The U.S. secretary of commerce is recovering from a fractured tailbone, but she doesn’t know how it happened.
“I have no idea!” Gina Raimondo says with an exasperated sigh when I ask, before pointing to the donut pillow that she’s about to sit down on for our interview. She adds, “I’m only telling you because I don’t want you to think I’m weird.”
We meet late on a Friday morning in July in Raimondo’s office on the fifth floor of the Department of Commerce—one of Washington’s largest government buildings, located just off Pennsylvania Avenue and across the street from the White House complex.
For the past three-and-a-half years, the proximity between the two buildings has been more symbolic than ever. The Commerce Department has been thrust to the forefront of what is arguably President Joe Biden’s biggest geopolitical priority: winning the technological race against China and ensuring U.S. economic and military primacy.
That includes cutting off Chinese access to advanced semiconductor chips through ever-expanding export controls while also ensuring that more of those chips are made in the United States and allied countries; spearheading the development and regulation of artificial intelligence; and even looking ahead to the implications of advanced quantum computing through the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
As one individual put it at a recent gathering in Washington conducted under the Chatham House Rule, the Pentagon is probably “jealous” of the Commerce Department’s centrality to U.S. national security.
Raimondo acknowledged her department’s outsized influence but disagreed that the overriding sentiment is that of jealousy. U.S. Defense Secretary “Lloyd Austin has called me his battle buddy,” she said, adding that she sees herself as “connected at the hip” with the military and intelligence communities.
“We’re at the red-hot center of national security and economic competitiveness,” Raimondo said. “Some of that is because technology is in the middle of everything, and some of it, I think, is just the way in which I have managed this place.”
That centrality is why I wanted to sit down with Raimondo. I wanted to know more about how she balances the need to protect national security interests with the department’s mandate to promote U.S. economic growth and competitiveness—and her role in repositioning the department for those shifting priorities.
From left, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo testify during a U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee hearing in Washington, D.C., on May 16, 2023.Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images
Raimondo’s familiarity with technology predates her political career. In 2000, she co-founded Point Judith Capital—the first venture capital firm in her native state of Rhode Island. The experience influenced her “a lot,” she told me.
“I like to be with entrepreneurs. I love it. I miss it. That’s what I did,” she said. She then lowered her voice to nearly a whisper, as if she was telling me a secret: “So many people in government just play it safe, worry about their job—you’re not going to get anything done that way. Don’t be afraid to speak up, don’t be afraid to try for something big. Have impact. Judge yourself on impact.”
Raimondo decided to take that approach into politics, being elected as Rhode Island’s treasurer in 2010 before becoming the state’s first woman governor in 2015. She served in that position until Biden named her to his cabinet—making it through the Senate confirmation process despite opposition from some Republicans who accused her of being soft on China.
It would be harder to make that claim now. Raimondo has been the target of Chinese hackers and memelords, who see her as the face of the Biden administration’s anti-China tech policies.
Some of them took that literally, superimposing her images on fake ads for Chinese tech giant Huawei’s new Mate 60 Pro smartphone, which was released during Raimondo’s visit to Beijing last year. The phone is powered by a relatively advanced 7 nanometer chip—designed and made in China—that was previously thought to be beyond Beijing’s capacity to build due to U.S. export controls.
“I was there. I saw the billboards; my face on the billboard with the Huawei phone—my kids sent me the [memes], saying ‘Mom, this is terrible!’ because it’s all over TikTok,” Raimondo said, mentioning another major Chinese tech platform that Washington is trying to ban. “They were not subtle.”
In keeping with Raimondo’s credo of judging oneself by impact, I asked what impact the export controls on China have had, and how successful the Biden administration’s “small yard, high fence” approach to cutting off Beijing’s access to critical technologies has been.
“I’m smiling, because yesterday I had a meeting with my team, and I’m pushing them hard to share data with me on the effectiveness of our export controls, and we have a little study ongoing where I’m trying to collect the data,” she said, “because that’s really the question you’re asking, like, ‘show me, show me.’”
That data is still a work in progress and hasn’t been made public yet, but Raimondo laid out her case for why she believes that the United States remains in the lead: China may have put a 7 nanometer chip in Huawei’s phone (the smaller that number, the more advanced the chip—the iPhone 15 Pro, for example, is powered by a 3 nanometer chip), but there still isn’t evidence that it can produce those chips at scale. And they’re a far cry from the 2 nanometer chips that will soon be made in Arizona by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company—the global industry leader—thanks to subsidies from another big Commerce Department-led initiative, the CHIPS and Science Act.
U.S. artificial intelligence models are also more advanced than their Chinese rivals, which “wouldn’t be the case” if it weren’t for export controls on the chips needed to train those models, Raimondo said.
