fealty to Adolf Hitler, generating tensions. Röhm’s disregard for the party’s bureaucracy irked Hess, and Göring was deeply perturbed by SA violence in Prussia.
In the early months of 1934, the deepening discord between Röhm and Hitler over the role of the SA in the Nazi state prompted former chancellor General Kurt von Schleicher to re-enter the political fray. Schleicher castigated the existing Hitler cabinet, and his adherents, including General Ferdinand von Bredow and Werner von Alvensleben, circulated lists proposing a new cabinet. These lists featured Schleicher as vice-chancellor, Röhm as minister of defense, Heinrich Brüning as foreign minister, and Gregor Strasser as minister of national economy. Although Schleicher’s significance had waned by 1934, rumors circulated that he and Röhm were scheming to reclaim power, heightening the sense of crisis.
To isolate Röhm, on April 20, 1934, Göring entrusted control of the Prussian political police (Gestapo) to Himmler, anticipating action against Röhm. On April 22, 1934, Himmler appointed Reinhard Heydrich as head of the Gestapo. Despite coveting the SA’s autonomy and might, Himmler and Heydrich had already been transforming the SS into an independent elite corps loyal to themselves and Hitler. The loyalty of the SS members would prove pivotal when Hitler resolved to confront Röhm and the SA. Lists of individuals marked for “liquidation” began circulating by May, as Göring and Himmler’s associates engaged in a barter, swapping enemies of one for allies of the other. In late May, former chancellors Brüning and Schleicher received warnings of imminent danger to their lives. Brüning fled to the Netherlands, while Schleicher dismissed the threat as a jest. By early June, everything was set, awaiting Hitler’s sanction.
Conservative calls for Hitler to rein in the SA intensified, with pressure emanating from quarters in the army, industry, and politics. They implored Hitler to restrain the SA’s influence and take measures against Röhm. While Röhm’s homosexuality didn’t endear him to conservatives, their primary concern was his political ambitions. However, Hitler remained indecisive and uncertain about his course of action as he departed for a meeting with Benito Mussolini on June 15. Before his departure, Foreign Minister Baron Konstantin von Neurath, at the behest of Presidential State Secretary Otto Meißner, covertly asked the German Ambassador to Italy Ulrich von Hassell to convey Mussolini’s apprehension that the SA was tarnishing Germany’s image. During the summit in Venice, Mussolini rebuked Hitler for tolerating SA violence, hooliganism, and homosexuality, cautioning that such behavior marred Hitler’s global standing. While Mussolini’s critique didn’t instantly sway Hitler, it nudged him toward contemplating action against the SA.
On June 17, 1934, conservative demands for Hitler to act reached a zenith when Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen, a confidant of the ailing Hindenburg, delivered a speech at Marburg University, warning of the peril of a “second revolution.” According to von Papen’s memoirs, he privately threatened to resign unless Hitler took action. While von Papen’s resignation as vice-chancellor wouldn’t have directly imperiled Hitler’s position, it would have constituted a significant display of autonomy from a prominent conservative figure.
Heydrich and Himmler.
In response to mounting conservative pressure to rein in Röhm, Hitler embarked for Neudeck to confer with President Hindenburg. Surprisingly, Blomberg, engaged in talks with the president, censured Hitler for delaying action against Röhm. Blomberg conveyed to Hitler that Hindenburg teetered on the brink of declaring martial law and transferring governance to the Reichswehr unless immediate steps were taken against Röhm and the SA. Hitler had dallied for months in moving against Röhm, partly swayed by Röhm’s prominent role as the head of a national militia boasting millions of members. However, the specter of martial law from Hindenburg, the sole figure in Germany with the authority to potentially dismantle the Nazi regime, coerced Hitler into decisive action. Exiting Neudeck, Hitler aimed not only to eliminate Röhm but also to settle scores with longstanding adversaries. Both Himmler and Göring embraced Hitler’s decision, as Röhm’s downfall promised autonomy for the SS under Himmler and the removal of a rival for future army command for Göring.
In anticipation of the purge, Himmler and Heydrich assembled a dossier replete with concocted evidence suggesting that Röhm had received a payment of 12 million Reichsmarks (equivalent to EUR 29.1 million in 2023) from France to orchestrate Hitler’s overthrow. On June 24, leading SS officers were presented with manipulated evidence alleging Röhm’s intent to deploy the SA in a coup against the government (Röhm-Putsch). Acting on Hitler’s directives, Göring, Himmler, Heydrich, and Victor Lutze drafted lists of individuals within and outside the SA earmarked for elimination. Willi Lehmann, a Gestapo official and NKVD operative, was enlisted by Göring to aid in the operation. On June 25, General Werner von Fritsch escalated the Reichswehr to the highest state of alert. On June 27, Hitler moved to secure the army’s cooperation, with Blomberg and General Walther von Reichenau, the army’s liaison to the party, expelling Röhm from the German Officers’ League. On June 28, while attending Josef Terboven’s wedding celebration in Essen, Hitler summoned Röhm’s adjutant at Bad Wiessee and instructed SA leaders to meet with him on June 30 at 11:00. A signed article by Blomberg, ardently affirming the Reichswehr’s backing for Hitler, surfaced in the Völkischer Beobachter on June 29.
