

isfaction to our constituents; they are not those solid and substantial amendments which the people expect; they are little better than whip-syllabub, frothy and full of wind, formed only to please the palate; or they are like a tub thrown out to a whale, to secure the freight of the ship and its peaceable voyage." This, off of the available records, was the view of those of a substantial majority who voted for the proposed amendments.¹⁶

We can only conclude as follows concerning the Bill of Rights and the First Amendment: Their adoption did not alter the mainstream of the American tradition which, as the Preamble and *The Federalist* would have it, comes down to rule by the deliberate sense of the community. The Bill of Rights, contrary to what we have over the years been led to believe, did not constitute any departure from the tradition. Yes, indeed, our tradition was derailed and, to be sure, the Bill of Rights plays a critical role (because of deliberate distortion) in justifying the theories of those who support that derailment. But the real source of the derailment is not to be found in the Bill of Rights. It occurs, as best we can tell, at a point somewhat later in our history.

¹⁶ Paradoxically—paradoxical because it does conflict with the myth handed down to us by the official literature—the Antifederalists were not the champions of "civil liberties" (as we currently understand that term). They wanted to preserve the sovereignty of states vis-à-vis the national government. The record is abundantly clear on this point.

Derailement and the Modern Crisis

We have in the foregoing pages talked about a "derailment" in our tradition. The derailment, as we have further remarked, has understandably caused a certain schizophrenia among us, We the People, so that we do not really know who we are and where we are going. To detail when all this came to pass is far beyond our purpose here. We can, however, say this much: The philosophical plants of derailment were seeded and began to grow full force sometime between the very early years of the Republic and the Civil War. This is precisely why Lincoln could speak in the manner he did at Gettysburg and get away with it. These plants were lavishly fed and nourished, sometimes unwittingly, after the Civil War, so that by the turn of the century the so-called progressivist historians and political scientists could burst forth with their notions about the central symbols of the American tradition. In the intellectual world their interpretations have subsequently enjoyed remarkable and frightening success. Today, by and large, in the average college classrooms across the nation, it is their recounting of the American tradition and symbols (the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights being their major sources) that is accepted pretty much as gospel truth, if we judge only by the texts that are most commonly used. Why two or more generations of presumed scholars fell under the spell of the "progressivists" is an intriguing matter.

Perhaps this question can be answered once we discover precisely why it is that the academic community is so philosophically out of step with the more general community of which it is presumably a part.

We can speak with a greater degree of certainty about the extent and causes of our derailment. Throughout, from our analysis of the Mayflower Compact to the Bill of Rights, we have emphasized that our supreme commitment and symbol has been self-government by a virtuous people. As we hope to have shown, the notion of legislative supremacy has been intimately linked with this symbol. We have, beyond any doubt, come a long way from any such self-interpretation. To show just how far we have come we need only reproduce a line of argument against our thesis well within the grasp of intelligent sophomores in our institutions of higher learning and most surely their instructors. One superficial but revealing manifestation of the derailment runs pretty much as follows:

"You have told us that there is a continuity from the Mayflower Compact through even the Bill of Rights. By this we understand you to mean that our Constitution is a legislative supremacy document, which leaves the Congress free to do, without let or hindrance, pretty much anything and everything it chooses to do. But all of this is surely not true. Ours is, if anything, a constitution of judicial supremacy. We do not, we in America, think of Congress as having the last word about its own powers, and what is more, Congress does not think of *itself* as having the last word. We have been taught that our Constitution is built on the principle of balance of powers specifically designed to prevent Congress *from* being supreme. We have in America three nominally equal and coordinate branches, legislative, executive, and judicial, each with power to check and balance the other, none of them therefore supreme in constitutional theory, none of them possessing the last say as a matter of constitutional theory, al-

though in practice one of them does end up having the last say, namely, the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, after all is said and done, finds itself called upon, year in and year out, to decide whether this or that act of Congress or of the President is or is not constitutional. In practice, it would seem, neither Congress nor the President ever talks back to the Supreme Court (very rarely, in any case), so that both of these branches are very much in the habit of accepting Supreme Court decisions. Beyond this, the Court must be supreme among the branches of government because the Constitution is supreme, and it is within the province of the Court to tell us what the Constitution means. Congress cannot exceed the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution, and Congress cannot invade the individual rights enthroned in the Bill of Rights, because if and when it were to try to the Supreme Court would, legitimately, bring it to heel."

