Against the backdrop of rising tensions with China in the South China Sea, the Philippines has shifted its defense diplomacy into high gear. Manila recently finalized a vital security pact with Japan that is set to dramatically enhance interoperability and bilateral defense cooperation. Under the newly signed Reciprocal Access Agreement, or RAA, the two countries will establish legal frameworks and logistical procedures for mutual troop exchanges. The de facto visiting forces agreement also facilitates expansive and regularized joint drills and military exercises between the Philippine and Japanese armed forces, including their first bilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea, which began today.
Crucially, the RAA will also facilitate the transfer, exchange and joint development of advanced weapons systems, which are crucial to the modernization of the Philippine military as well as in promoting Japan’s increasingly proactive regional defense policy. The intensification of Philippines-Japan defense cooperation comes on the heels of both sides participation in two new “minilateral” defense groupings: the Japan-Philippine-U.S. trilateral framework as well as the new “Squad” grouping comprising Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States.
As if that weren’t enough, Manila has made it clear that it’s also pursuing RAAs with Canada, New Zealand and France. To enhance its maritime security capabilities, the Philippines has conducted increasingly regular joint drills and naval patrols with both its traditional and new defense partners, including the U.S., Japan, Australia, Canada, India and France. In the words of Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr., his country is pursuing something “close to the apex of a defensive alliance.”
Although Philippine authorities have not directly mentioned the threat from Beijing as the driver of these efforts, they have clearly positioned Manila as the linchpin of a broader security network in the Indo-Pacific in the face of China’s growing naval assertiveness in adjacent waters.
For critics, the Philippines risks getting dragged into a U.S.-led “proxy war” against China. Upon closer examination, however, the Philippines is pursuing a rational and proactive strategy that: is purely defensive against China’s aggression in the South China Sea; aims to diversify the country’s pool of strategic partnerships beyond the U.S.; and seeks to institutionalize fruitful defense partnerships beyond the whims of domestic politics in Manila and populist disruptions in Washington.
Dancing With the Superpowers
The Philippines’ current defense policy can be best understood as a reaction to China’s increasingly aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, though it took time to take shape. Indeed, upon taking office in June 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. broadly reproduced the approach of his notoriously pro-Beijing predecessor, former President Rodrigo Duterte.
Shortly after winning the presidency, Marcos Jr. held a cordial phone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping, during which he vowed to ensure bilateral ties “shift to a higher gear” under his watch. Shortly after, he hosted China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Manila, where both sides agreed to pursue a “new golden era” of bilateral relations. Crucially, like Duterte, Marcos also chose Beijing as his first major foreign destination ahead of both Washington and Tokyo.
However, China refused to offer any major concessions on either unfulfilled pledges of infrastructure investment or festering disputes over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Marcos’ fruitless visit to Beijing last year, coupled with the increasingly aggressive behavior by Chinese coast guard vessels in the disputed waters, convinced Marcos to recalibrate his foreign policy. In order to enhance his country’s strategic leverage and defensive capabilities, he doubled down on traditional security partnerships, while also pursuing new ones.
In underscoring his commitment to remaining nonaligned in any superpower rivalry, Marcos has emphasized the Philippines’ “strategic agency” as well as smaller nations’ unwillingness to get embroiled in any great power conflict.
On one hand, Marcos expanded military cooperation with Washington by granting the U.S. military access to additional sites under the two sides’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA. Nevertheless, he consciously avoided overdependence on Washington in order to preserve the Philippines’ strategic autonomy as well as to dispel accusations of acting as a U.S. puppet.
“[T]here is a narrative out there that is going around that we are at the beck and call … of the United States when it comes to these foreign policy decisions, especially surrounding the South China Sea,” Marcos said during a high-profile speech at the Sydney-based Lowy Institute earlier this year. “But let me make it very, very clear,” he added. “The Philippines acts for its own interest, and the decisions that we make when it comes to foreign policy are decisions that we make because we believe, and are convinced, and know that it is in the national interest.”
In May, during his keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue—a high-level security conference held yearly in Singapore—Marcos reiterated Manila’s opposition to any “new Cold War” in Asia and underscored his commitment to remaining broadly nonaligned in any superpower rivalry. Time and again, he has emphasized the Philippines’ “strategic agency” as well as smaller nations’ unwillingness to get embroiled in any great power conflict.