Raimondo leaves a Boeing facility after a press conference in Shanghai on Aug. 30, 2023.Andy Wong/Pool/AFP via Getty Images
“However, I think it’s very dangerous to assume that it’s inevitable that we’ll stay ahead. I think that’s an arrogant viewpoint,” she said. “I feel good about where we are, but literally every single day, we should be on the edge of our seat.”
Determining the size of the yard—how many and what kinds of technologies should be subject to U.S. export controls to China—and the height of the fence—how strong those export controls should be—has been a challenge. It’s a tricky place to be in for a department whose official purpose is to be the “voice of business in the federal government” in a country that prides itself on the openness that fosters technological innovation. China, with more than a billion people, has been a coveted and lucrative market for U.S. companies for years, but it is also now undisputedly the United States’ biggest geopolitical rival.
Nvidia, the California company that designs advanced semiconductors that are essential to training artificial intelligence models, is making new chips that it can continue selling to China without flouting the export controls. And the Semiconductor Industry Association, a leading trade group, has urged the Commerce Department to “reduce burdens” on chip exports even as it praises efforts to bring semiconductor manufacturing back to U.S. shores.
“Excessive and unilateral export restrictions stifle the ability of American companies to compete with foreign competitors that do not bear the same export-related administrative and bureaucratic burdens,” the association writes on its website.
lustrated portrait of“I struggle with this. It’s hard to know exactly where to draw the line,” Raimondo said. “I’ve tried hard to bring strategic thinking to the BIS so it’s not whack-a-mole,” she added, referring to the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, which oversees export controls. “That being said, China’s not standing still and technology’s not standing still, so when we learn that now they can take less sophisticated equipment or less sophisticated chips and maybe use more of them to do bad things, well, then we’re going to change.”
Could there be a point where the yard gets too big, and the fence gets too high? On the latter, it’s a firm no. “There’s not a point where the fence gets too high, because China is constantly trying to get around the fence,” she said. “Yes, the yard could get too big, [but] I don’t think we’re there yet, I really don’t. [Chinese President] Xi Jinping’s civil-military fusion strategy makes it hard, because everything’s militarized. He could walk into any company at every minute and take whatever he wants.”
Raimondo engages frequently with the executives and businesses working on artificial intelligence, chips, and other next-generation technologies—and by many accounts is popular with them—but she said that those conversations have increasingly been less rosy than one might expect. “It’s not easy for me to go to Intel, and Applied Materials, [and] Lam, and tell them I’m going to take away hundreds of millions of revenue,” she said, listing three leading U.S. semiconductor companies. “But sometimes commerce has to take a back seat to national security.”
That industrial policy approach, driven by technology and defined by competition with China, has set Raimondo apart from her predecessors.
“Previous Commerce secretaries have thought of themselves as the voice of business—I don’t think of myself quite as the voice of business; I think of myself as a force for economic competitiveness,” she said. “The dynamism of our economy directly relates to our ability to lead in the world,” she added. “It’s not a huge shift …but it’s enough of a shift to matter.”
From left, IMEC CEO Luc Van den hove, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo, Raimondo, Flemish Finance Minister Matthias Diependaele, and EU Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager tour the IMEC research center for nano-electronics and digital technologies in Leuven, Belgium, on April 4.Benoit Doppagne/Belga Mag/AFP via Getty Images
Beijing isn’t the only place where Raimondo is the face of the Biden administration’s tech policies. She’s been front and center in building the global partnerships needed to help sustain the fight against China, racking up frequent flyer miles with trips to Southeast Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.
“I’m very purposeful about my travel—the team doesn’t like it because we don’t do anything fun,” she said. “I’ve been to the UAE [United Arab Emirates] for meetings without staying in a hotel … we fly, we do a lot of work, we get back on the plane.”
She’s also been Washington’s lead representative at new forums such as the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, aimed at aligning trans-Atlantic approaches to tech regulation, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum, which attempts to do the same with a dozen countries in that region. It’s emblematic of another one of the administration’s priorities: shoring up bilateral and “minilateral” relationships.
Raimondo said those relationships are indispensable. “If you’ve got the best idea in the world, really the most brilliant thing in the world, [but] you don’t have buy-in from a broad cross-section of people and you haven’t built coalitions, you will fail,” she said.
Building those coalitions has become easier in some ways and trickier in others. While most of the democratic world is increasingly aligned on the threat posed by China and the need to reorient supply chains away from the world’s second-largest economy, everyone wants those supply chains to run through their soil, and many countries are heavily subsidizing industries such as semiconductors to make it happen.
I asked Raimondo how she deals with concerns about a so-called subsidy race to the bottom.
