In Ukraine and Gaza, China’s great power comes with great responsibility
- Beijing is starting to have a say in regions where it has traditionally downplayed any security role, but this comes at a cost
 
History
 is mostly made up of the mundane but remembered for the remarkable. For
 historians of Chinese diplomacy, China’s success in 
restoring diplomatic ties between arch-rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia might well be remembered as a turning point. The signing of the 
Beijing Declaration
 for unity by 14 Palestinian factions should have raised eyebrows 
further – in a most volatile region, China has succeeded in herding the 
cats, at least for a while.
Can China build on these to become a global peacemaker?
The
 precondition to being a peacemaker is being trusted for neutrality or, 
more precisely, impartiality. The neutrality of great powers is not 
normally very reliable because, given the realism of international 
relations, self-interest could drive them to alter the distribution of 
world power in their favour. That is why when it comes to honest 
brokers, people often think of middle powers such as Norway, Switzerland
 and Sweden.
But China stands out. Unlike 
Britain or 
France,
 it has no historic burden of being a coloniser. Unlike Russia, which 
would use force to maintain its spheres of influence, China needs no 
such spheres as its influence, especially in the global economy, is 
ubiquitous. And unlike the United States, China has shown 
no missionary zest
 to police the world through hegemony or alliance. All of China’s 
military operations overseas in recent decades, whether in peacekeeping,
 counterpiracy or disaster relief, have been invariably humanitarian in 
nature.
If
 China has waded into deeper waters in the Middle East, then in Ukraine,
 Beijing has tried its best to strike a balance in a war between two of 
its friends.
It
 has almost never voted against or vetoed any of the UN resolutions 
condemning Russia, but rather only abstained. While the US-led Nato has 
provided full military support to Ukraine, Beijing has provided no 
military aid or weapons to Moscow. True, China’s trade with Russia has 
helped it 
skirt Western sanctions,
 but the trade went on before the war and none of it violates 
international rules or regimes. Last year, Ukraine’s largest trading 
partner remained China, with a trade revenue of around US$12.9 billion.
02:02
China skips international peace conference on Ukraine, calls for negotiations ‘as soon as possible’
It remains to be seen how China’s 
12-point peace plan and its six-point 
joint proposal
 with Brazil might work. After all, China is not the only country that 
has tabled a peace plan, and all peace plans rest on the precondition of
 a ceasefire.
But none is in sight. Russia must gain full control of the 
four annexed regions
 in Eastern Ukraine to be able to declare victory while a Ukraine fully 
supported by the West has every reason not to relinquish territory.
Still, no war can last forever. As Ukrainian forces lose ground and the US gears up for a presidential election that could 
fundamentally change Western support for Ukraine, Kyiv may find it imperative to reach out to Beijing.
During his first 
trip to China
 since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Ukrainian Foreign 
Minister Dmytro Kuleba said “a just peace” in Ukraine is in China’s 
strategic interests and that Beijing’s role as “a global force for 
peace” is important.
01:47
Ukraine says it’s ready to resume ‘good faith’ negotiations with Russia
Beijing
 can help in at least three ways. First, it can facilitate a ceasefire 
dialogue between Moscow and Kyiv. Russia was not invited to the 
peace summit
 held in Switzerland in June and China did not attend. Now Ukrainian 
President Volodymyr Zelensky is calling for a second peace summit to be 
held in a Global South country, and suggested that Russia could be 
invited. Could that Global South country be China? Should the warring 
parties agree, Beijing could well be the willing host.
Second,
 China could, with other major powers, help provide a collective 
security guarantee for an armistice, the most likely scenario so far 
after a ceasefire. Without such a guarantee, Ukraine can never be sure 
that Russia will remain content with what it has annexed, and Russia 
would worry about the annexed lands becoming another Afghanistan with 
Ukrainian fighters playing the role of the 
1980s mujahideen.
Other
 questions are bound to crop up. If Ukraine has to give up some of its 
territory, where will the new border be drawn? Will the contested 
territory be put under an international trusteeship with proper 
referendums so residents can state their preferences? Will peacekeeping 
forces be allowed to monitor ceasefire lines?
None
 of these issues can be bilaterally resolved by Moscow and Kyiv. They 
demand United Nations involvement and a large dose of US-China 
cooperation. If Russia listened to anyone, it would be China. The onus 
on the US, then, is to secure Ukrainian cooperation.
Third,
 China is in a better position than any other country to help with 
post-war rehabilitative reconstruction, be it in Ukraine or Gaza. In 
March last year, the World Bank estimated the cost of the reconstruction
 and restoration of Ukraine’s infrastructure at US$411 billion, more 
than double its 2023 gross domestic product. According to the UN, 
reconstructing Gaza will need US$40-50 billion at least, with rebuilding
 lost homes alone taking a minimum of 16 years.
While
 who will pay for reconstruction in Ukraine and Gaza remains an open 
question, China’s capabilities in infrastructure-building, which are 
second to none, can most certainly help.
It
 is intriguing to see how Beijing is starting to have a say in Europe 
and the Middle East where it has traditionally pursued economic gains 
and downplayed any security role. When China started reforms in the late
 1970s, it was 
“crossing the river by feeling the stones”.
 It is now wading into the ocean and there is no seabed it can touch nor
 can it turn back. Being a responsible global power comes at a price.
Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret) is a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University