This explains why Marcos has remained deliberately ambiguous on the extent of the U.S. military’s access to Philippine bases under the EDCA. Crucially, he also turned down an offer of assistance from Washington after numerous clashes between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea. And last month, when he came under pressure to invoke the Philippine-U.S. mutual defense treaty after Chinese forces injured a Philippine serviceman during a resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal, Marcos declared, “We refuse to play by the rules that force us to choose sides in a great power competition.”
A Linchpin State
In consciously avoiding any blatant alignment with Washington, even when faced with a hopelessly imbalanced showdown with Beijing, the Marcos administration’s key priority is to project and pursue an “independent foreign policy.”
This is partly to disarm his domestic critics, particularly the Duterte political clan, who broadly back warmer relations with China and have on occasion openly accused Marcos of acting as Washington’s proxy. Vice President Sara Duterte, Rodrigo’s daughter, allied with Marcos ahead of the 2022 election, but they have since had a falling out, in part due to differences over China policy.
But it’s also born out of decades-long frustration with Washington, which has repeatedly abandoned Manila during moments of high tension with China in the South China Sea—from the Mischief Reef incident in 1995 to the Second Thomas Shoal standoff in 2012—and has provided relatively minimal defense assistance to its chief Southeast Asian ally.
Even now, the Philippines does not possess a single modern U.S. fighter jet or tank, even as non-allied partners like Jordan, Pakistan and Egypt have enjoyed access to advanced U.S. military hardware. Washington’s annual foreign military financing assistance to the Philippines has increased in recent years, with an additional $500 million pledged by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken during his visit to Manila this week. But that is still dwarfed by multibillion-dollar aid packages to key allies such as Israel and strategic partners such as Ukraine.
In fact, the bulk of Manila’s modern defense equipment hails from South Korea and India. Over the next decade, the Philippines, now the fastest-growing economy in the region, is set to spend close to $35 billion to modernize its naval and air force capabilities. Manila has also adopted a new “Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense” strategy, which aims to enhance its maritime domain and defense capabilities across the Western Pacific, South China Sea and the Luzon Strait.
Accordingly, the Marcos administration has focused on developing an expanding network of strategic partnerships with fellow “middle powers” in order to modernize its armed forces and enhance its strategic autonomy. In that context, Japan makes a natural partner of choice, given the depth of bilateral trade and investment relations as well as the support Tokyo traditionally enjoys in Manila across both populist and reformist administrations.
Crucially, Japan is also assuming a more proactive regional role with a focus on aiding maritime security capabilities of likeminded nations in the Indo-Pacific, with the Philippines emerging as a major beneficiary of Japanese defense aid in recent years. Meanwhile, Canada has provided substantial assistance in terms of domain awareness capability-development, while France is offering submarines and advanced weapons systems. For its part, New Zealand—a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing pact alongside the U.S., Canada, the U.K. and Australia—is also seeking a “comprehensive partnership” with the Philippines amid shared concerns over China’s expanding maritime footprint in the Pacific.
Undoubtedly, the U.S. remains the Philippines’ sole treaty ally and, as a major power, is at the center of multiple minilateral initiatives involving Manila, including the ones mentioned above. But the Marcos administration is cognizant of Washington’s manifold strategic commitments from Europe and the Middle East to Northeast Asia. Beyond that, legitimate concerns remain over the potential return of a more transactional and unilateralist foreign policy should former U.S. President Donald Trump return to the White House next year.
By actively developing an expanding network of defense partnerships, Manila is steadily enhancing its strategic autonomy and modernizing its defense capabilities. But it’s also indirectly serving as a linchpin of a broader U.S.-led “integrated deterrence” strategy against China. In many ways, the Philippines is solidifying its position as a rising middle power by leveraging its enhanced importance as a key U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific. It’s a strategy that carries its own set of risks, namely provoking China, but it’s also a rational response to an increasingly uncertain and perilous strategic environment. Neither dependence on the U.S. nor submission to China is an option for the Marcos administration.
Richard Javad Heydarian is a global affairs columnist, academic and policy adviser. He is currently a senior lecturer at the University of the Philippines’ Asian Center, and has written for the The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Guardian and Foreign Affairs, among other outlets. His forthcoming book is “China’s New Empire” (Melbourne University Press).