This is a sensible objection to our thesis, and we hope to have stated it accurately and unprejudicially. We do recognize that it might be stated differently with a considerable amount of evidence to show its validity.¹ How, then, are we to answer?

Part of our answer would take this form: The plain language of the Constitution tells us unambiguously that Congress (whether the Congressmen think so or not is irrelevant) is supreme, and just can't help being supreme because the Constitution places in its hands weapons with which, when and if it chooses to use them, it can completely dominate the other two branches. If the Supreme Court says that such and such an act of Congress is null and void, Congress can, to begin with, reenact the statute and at the same time remove it from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Or, it can reach for another weapon, more readily available if it has the President on its side: It can "pack" the Supreme Court. Or, it could

¹ The deans of our most prestigious law schools are wont to remind us of this periodically.

reach for still another weapon and remove justices through the impeachment process. Still another weapon is this: Congress could refuse to appropriate money for the Supreme Court justices in hopes of "starving" them into submission. And this, whatever one thinks about the morality of any of these weapons, is what the Constitution allows. There is no escaping this fact.

We know as well as anyone else that Congress does not in fact pack the Court, or impeach Supreme Court justices, or cut off their pay every time the Supreme Court challenges its authority; and only very rarely does it remove statutes from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. In the vast majority of cases, when the Supreme Court does declare a statute of Congress unconstitutional, Congress, by long-standing habit, swallows hard and lets the Supreme Court (but notice we say *lets*) have its way—not, we imagine, because it has forgotten it has the ultimate weapons in its hand, and not necessarily because it in fact regards the Supreme Court's opinion as to what is constitutional and what isn't as better, wiser, or more inspired than its own. **Why, then, does it allow the Supreme Court to have its way? This, we submit, is a real mystery of our political system that for some strange reason the intellectual community has never chosen to recognize as a mystery. And, we say, the fact that it is not regarded as a mystery is indicative of how far our tradition has been derailed.**

Now let us try to clear up the mystery at, again, a fairly superficial level. First, unless Congress deems the issue at stake to be a very urgent one, it can lean back and let something called time take care of the matter. To put this rather bluntly, the mortality rate among Supreme Court justices happens to be very high; therefore we know that, at any given point in history, the dominant majorities or coalitions of the Court will not last for very long, and the President (if Congress indeed had the country on its side) will have named new justices who

agree with Congress about what is constitutional. Congress, again presuming the country on its side, can clearly afford to play a game in which it cannot lose because the cards are stacked in its favor.

Second, just as Congress knows it has the ultimate weapons in its hands, the Supreme Court also knows that Congress, in case of a showdown, would win. The Supreme Court, therefore, may sometimes tailor its decisions a little, in order not to confront Congress with the temptation to bring the ultimate weapons to bear. Or, if that seems to be too strong a statement, we can at least say that considerations of prudence, particularly the consideration that you don't get yourself into a fight that you are sure to lose, might well dispose the Supreme Court to hold back any decision that might break the peace.

