Turkish airstrikes in Erbil's mountainous Bradost region ignited
wildfires that raged for two days devastating local properties and
vineyards, July 26, 2024 [photo credit: Hunar Kawarty]
In most places, such blatant violations of sovereignty and the
consequent harm to civilians would elicit a strong reaction. Yet the
Iraqi government and the ruling parties in the Kurdistan Region are
publicly tolerant of Türkiye’s military activities, mostly offering
token condemnation. This contrasts sharply with public sentiment in the
Kurdistan Region. Ordinary citizens are horrified by Türkiye’s incursion
onto their land, the deaths and wounding of civilians and the impact on
farmers and the environment. This does not necessarily mean there is
much support for the PKK; indeed, many people have no love for the
Turkish Kurdish militia and blame its presence for the fighting in the
Kurdistan Region. Yet their ability to object to Türkiye’s military
activities is hampered by the political interests of the Iraqi
government and the Kurdish ruling parties who do not want to upset
Ankara and work to limit vocal dissent.
Over the past six months Baghdad has sought to improve its
relationship with Ankara. It has pursued increased trade and investment
through programmes like the US$17 billion Development Road transportation network and is seeking a negotiated solution to water management disputes in order to increase flows on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. It also wants to bolster Iraq’s ambitions to be viewed as a regional broker
by facilitating a rapprochement between Türkiye and Syria. Ahead of a
landmark visit by President Erdoğan in April, the Iraqi government formally declared the PKK a “banned organisation” as a concession to Ankara.
Diplomatic and trade initiatives aside, Iraq also lacks the military
capacity to prevent Turkish incursions. The affected areas, as explained
below, are controlled by others and federally controlled units like the
Border Force are fairly thin on the ground and certainly no match for
Türkiye’s army which is the second largest standing army in NATO with
only the US having a larger military commitment in the alliance.
These are all pragmatic reasons for Iraq to avoid upsetting Türkiye
even though the latter is flagrantly and repeatedly violating Iraqi
sovereignty. As a result, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s
government has only issued a pro forma objection to the new offensive. There is some grumbling among his coalition, notably from Qais al-Khazali,
but the benefits of positive relations with Türkiye seem to outweigh
the costs that would come if it more robustly opposed the Turkish
offensive.
It is worth noting, too, that the dynamics of the conflict within the
Kurdistan Region are influenced both by geopolitics and intra-Kurdish
rivalries. Analysts often focus on the former, while ignoring the
latter.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) run by the Barzani family
controls Erbil and Duhok governorates where the current offensive is
happening. As a result, it is a particularly important actor.
Geopolitically the KDP is closely aligned with Türkiye with whom it has
longstanding economic, political, and security ties. The entirety of the
Türkiye-Iraq border lies within the KDP’s zone and border crossings
provide a lucrative source of income for the party. As the more powerful
side in the relationship, Ankara is able to wield significant leverage
over the KDP and enlist its help in combating the PKK. The KDP’s
affiliated security forces are key to controlling movement around the
conflict zone, hindering PKK operations and providing intelligence.
The KDP is not forced into this unequal relationship. Rather, it sees
the PKK as an ideological and political competitor for the hearts and
minds of Kurds around the world when in reality both the KDP and the PKK
are deeply flawed standard-bearers. Moreover, the PKK’s presence inside
the Kurdistan Region impinges on the KDP’s ability to control its own
territory, putting areas outside of its reach and influence. These
factors underpin a mutual antagonism between the KDP and the PKK which
occasionally leads to armed clashes.
The KDP has a well-earned reputation for intolerance of dissent
and will punish journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens who
criticise it publicly. The party watches discourse about Türkiye and the
PKK closely and regularly prevents demonstrations
against Ankara’s military policies. Dissidents are routinely accused of
conspiring with the PKK — which the United States, European Union, and
others have designated as a terrorist group and the Iraqi government has
formally banned — even when there is little evidence to suggest any
connection. This has a chilling effect on public discourse about the
ongoing conflict and its effects on Kurdish civilians.
The other Kurdish ruling party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK), controls Sulaymaniyah governorate, which is located to the south
and west of the current fighting and does not border Türkiye. The PKK
does have a presence in the area, however, with its main headquarters in
the Qandil Mountains north of Ranya. In recent years, Türkiye has advanced a narrative
that the PUK and the PKK are closely aligned. The KDP also pushes this
framing as part of its own rivalry with the PUK. In reality, the PUK and
the PKK tend not to interfere in each other’s affairs. For Türkiye,
this is a distinction without a difference and it has used its influence
to push the PUK to do more to interfere with the PKK’s activities. For
example, Ankara has imposed a real cost on the PUK by closing its airspace to all flights going to or from Sulaymaniyah’s airport for more than a year.
The PUK leadership in Sulaymaniyah faces a double problem in crafting
its response. On the one hand, it wants to exploit negative public
opinion about Türkiye’s military campaign and the rival KDP’s close
relationship with Ankara. In service of this and to boost his own
Kurdish nationalist credentials, PUK leader Bafel Talabani has pursued close ties with Syrian Kurdish groups. However, this strategy comes at the cost of antagonising the Turkish government, which reportedly refuses to engage with Talabani.
Civilians affected by war deserve the ability to engage in robust
discussion about how it impacts their lives. This is not happening in
the context of the current Turkish military campaign in the Kurdistan
Region because the political leaderships in Baghdad, Erbil and
Sulaymaniyah have an interest in limiting the discourse and visibility
of public opinion on the issue.
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