South Korea Must Grow Up and Defend Itself
And it isn’t the only such country.
7/18/24
The South Korean nation began as an American appendage 76 years ago. Washington created the new state out of a military occupation zone, defending the Republic of Korea in war, financing it in peace, and garrisoning it today.
Behind this U.S. shield, the South morphed into one of the world’s leading powers, with a top-ten economy, global trade ties, a military ranked among the world’s best, and extraordinary cultural reach. Yet South Koreans lack commensurate self-confidence.
The Washington Times recently reported on “ripples of fear” racing across the ROK. Not from the latest military maneuver by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Not from the latest missile launch or nuclear test by the communist regime. Not from the latest blood-curdling threat from the North’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un or his sister, often deployed as the official DPRK attack dog.
Instead, South Koreans are wailing, gnashing their teeth, and rending their garments on a Biblical scale because of Elbridge Colby. Colby is a onetime Pentagon official hoping to do bigger and better things in a possible—indeed, at this point likely—second Trump administration. Regarding the ROK, he questions the continued viability of the bilateral alliance, suggesting that Washington should not “break its spear” fighting North Korea, given the threat posed by China. Explained Colby: “South Korea is going to have to take primary, essentially overwhelming responsibility for its own self-defense against North Korea because we don’t have a military that can fight North Korea and then be ready to fight China.”
These sentiments shouldn’t be controversial. The U.S. is overstretched. Last week NATO celebrated its 75th year, yet still effectively stands for North America (meaning the U.S., not Canada) and The Others, despite Europe’s vast advantages over Russia. Washington remains entangled in the Middle East, dedicated to defending a gaggle of Arab dictatorships and an increasingly illiberal Israel, the latter a nuclear state long capable of protecting itself. In Asia, Republicans and Democrats alike want to contain China up to its border. They also want to keep the Pacific an American lake.
Can the U.S. continue to defend most of the known world? And why should the U.S. do so when its allies vastly outstrip their enemies, as in the Korean peninsula? By the 1960s, the ROK began to surpass the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea economically. In 1987, the South Korean military finally yielded power, enabling free elections and the development of a vibrant democracy. With the end of the Cold War, the DPRK lost its military allies, who forged economic and political relations with Seoul.
In succeeding years, the South ascended to the top tier of nations, with extensive diplomatic ties and an economy 50-plus times as large as the North’s. David Maxwell of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy complained that Colby’s policy would “drive a dagger through the heart of the alliance and give Kim room to coerce concessions from the ROK and ultimately use force to unify the peninsula under the Gulag State.” But why? Why, seven decades after the end of the Korean War, are South Koreans unable to deter Pyongyang from attacking? By reducing the pressure on Seoul to act on its own, the “Mutual” Defense Treaty has encouraged cheap-riding on Americans. Even so, despite having skimped on military outlays in the past, the South’s armed forces are ranked fifth-most powerful on earth, compared to North Korea’s military at number 36, down from number 34 last year.
Foreign and defense policy should change along with circumstances. In 1945, as World War II came to a merciful close, Washington was forced to consider Korea’s fate. The peninsula was never thought to be a vital interest for America, and no U.S. government would ever have gone to war over it. However, Japan’s defeat opened the peninsula’s future. Early victims of Japanese imperialism, Koreans yearned to be free, so they could not be left under Tokyo’s rule. Unfortunately, the alternative to a divided peninsula was an undivided one—initially occupied by Soviet troops with the Kim dynasty later ruling over all Koreans.
Having made the ROK’s future an American interest, it was difficult for Washington to stay out of the conflict, especially given erroneous assumptions about Joseph Stalin planning the attack as a possible prelude to a similar European onslaught. Nevertheless, as Seoul raced ahead of Pyongyang, the U.S. should have devolved defense responsibilities on the ROK, preparing the latter to deter an attack and win a war.
Today the South is well able to mount whatever conventional defense is necessary. A South Korean official once rebuffed my argument, complaining that Seoul had education and social needs. But so does America. There is no reason for Washington to force Americans, whose government is spending and borrowing wildly, to bear the ROK’s defense burden as well. Along with protecting Japan, a multitude of European states, and an assortment of Middle Eastern despots. With the increasingly lopsided Korean power balance, the peninsula would be a good place for the US to begin turning military responsibilities over to its longtime dependents. Yet so determined is the Biden administration to keep Seoul on the American defense dole that the administration began talks over burden-sharing early to foreclose an expected Trump administration from setting policy.
The North’s possession of nuclear weapons poses a particular challenge, but Washington’s “nuclear umbrella” is an increasingly dangerous response as Pyongyang develops a larger and more sophisticated atomic arsenal, as well as ICBMs that will eventually be capable of targeting American cities. The ROK, though a good national friend, does not warrant taking that kind of risk. What U.S. president would gamble mass incineration of his or her nation’s population to defend a distant country not vital to America’s defense? It is time for Washington policymakers to consider the utility of the ROK developing its own nuclear weapons in response—a bad option, perhaps, but still better than the alternatives, especially continued US entanglement in the peninsula’s always erratic and often threatening affairs.
Of course, the Colby boomlet may come to nothing even if Donald Trump returns to the Oval Office. Colby is an able policy salesman, but Trump has not publicly expressed any staff preferences. Although self-promotion fills Washington, ostentatious hype more often kills than advances such ambitions. Today, smart money on the next national security adviser is being wagered elsewhere.
Nevertheless, while the election is still three and a half months away, a lot of time in American politics, it increasingly looks like a Trump victory is likely, with a possible GOP congressional sweep. President Joe Biden is evidently deteriorating mentally and physically, poorly suited to being president now and almost certain to be incapable of serving until a second term would end. The assassination attempt on Trump has turned the latter into an unexpectedly sympathetic and even heroic figure, allowing him to grab the mantle of national unity. Down-ballot Democratic races will be vulnerable as party morale and fundraising deteriorate. The corruption conviction of Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ), long-time chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is a notable embarrassment. Many leading Democrats have written off the presidential race, planning to concentrate on congressional contests.
All of which suggests significant changes are likely in U.S. foreign policy. Trump’s actions did not match his rhetoric during his first term, but his prospective vice president, Sen. J.D. Vance (R-OH), has taken the lead in challenging several foreign policy shibboleths. Moreover, Trump appears to have learned that personnel are policy, and thus is more likely to choose likeminded staff, whether that includes Colby or not. Finally, Biden has inadvertently exposed the bankruptcy of the uber-interventionist status quo. Who can look at the last three and a half years and want to see a replay?
Hence, it is not just South Koreans who should worry about relying on Washington. If Trump regains the presidency, he might begin reducing subsidies for Europe’s defense and Ukraine’s war. Indeed, one could imagine him handing this policy portfolio to Vance. Although Trump had a good relationship with Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the former might recognize the opportunity to speed the shift of responsibility for Japan’s defense onto Tokyo. And despite Trump’s supposed affection for authoritarians and despots, the need to curb fiscal deficits, address recruiting shortfalls, and minimize military risks might cause him to reconsider commitments in the Middle East. The larger the political victory, the greater the foreign policy possibilities.
South Koreans should worry about the future of the alliance. Free-riding allies are likely to be targets of the next administration, whoever ends up as top foreign policy adviser. Such a shift is long overdue. With the federal government hurtling toward de facto bankruptcy, it is time for Americans to concentrate on saving their republic.