We have before us, then, two important facts which help to clear up the mystery. But the mystery still remains if Congress, as by all evidence it sometimes does, lets the Supreme Court have its way even when the statute in question is an urgent one. If, then, we are going to clear up the mystery we must come up with something better than the two reasons we have just named. And we believe the mystery can be resolved if we recall that for most purposes we in America do not live under the Philadelphia Constitution, or under the Bill of Rights, but under what we may term the "Federalist Papers Constitution." The "Federalist Papers," which we are in the habit of reading wrongly as an *explication* of the Constitution, in fact give us a new and different constitution, or, if you like, a special set of rules for operating the Philadelphia Constitution which most of us have taken to heart, adopted in our hearts as our very own, and which in fact govern our political life almost as completely as if they *were* in fact our Constitution. The idea that we have three separate and coordinate branches comes to us not from the Constitution, which is a

legislative supremacy constitution, but from *The Federalist*, which lays down for us a constitutional morality, a political ethos that is as natural to us as the air we breathe. Congress does not forget that it possesses the ultimate weapons; it simply believes, as *The Federalist* teaches it to believe, that it *ought* not to use them—that it ought, as the supreme branch, to treat the other two branches *as* equal and co-ordinate. And similarly, *The Federalist* teaches the other two branches that *they* must act merely as equal and co-ordinate branches and not throw *their* weight around. The three branches, *The Federalist* instructs us, are to move together—a requirement which, let us notice, may require any one of the three to spin its wheels for a while until the others are ready to move in the direction in which it wants to go. To put this otherwise: *The Federalist* instructs us, as a matter not of constitutional law but of constitutional morality, that none of the three branches shall force a showdown with the other branches. Nor is there anything more remarkable in our history as a nation than this: There never has been a showdown, and this despite the fact that the Philadelphia Constitution from beginning to end simply invites a showdown. The mystery, we say, disappears when we approach it as a problem not of constitutional law—as we are much in the habit of doing today—but as a matter of constitutional morality that we in America not only believe in, cherish in our hearts as something we ought to obey, but actually practice. We have a duty, if we are Supreme Court justices, not to force a showdown with Congress—not so much because we will lose, though we will, but because the political system held up to us by *The Federalist* obviously cannot survive such showdowns. We have a duty, if we are Congressmen, not to force a showdown with the Supreme Court—not because we have any doubts about whether we will win, but because the American political system, as we have in-

terpreted it for ourselves, requires that there shall be no such confrontations.

What we have said to this point reveals, in its own way, the extent of our derailment. The “new” tradition, and let us call it that for now, seems to overlook or ignore the central teachings of *The Federalist*, teachings which do render our constitutional machinery workable within the context of our traditional symbols. The “new” morality, as we have already indicated, is a long way from accepting any such notions about legislative supremacy, forbearance, or deliberate sense of the community. Instead, its proponents look to institutions other than the Congress for the advancement and even explication of the American tradition. There is, and we believe we do them no injustice in so saying, a certain impatience with those institutions and processes designed, so it would seem, to collect the sense of the community and operate within the confines of the consensual politics of which we have spoken. Indeed, from *their point of view* we could hardly expect anything but impatience. The Declaration of Independence, *as they read it* (quite improperly and arbitrarily in our view), does hold up certain goals, the foremost of which over the years has become *equality* in the sense of making all humans equal through positive governmental action. But the system, operating under the traditional symbols, has failed to produce the kind and degree of equality which the proponents of the new tradition envision. *The Bill of Rights, as they read it and interpret it*, also holds out certain ends, the foremost of which has again, over the years, become that of the “open” society. Yet, as if to say “no deal,” the American people, acting principally through Congress, have shown great reluctance to move in this direction.

There is, to put the matter somewhat differently, an impatience among some with our consensual system. The Declara-

tion of Independence and the Bill of Rights—when they are read out of the context of the traditional symbols—can be interpreted to provide us with a new tradition which presumes to know the answers to those questions which have plagued every society of which we have any recorded history. This tradition so much as tells us, as a people, what our commitments, goals, and mission in history are. Thus, the impatience with that tradition—we believe our true tradition—embodying the symbols of self-government through deliberative processes such as that spelled out in *The Federalist*. So, too, we find that the new tradition provides us with the rationale (and a very elaborate rationale it is) for upholding the most extravagant claims of those institutions, the Presidency, and more notably the Supreme Court, which, so the new tradition tells us, not only have the authority but also the duty to advance our presumed commitments. So it is that our heroes today, at least within intellectual circles where the new tradition predominates, are the Warrens, Blacks, Douglasses, along with the Wilsons, Roosevelts I and II, and Lincolns.

