Israel Is Stuck in the Year 2000
The country’s relationship with Lebanon hasn’t moved beyond decades-old dilemmas.
Whoever “they” are, they often say, “Everything old is new again.” That seems indisputable when it comes to pop culture. One of my daughters listens to classic rock, and she isn’t an outlier among her friends. Both kids dig 90s television, and I am told that pants cuffs and three-button suit jackets will be making a comeback soon. It is not just music, television, and fashion, however. The same “old is new” phenomenon is also true about the Middle East.
Many of the ideas that policymakers and the foreign-policy community have put forward to resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians after the war between Israel and Hamas comes to an end are based on initiatives proffered in the second half of the 20th century—or even before then.
Israel’s leaders have mostly ignored these proposals. Yet there is an undeniable “back to the future” quality to their own approach to security. Even if the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) do not establish a full-blown military administration in the Gaza Strip, it is likely that Israel is going to occupy parts of the territory—a reversal of the withdrawal it carried out in August 2005. And, as the Israelis turn their attention to their northern border and Lebanon, they may be embarking on a military operation that will likely put them back where they were on May 23, 2000—the day before Israeli military forces withdrew from southern Lebanon after 28 years. Both policies would pose political dilemmas for which Israel has never found lasting solutions.
By the turn of the 21st century, Israel was confronted with at an impasse with Lebanon. It had invaded its northern neighbor almost three decades prior in an attempt to bring peace to the Galilee. It achieved that objective, but at a significant cost. The Israelis remained in Lebanon for almost three decades—for the last 25 years maintaining a 328 square mile security zone in the country’s south that they patrolled along with allied militias, notably including the South Lebanon Army (SLA). In those years, the Israelis lost about 300 soldiers and spent billions maintaining their presence and ensuring the capabilities of their proxy forces.
When he became prime minister in 1999, the Labor Party’s Ehud Barak—Israel’s most decorated soldier—promised Israelis that he would withdraw from the security zone. He made the case that Israel’s investment in southern Lebanon was hardly worth it. From Barak’s perspective, the IDF’s presence gave militant group Hezbollah and Syria a golden opportunity to bog it down and draw as much Israeli blood as possible. It was only bureaucratic inertia resulting from fiercely held differences about the value of the mission among the IDF high commander that had locked the Israelis in a policy that left their forces vulnerable.
Once Barak made the decision to withdraw, however, the Israelis were so eager to get out of Lebanon that they left five weeks earlier than planned. Since then, there has been one major conflict with Hezbollah (in 2006) and too many skirmishes to count, not including the daily exchange of fire since the war in Gaza began more than nine long months ago.
Up until Oct. 7, 2023, the Israelis seemed reasonably confident that they could continue to secure their border by deterring Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons through the timely and judicious use of force in Lebanon; Syria; and at times, Iraq and even Iran. This shadow war was successful, but there were worrying signs before Hamas’s attack that Israel’s deterrent was weakening. Hezbollah’s leaders sent their forces right down on the Israeli border, and the group’s militants periodically tried to infiltrate Israel from both above and below ground.
Since Hamas’s attack last fall, the Israelis have reconsidered their tolerance for Hezbollah’s provocations. Fearing that the Lebanese group would stage an assault on Israel’s northern communities akin to what Hamas carried out, Israeli authorities evacuated 80,000 civilians from the area. This situation is intolerable for Israelis. Of course there is hardship for those who have left their homes, but as long as they are gone, Hezbollah has effectively rendered Israel’s sovereignty over its own territory an open question.
As a result, Israel is determined to change the status quo. Principle among its concerns is pushing Hezbollah back to the Litani River, which runs parallel to the Israel-Lebanon border, located about 18 miles north of it. This is consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, a 2006 document that, among other things, requires that Hezbollah be dismantled and prohibits forces other U.N. peacekeepers and the Lebanese Army from operating south of the Litani.
Fearing a devastating conflict, the Biden administration has been hard at work—with the French government along for the ride—trying to find a diplomatic solution to the issue. It is a heavy lift. Hezbollah has thrown cold water on any agreement that would require it to withdraw. And the Israelis are not willing to accept an agreement on paper—like Resolution 1701—but would instead require an actual Hezbollah withdrawal. For either side to concede would amount to a strategic defeat. That makes escalation more likely.
Setting aside what is likely to be a shattering war that will lay waste to significant portions of both countries, the same question that has bedeviled the IDF in Gaza—what comes next?—beckons in southern Lebanon. Assuming that they prevail—not a forgone conclusion—the Israelis have no clear way forward once the fighting stops. Like in Gaza, there is no authority to whom to hand off territory once it is cleared. Israel’s proxies in southern Lebanon collapsed long ago. A quick Israeli withdrawal would likely result in the return of Hezbollah, rendering the conflict strategically meaningless for Israel. Meanwhile, a lot of blood would have been expended.
No doubt, Israel’s leaders want to avoid that outcome, but their options are limited. Even with its firepower, the IDF is unlikely to eliminate Hezbollah’s threat. With no partners on the ground, a feckless U.N., an ineffective Lebanese army, and zero prospect of getting help from NATO peacekeepers, the Israelis may very well turn back the clock to establish a security zone in southern Lebanon.
The Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon are quite different in terms of the political, diplomatic, and specific security challenges that Israelis confront in each place. Yet, Hamas’s October 2023 attack against Israel and Hezbollah’s ability to compromise the country’s sovereignty are making the case for Israelis that the withdrawals of the early 2000s have not brought Israel peace, but rather, the opposite.
It is an argument that Israel’s right wing was making at the time. It is now more potent than ever. Analysts and policymakers should not be surprised if the future of Gaza and southern Lebanon looks eerily similar to the recent past.
Steven A. Cook is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. His latest book, The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East, will be published in June 2024. Twitter: @stevenacook