Speaking to the media on Monday President Assad said he would meet
with President Erdoğan if it was in Syria's interest but Türkiye is
illegally occupying Syria and supporting terrorist organisations
Preparing for Trump
Erdoğan’s outreach to Assad is also designed to prepare for the
possibility of Donald Trump returning to the US presidency. Conventional
wisdom suggests that a Trump administration would draw down US troops
from northeastern Syria, which would create a power vacuum that could be
filled either by the Turks or Iran. Erdoğan aims pre-emptively to
secure Türkiye’s interests by locking Assad into an anti-YPG/SDF
coalition dominated by the Kurds. That, in essence, would hand Ankara
recognition by Damascus of its right to maintain troops in Syria on a
par with Russia and Iran. This would likely result in Türkiye (rather
than Iran or Assad) becoming the primary interlocutor for the US during
any future negotiations concerning an eventual withdrawal of American
troops. In turn, this would set the stage for a repetition of the 2020
Sochi agreements that established Türkiye’s protectorate in the
northwest and bring Ankara a step closer to realising its longstanding
goal of a contiguous buffer zone 30-40 kms deep inside Syria.
Such an outcome would compel Assad to navigate a more complex web of
alliances, balancing his commitments to Russia, Iran, and now Türkiye.
Juggling these relationships, Assad’s regime would be stretched thin,
undermining his authority even further and strengthening the strategic
position of the Turks.
The cost
Unlike the unconditional normalisation pursued by some Arab states,
Türkiye’s engagement with Assad is conditional and strategic. When Assad
failed to deliver on Arab demands, there were no immediate
consequences. In contrast, Türkiye’s implicit condition for
rapprochement is that Assad accepts it’s military presence on Syrian
soil for an unspecified period. The conditions for withdrawal are even
more stringent: safety and calm that allows refugee return, countering
the YPG/SDF, finding compromise with the Syrian opposition and a degree
of permanent Turkish influence within Syrian territories. Assad is not
willing to or capable of delivering on any of these.
A rapprochement between Türkiye and Syria, while seemingly bolstering
Assad's legitimacy on the international stage, paradoxically could
undermine his standing among his core supporters and gravely weaken his
regime. Assad’s supporters have rallied around his resistance to
“Ottomanism” and the armed opposition groups that Ankara backs. Any
perceived leniency towards returning refugees or to repentant rebels
would enrage those supporters and create security challenges that the
regime would struggle to contain. Moreover, a closer alignment with the
Turks – Iran’s main regional rival in Syria – could further strain
Assad’s alliance with Tehran at a time when his regime is coming under
pressure to do more in the Resistance Axis confrontation with Israel. It
is no secret that the Alawite core of the regime wants nothing to do
with Gaza or with fighting Israel, and views Iran as a necessary evil
that should be dispensed with at the earliest opportunity. A reported
discovery of an anti-Iran spy network within the Presidential Palace
that included the late adviser Luna al-Shibl
will have done nothing to allay Tehran’s displeasure at Assad playing
both sides of the fence. A fate not dissimilar to that of Ali Abdullah
Saleh could become a very real risk for Assad.
This makes Türkiye the most dangerous enemy for the regime – more so if Erdoğan’s olive branch is accepted.
Calling the bluff
Despite their vocal opposition to the Assad regime, the EU and the US
have not withdrawn their recognition of him as Syria’s leader. By being
open to normalisation, Türkiye is not necessarily endorsing Assad but
is instead positioning itself as a mediator and ensuring it can operate
within established international legal frameworks to achieve its
security goals. This is not at all different to what some EU member
states are doing, Italy for instance.
EU and US disengagement and disinterest in Syria diplomacy, including their failure to push for a genuine implementation of UNSCR 2254,
and their less than cordial attitude to Türkiye’s role in Syria, have
left Ankara with few options. The US’ last-minute rejection of local
elections in the northeast administered by the Autonomous Administration
of North and East Syria (AANES, otherwise known as Rojava) – a major
bugbear for Türkiye – is a case of too little too late. Absent a genuine
political and security partnership, Ankara will continue to play its
own game with Russia.
Assad will likely continue to resist pressure to meet with the
Turkish leader, who in turn will call Assad’s bluff by exaggerating his
openness to a rapprochement. For now, Erdoğan can appease his electoral
base, slow-cook prospects for an interim settlement that consolidates
his country’s control over northern Syria and, at the same time, create
enough wiggle room to achieve a convenient understanding with President
Putin should Trump, if he wins, pull another impulsive act next year.
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