We have been speaking to this point, we hasten to emphasize, only about the superficial manifestations of our derailment.² The causes of the derailment are far deeper and more complicated than we have suggested. Voegelin teaches us that sets of basic symbols, throughout the West, tend to be variants of the myth of Moses, of the symbols of Egypt: Desert, Covenant, and Promised Land. They are all subject to one variant or another of the kinds of derailments that happened to the people of Israel as chronicled by the Old Testament. The derailments run, as Voegelin tells us, pretty much to type, and assume forms that are not too difficult to identify. One derailment, for example, takes the form of forgetting that the truth

² We speak at a level, we can go so far as to say, at which most contemporary discourse on these problems takes place. For a further exploration of these and similar matters, see George W. Carey, "Dialogue: Sophistic or Academic," *Phalanx* (Winter, 1968).

of the soul and the truth of society are transcendent truths, and that the function of the basic symbols is to express the relations between political society and God. The basic symbols may be so manipulated as to leave God out altogether, to cut man off from anything and everything higher than himself in the constitution of being, to set man up as God, to understand man as possessing final truth, instead of merely groping for it across the gulf of transcendence. This represents a very fundamental derailment and the most dangerous one. We should hardly be surprised when we find people who experience this form of derailment being terribly sure that they are right and everybody else not only wrong, but wrong because of their wickedness and perversity. People who have suffered such a derailment, we understand at once, are not likely to enjoy waiting for a deliberate sense of the community, and are not likely to content themselves with any process of persuasion and conviction. They *know* they are right.

Another typical derailment takes the form of seizing on a single basic symbol that belongs to and was originally set forth in the context of a cluster of symbols and exaggerating it at the expense of the remainder—for example, majority rule at the expense of the deliberate sense of the community; or equality, originally understood as an equal capacity on the part of all men to give or withhold their consent, may be seized upon and exaggerated until it becomes a demand that all men be made equal in every respect, and at whatever cost to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness on the part of others.

Yet another derailment, a very common one indeed, takes the form of deciding that the Promised Land, the ideal society of saints, can be built in this world, and need not be postponed until the world to come. Marxism is the very embodiment of a derailment of this nature. and we cannot help but notice that the kind of people who go in for it aren't very much concerned with the deliberate sense of any community. Give them, even

a small minority of them, the power, and they will proceed to work their way with nary a thought about how others may feel.

And still another derailment takes the form of a belief that you can remake human nature, that you can create, through manipulation of your neighbors, a new and superior breed of men, made in *your* image just as the God of the original symbols made Adam in His image.³

These represent the typical derailments, and those who are victimized by them are pretty certain to become fanatics of a sort. They will, each in his own way, demonstrate by their behavior a contempt for the rules laid down in *The Federalist* for the operation of the Philadelphia Constitution. They are the very ones most likely to kick over the traces of the American political system, to manipulate our tradition to suit their fancy, and to insist that such and such be done no matter what the consequences. So we may safely say: Whenever there is any considerable number of them amongst us, the American political system is on the threshold of a crisis, in danger, that is, of breaking down.

Bearing this in mind, let us return to the American tradition. We have seen the purposes of the American civil body politic presented in embryonic form in the Mayflower Compact, wherein the signers interpret themselves and understand themselves as committed to the glorification of God and the advancement of the faith. Over and against these purposes we also see a solemn commitment to enact just and equal laws, that is, *laws thought to be* (we must never forget this) just and equal, or, more precisely, thought to be *meet and convenient* for the general good.