Purge.
Around 04:30 on June 30, 1934, Hitler and his retinue took flight to Munich, then proceeded to the Bavarian Interior Ministry. There, they convened with the leaders of an SA rampage that had unfolded in the city streets the preceding night. Incensed by the turmoil, Hitler confronted Obergruppenführer August Schneidhuber, the chief of the Munich police, and vehemently ripped the epaulets off his shirt for failing to maintain order. Accusing Schmidhuber of treachery, Hitler orchestrated Schneidhuber’s execution later that day. Subsequently, accompanied by a substantial contingent of SS and regular police, Hitler journeyed to the Hanselbauer Hotel in Bad Wiessee, where Ernst Röhm and other SA leaders were lodging.
Hitler’s unanticipated arrival in Bad Wiessee between 06:00 and 07:00 caught the SA leadership off guard, finding them still in repose. SS personnel stormed the hotel, and Hitler personally apprehended Röhm and other high-ranking SA figures. In one incident, SA leader Edmund Heines was discovered in bed with an eighteen-year-old male SA senior troop leader. Both Heines and his companion were escorted outside the hotel and executed on Hitler’s orders. This facet was accentuated in subsequent propaganda to rationalize the purge as a crackdown on moral decadence.[38] The SS detained other SA leaders as they disembarked from their train for the planned meeting with Röhm and Hitler.
Despite presenting no evidence of a plot by Röhm to overthrow the regime, Hitler condemned the SA leadership upon returning to party headquarters in Munich. In a speech to the gathered crowd, Hitler vented extreme fury, denouncing what he termed “the worst treachery in world history.” He proclaimed that “undisciplined and disobedient characters and asocial or diseased elements” would be eradicated, drawing approval from the crowd, including SA members fortunate enough to evade arrest. Joseph Goebbels, present with Hitler at Bad Wiessee, set the final phase of the plan in motion. Upon returning to Berlin, Goebbels phoned Göring at 10:00 with the codeword Kolibri, initiating the release of execution squads on the remaining unsuspecting victims. Under Hitler’s orders, Sepp Dietrich directed the Leibstandarte to form an “execution squad” and proceed to Stadelheim Prison, where certain SA leaders were held. In the prison courtyard, the Leibstandarte firing squad executed five SA generals and an SA colonel. Those not immediately executed were taken back to the Leibstandarte barracks at Lichterfelde, subjected to one-minute “trials,” and shot by a firing squad.
The purge transcended the SA, encompassing a broader group. Prominent Social Democrats, Communists, and conservatives deemed unreliable became targets. Vice-Chancellor Papen and his associates were among those arrested and executed. Hitler also moved against old adversaries, such as Kurt von Schleicher, the predecessor as Chancellor, and Gregor Strasser, a former Nazi who had resigned from the party in 1932. Gustav Ritter von Kahr, the former Bavarian state commissioner who had assisted in suppressing the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, also met his end. The purge included unintended victims, like Willi Schmid, a music critic mistakenly targeted by the Gestapo.
Kurt Lüdecke, a National Socialist and associate of Ernst Röhm, found himself imprisoned but managed to escape after eight months in a concentration camp. He authored “I Knew Hitler: The Story of a Nazi Who Escaped the Blood-Purge,” published in 1937 by Scribners of New York, United States.
Röhm, briefly held at Stadelheim Prison in Munich, faced an uncertain fate as Hitler deliberated. On July 1, at Hitler’s behest, Theodor Eicke, Commandant of the Dachau concentration camp, and SS adjutant Michael Lippert visited Röhm. They handed him a loaded Browning pistol and granted him ten minutes to end his own life. When Röhm declined, stating, “If I am to be killed, let Adolf do it himself,” Eicke and Lippert fired upon him. Röhm was discovered standing defiantly with his bare chest puffed out when they returned at 14:50. In 1957, Michael Lippert was tried in Munich for Röhm’s murder and convicted, receiving an 18-month prison sentence.
Aftermath.
The Night of the Long Knives, or the purge of June 30, 1934, emerged as a pivotal event in Nazi Germany, resulting in the eradication of perceived threats to Adolf Hitler’s regime. The aftermath of the purge was characterized by efforts to control information and manipulate public perception.
Initially, a schism existed among the orchestrators of the purge regarding the handling of information about the event. Hermann Göring directed police stations to incinerate all documents related to the actions of the past two days, aiming to obliterate traces of the purge. Simultaneously, Joseph Goebbels sought to prevent newspapers from publishing lists of the deceased. Nevertheless, Goebbels utilized a radio address on July 2 to narrate how Hitler had thwarted a purported attempt by Ernst Röhm to overthrow the government, framing the purge as a necessary measure to maintain order.