In Virginia, a century and a half later, some things have

³ Publius, let us duly note, is in no way guilty (whatever else his critics may say about him) of contributing to or nourishing any of the forms of derailment.

changed, while others seem to remain the same. The Virginians, though still determined to glorify God and advance the faith, have driven a wedge between government, the political order, and society: If God is to be glorified and the faith advanced, that is to be the business of the American society, operating through the processes of persuasion and conviction. What the American government is to do, above all, is to promote the general good, now understood to be first, a matter of serving the ends of justice, temperance, frugality, virtue, etc.; and second, a matter of serving these ends by turning the job of day-to-day government over to the representative assembly which has supreme power, but power that it is to exercise under God and always with the understanding that the legislative assembly is, according to its best lights, to do justice, to give the individuals out among the people those individual rights that, from the standpoint of justice, they ought to have. And yes, a danger does present itself: The legislative assembly may act too hastily, may not take into account all the considerations that it ought to take into account. What is more, a mere majority of the legislative assembly may act, may even act in good conscience as regards justice, *without* taking into account all that it ought to take into account. The majority may be so sure it is right about what is just that it feels no need to deliberate or even to talk things over. Even the Philadelphia Constitution gives us no solution to that problem for it, too, leaves the majorities of the legislative assembly free to throw their weight around—to refuse to deliberate, to reach for its weapons when someone, anyone, attempts to thwart them. Here, as we have already seen, is where the political morality of the “Federalist Papers” comes in: It teaches us a morality of conciliation, moderation, and, above all, deliberation. The branches of our government, especially Congress, should, according to *The Federalist* morality, avoid a showdown which would be destructive to the very structure created by the Phil-

adelphia Constitution. Congress *should* treat the other two branches as equal and co-ordinate, if for no other reason than to guarantee that the viewpoints, opinions, and considerations of these branches will be given their due weight. Congress *must* and *should*, week after week, month after month, and even, in some cases, year after year, keep on deliberating until, to all intents and purposes, all agree. That is what the teachings and morality of the "Federalist Papers" require the majority of Congress to do; just as Congress must not act until it can carry with it the President and the Supreme Court, so the majority of Congress must not act until it can carry with it the minority—at least to the extent that it will not leave any minority determined (as otherwise it might be) to sabotage the new legislative act. And we need, in this connection, to remember: We have in America no experience, any more than that of the signers of the Mayflower Compact, of a *deliberation* that leaves us with a dissident minority, a minority that proclaims its intention to disobey the law that Congress enacts. One might well say that in America, in accordance with the constitutional morality set down by *The Federalist*, "We the People" act in a very special manner to produce unanimity, obeying the basic rule: The majority must carry the minority along with it, because all men are equal, as they were in the saloon of the Mayflower, in their capacity to give or withhold their consent.

What we come to is this: The basic American symbols, as we have noticed when we spoke about the Mayflower compact, breathe the spirit of moderation, which, we have noticed, has become quite explicit by the time we get to the Virginia Declaration of Rights. They treat the problem of what we are to do, where we the people are going with our government, as a problem that we must think about, and think *together* about. As the "Federalist Papers" put it, the system based on these symbols calls for action by the *deliberate sense of the commu-*

nity, not action by mere majority vote. To be sure, the majority, according to *The Federalist*, has its role in the system; but that role, as we begin to understand, is that of midwifing and then declaring and announcing to the world the sense, the opinion, that the whole community has arrived at through the process of deliberation—which, as we now see, requires that "We the People" proceed with little catsteps.⁴ When, therefore, back in Massachusetts, we found them saying that it is the business of government to carry out the truth of the gospel, and the discipline of the churches (obligations which we find in many of our early documents), we did not hesitate to describe this as ominous, for, as we well know, people feel very strongly about the truth of the gospel and the discipline of the churches. Thus we sighed the sigh of relief when we got to Virginia and found the Americans ready to separate the political order from the religious order. And we sighed the same sigh when we found that the Philadelphia Constitution also drives a wedge between politics and religion. The system begins with the spirit of moderation in the political order, and, after Massachusetts, works its way back to the spirit of moderation and to the rules laid down in *The Federalist*.

The system begins, one might say, by an act of consensus in the saloon of the Mayflower, and ends up with acts of consensus, acts of the deliberate sense of the community, as its central political rite, to be reenacted at Philadelphia and, we can now add, in each and every session of Congress. One of the virtues of a virtuous people, we begin to see, one of the virtues that, as individuals, they must cultivate, is that of not expecting the political order, the government, to reflect and act upon the beliefs that they, as individuals, hold most strongly. They are free, as individuals, free over in the social order, to plead the case for the beliefs that they hold most strongly. Unless they

⁴ See Kendall and Carey, "The Intensity Problem and Democratic Theory," *American Political Science Review* (March, 1968).

make solemn bores of themselves, we the people will listen to them. They can try through the processes of persuasion to build a consensus around their strongly held beliefs, but one virtue they must cultivate is that of not being in too much of a hurry, and another is that of not expecting other people, their neighbors, to give up overnight their *own* strongly held beliefs.

We can put this in another way. The system requires of us that we learn the virtue of patience, along with the virtue of accepting, and accepting with good grace, political defeat. And we should begin to understand why the system has room for institutions that seem to force us into such a morality, even though by all outward evidences they also seem to thwart the will of mere majorities within our society. But all of this, we hasten to add, is foreign to those who presume to know the truths of our tradition, weaned as they are on that literature which tells them that our basic symbols are contained in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights.

To return to the basic framework which Voegelin provides us. The basic myth, in terms of which the American people have traditionally represented themselves and created their own world of meaning, runs something as follows (that it happens to be historically true, as we believe, is the least important thing about it): The American people lived originally in that wicked and darkest of most oppressive places Europe (=Egypt). Yes, some might well laugh at this equation, but such a teaching, albeit in different terms, was commonplace and well understood and accepted up to a relatively recent time. The wickedness of Europe is a fundamental presupposition of our central myth: The American people "lived" in Europe, where they suffered tyranny and oppression, where, above all, they were not permitted to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences. They dream a dream—of a promised land, off there in the Canaan (= America), that lies beyond the desert (=Atlantic Ocean) where they *will* be

able to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences. They decide, rather remarkably but quite in keeping with the myth which keeps on warning that they are a rather special lot, to be their own Moses and lead *themselves* out of Egypt. They pause for a moment in Holland, which is, of course, the wrong direction, then sail across the desert to the border of the Promised Land—and there naturally enough re-enact (in the form of a covenant with one another) the very covenant of the people of Israel at Mount Sinai, giving it the name of the Mayflower Compact and adopting it as one of their highest symbols. Once ashore, they discover, rather to their surprise, two things: First, they are not only free to worship God as they like—free because there is no one to tell them, besides themselves, how to govern and impose rules upon them; and second, they soon learn, in the absence of some authority to rule them, to govern themselves. This for them was a real problem, for the simple reason that it has been a long time since Greece and Rome, and understandably enough, they have only the haziest memory about that which we call self-government. Speedily, in any case, they discover self-government, the problem of how a people goes about governing itself, as their peculiar problem, which they conceive as a matter of making and remaking the Mayflower Compact, of experimenting with this or that variant of the symbolization of the Mayflower Compact.

But for all of this let us point out the following: They do not kid themselves that the Promised Land, the real and genuine Promised Land, can be built in this world. They content themselves with the more modest idea of building a promised land that will be merely decent and orderly—the very opposite, of course, of that indecent and disorderly Europe from which they emerged. They do not kid themselves either that they can remake human nature: Men, they know, are great sinners, potentially prideful, lustful, deceiving even, though