On July 13, 1934, Hitler addressed the Reichstag in a nationally broadcast speech to justify the purge. He asserted his responsibility for the fate of the German people, presenting himself as the supreme judge. Hitler contended that the measures taken on June 30, July 1, and 2 to suppress treasonous assaults were legal acts of self-defense by the state. To confer a semblance of legality to the purge, Hitler had the cabinet approve a measure retroactively legalizing the murders committed during the event. The “Law Regarding Measures of State Self-Defence” provided a legal veneer to the actions of the regime.
Reich Justice Minister Franz Gürtner played a role in drafting this statute, aligning himself with the Nazi regime. Notably, legal scholar Carl Schmitt wrote an article titled “The Führer Upholds the Law,” defending Hitler’s actions in the purge.
To manage the aftermath, a special fund administered by SS General Franz Breithaupt was established for the relatives of the murdered. This fund supported the families of the victims at the expense of the state, providing financial assistance to widows and dependents.
The reaction to the Night of the Long Knives varied among the German population. The army, despite losing figures like Kurt von Schleicher and Ferdinand von Bredow, almost unanimously applauded the purge. A purported telegram from the ailing President Hindenburg expressed gratitude to Hitler for thwarting treason. However, Hermann Göring later admitted that the telegram was fabricated by the Nazis.
The purge had far-reaching consequences for the army, as its support further tied it to the Nazi regime. Some individuals, such as General Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord and Field Marshal August von Mackensen, disapproved of the killings. They initiated a campaign to have Schleicher rehabilitated, showing that not everyone within the military supported the purge.
Rumors about the Night of the Long Knives spread quickly. While some Germans approached the official news with skepticism, many believed that Hitler had saved Germany from chaos. The extent of the executions and the ubiquity of the Gestapo contributed to the reluctance of those who disapproved of the purge to voice their opinions publicly.
În late 1934–early 1935, Werner von Fritsch and Werner von Blomberg pressured Hitler into rehabilitating Generals von Schleicher und von Bredow. Despite this, the Nazis continued in private to accuse Schleicher of high treason.
Former Kaiser Wilhelm II, in exile in the Netherlands, was horrified by the purge and expressed concerns about the rule of law. He saw the event as a departure from legal norms and predicted further authoritarian actions by the Nazis.
The Night of the Long Knives solidified Hitler’s control and eliminated internal opposition, contributing to the consolidation of power by the Nazi regime.
After the Night of the Long Knives, Adolf Hitler designated Viktor Lutze to succeed Ernst Röhm as the head of the SA (Sturmabteilung). Lutze’s mandate involved enforcing stringent measures to reshape the SA and address perceived issues within the organization. Hitler explicitly tasked Lutze with putting an end to what he considered “homosexuality, debauchery, drunkenness, and high living” within the SA. This signified a redirection for the SA, as Hitler aimed to restrain what he perceived as excessive behavior and extravagance within the organization.
One of Hitler’s specific directives to Lutze was to cease the expenditure of SA funds on luxuries like limousines and banquets, which Hitler regarded as evidence of SA extravagance. However, Lutze made minimal efforts to assert the SA’s independence in the subsequent years. The SA’s influence waned significantly, with its membership plummeting from 2.9 million in August 1934 to 1.2 million in April 1938.
Albert Speer, a prominent figure in the Nazi regime, observed that following the Night of the Long Knives, the right-wing factions, represented by figures like the President, the Minister of Justice, and the generals, rallied behind Hitler. Conversely, the robust left-wing of the party, primarily embodied by the SA, was eradicated from the political landscape.
Ernst Röhm, initially a prominent figure in Nazi propaganda, was expunged from all official materials. For instance, in Leni Riefenstahl’s film “The Victory of Faith,” documenting the 1933 Nuremberg rally, Röhm was frequently shown alongside Hitler. However, after the Night of the Long Knives, Röhm was edited out of the film. A copy of the original film, featuring Röhm, was discovered in the German Democratic Republic’s film archives in the 1980s.
The term “Night of the Long Knives” itself has historical roots dating back to the 9th century Historia Brittonum, where it described an event of treachery and violence during the Anglo-Saxon settlement of Britain. In the years leading up to the purge, the term became associated with treachery in Germany and was sometimes used as a criticism of Nazi actions.
The legacy of the Night of the Long Knives was profound in shaping Hitler’s authority and the nature of the German government. It marked a turning point, establishing Hitler as the “supreme leader of the German people.” The purge solidified Hitler’s control and further concentrated power in his hands. The extrajudicial killings during the purge undermined centuries of legal norms proscribing such actions, effectively placing Hitler above the law. The legacy of the Night of the Long Knives epitomized Hitler’s unchecked authority and the ruthless elimination of perceived internal threats.