also, happily, capable of a certain amount of virtue which ought to be cultivated and developed. Finally, because of their good sense, they do not regard the world, the world out there beyond the two oceans, as their particular oyster; at their most typical, happily or unhappily, their thought about the big wide world is that it can go to hell at sunset. They have no desire or dream to build an empire that will include all of mankind, though all of mankind does, in due course, come to figure in their thinking about themselves. They come finally to the idea, stated at the beginning of the "Federalist Papers," that they are the suffering servants of mankind (never, however, suffering very badly, never suffering in a way that prevents a little groaning under their burden of turkey and ham on Thanksgiving Day), called upon to set an example to mankind by discovering the answer to the question: How is the people to govern itself without being tyrannical? If we may put it so, the answer to this question is found in two pieces of our sacred scripture (The Constitution and *The Federalist*) which add up to the following rules: Thou shalt govern thyself under God, through the deliberate sense of the community, of the generality of men amongst thee; thou shalt respect certain procedures necessary for that purpose; thou shalt avoid fanaticism; thou shalt preserve thy sense of humor, remembering that pride goeth before a fall; thou shalt try, above all, to be a virtuous people, made up of virtuous individuals, because only a virtuous people can do justice, remain untyrannical, as it governs itself through deliberation about the general good.

Now, in these very same terms, we can describe the typical derailments that have plagued the American tradition. One derailment runs as follows: God does not exist, but the American people are still the chosen people who must, because God does not exist, build the Promised Land on earth—on earth, of course, because earth is the only place where building is

possible. According to this myth, our national genius expresses itself, not so much in the Constitution and *The Federalist*, but in an apostolic succession of great leaders: George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Roosevelts I and II, and John Kennedy, each of whom sees more deeply than the preceding leader into the specifically American problem, which is posed by the "all men are created equal" clause of the Declaration of Independence. America will build a New Jerusalem which will be a commonwealth of free and equal men. If all of this requires remaking human nature, making the unequal to be equal—well, no job is too big for the self-chosen people if it knows its destiny and is determined to achieve it.

Still another, and more important derailment, holds that the Moses of the American people is Jehovah himself, who led them out of the hellhole, Egypt, in order to build, right here on Earth, the New Jerusalem. The Americans are God's people, America is God's Own Country. In other words, God has appointed America, not as the suffering servant of mankind, but as the arbiter of mankind, the supreme judge of all people, with a special insight into Divine Providence that no other people can match. God led the American people out of Egypt, and when He sees that Egypt won't let it go at that, He takes over and begins to run America as His Own private enterprise. He raised up a man, George Washington, a veritable paragon of all the virtues, to expel the pursuing Egyptians (who in their wickedness will not obey the command: Let my people go) from the Promised Land. In due course, the happy moment comes: The Egyptians have been forced back into Egypt, which since Egypt is Hell, is where the Europeans belong, and we, God's own people, can get down to our proper business, which is building the New Jerusalem and spreading it over the face of the entire earth. That, of course, since in the New Jerusalem, the lion will lie down beside the

lamb, involves remaking human nature. But in this account of our tradition this presents no problem: God made human nature to begin with, and we, as God's chosen people, will remake it.

The false myths produce the fanatics amongst us. They are misrepresentations and distortions of the American political tradition and its basic symbols which are, let us remind you, the representative assembly *deliberating* under God; the virtuous people, virtuous because deeply religious and thus committed to the *process* of searching for the transcendent Truth. And these are, we believe, symbols we can be proud of without going before a fall.

Appendix I

We are far from believing that the equality clause of the Declaration is meaningless. What does it mean? Our best guess is that the clause simply asserts the proposition that all peoples who identify themselves as one—that is, those who identify themselves as a society, nation, or state for action in history—are equal to others who have likewise identified themselves. This interpretation seems quite plausible in light of the first paragraph of the Declaration and the passages which immediately follow the equality clause.

We can put our point still another way. The Declaration asserts that Americans are equal to, say, the British and French. If the British and French can claim equality among the sovereign states of the world, so, too, can Americans. This interpretation takes on added force in light of the major purpose of the Declaration. Specifically, the drafters of the Declaration are maintaining that the Americans are equal to the British and are, therefore, as free as the British to establish a form of government which "shall seem most likely to effect their [American] safety and happiness." We think it important to note that equality is not listed among those ends to be secured by government. Equality, in the sense we have just described, is a value employed to justify the separation.

That Lincoln held a markedly different conception of the equality clause is beyond dispute. Although Lincoln did have