“Open collaboration and discussion,” she said. “We literally sit down and say, ‘this is how we’re spending our money.’ … I’ve been pleasantly surprised [by] the extent to which other countries have been willing to sit down with us because they don’t want to waste their money, either.”
Raimondo, front foreground, and Rebecca Miano—the Kenyan secretary for investments, trade, and industry—participate in a deal-signing ceremony at the U.S.-Kenya Business Forum while U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Meg Whitman, back left, and Kenyan President William Ruto look on at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington, D.C., on May 24.Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images
A shared recognition of the realities of the chip supply chain also helps. More than half of all semiconductors—and more than 90 percent of the most advanced ones—are made in Taiwan, the small island off China’s coast that is an ever-more-precarious geopolitical hotspot. “We as a world are so dangerously dependent on Taiwan that there’s room for duplication,” Raimondo said.
It’s a similar story on artificial intelligence (AI), not just with other countries, but also with the private sector as well. One example is the recent $1.5 billion investment by Microsoft into G42, the UAE’s top AI company, which included an “intergovernmental assurance agreement” that the Commerce Department was heavily involved with on the U.S. side, according to multiple sources who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity. That agreement mandated, in part, that G42 remove Chinese technology from its systems, including equipment from companies such as Huawei and Chinese cloud computing firms, the sources said. Microsoft is now reportedly backtracking on parts of that deal due to concerns around G42’s exposure to China. (Microsoft declined to comment, and G42 did not respond to a request for comment.)
Raimondo declined to comment on that deal but pointed to the UAE as an example of the sort of carrot-and-big-stick approach that the U.S. is deploying. “With respect to advanced technology, yes, we want them to pick a side … because the power of this technology in the wrong hands, in the hands of a dictator or autocrat, is too great,” she said. “I don’t twist anyone’s hand—you pick the UAE or wherever—we have the best, we want you with us, you should be with us, but these are the rules if you want to be in our ecosystem.”
Could that lead to the kind of resentment that often accompanies U.S. actions abroad or unilateral efforts to build a consensus, even with allies and partners?
“I would say yes and no. I’m in the thick of this right now with the Japanese and the Dutch,” Raimondo said, referring to the two countries that have a virtual duopoly over the equipment used to make advanced chips. Last year, Washington struck a deal with both countries to restrict the sales of that equipment to Chinese companies, but a proposed further tightening of restrictions will reportedly exempt key allies, including both Japan and the Netherlands.
“When I talk to my counterparts from Korea, Japan, Europe, they are sensitive to denying national champions revenue, and I respect that,” Raimondo said. “But don’t do it because we’re asking you to. Do it to protect the people of your country.”
It’s a message that key allies thus far appear to be on board with. “They have their own national security interests to do it,” she said. “We’re in the same boat. Now, it’s a little easier because America’s economy is bigger, and we have a lot of companies, but still, at the end of the day, it’s country first, profit second.”
U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo reacts during a press conference at a Boeing facility in Shanghai on Aug. 30, 2023.Andy Wong/Pool/AFP via Getty Images
It’s been an action-packed three-and-a-half years, and Raimondo has the customary mix of regrets and satisfaction ahead of the Biden administration’s term ending in a few months with the November election. On balance, she feels good and is happy to celebrate some big wins.
“When I started this job, the Commerce Department budget was $9 billion, and because of our work with Congress and the president’s leadership, it’s now like $150 billion,” she said, referring to the total funding for the Commerce Department appropriated by Congress in fiscal 2021 versus the total resources available to the department now. The latter has been bolstered in large part by the $53 billion set aside for semiconductor manufacturing by the CHIPS and Science Act, as well as major investments in broadband access and the creation of nearly three dozen new “tech hubs” around the United States.
Raimondo rattles those off as a checklist that she intends to get through by the end of this year. “The chips team didn’t exist when I got here, and now I have 200 people working for me on chips who are some of the brightest minds in America,” she added. “We’re never done, and I’m not saying it’s perfect, but as I assess we are more secure than we were because of our efforts.”
Her main regret is one that she has repeated several times throughout her tenure, including previously to Foreign Policy: the need for resources and funding commensurate with the department’s vastly expanded purview. The Bureau of Industry and Security still has a budget of around $200 million, which is the “cost of one fighter jet,” she said, repeating an analogy she has used in the past. The bureau’s budget for its core export control functions has “been flat for more than a decade, and we need help—we need more.”
As she continues to work with Congress to get those funds, the bipartisan legislation passed so far and the global alliances that Raimondo has built are what she hopes will prevent a potential second Donald Trump administration from unwinding Commerce’s most impactful policies, she said.
“When you have a statute, that’s more durable than an executive order,” she said. “And then, honestly, the other thing is [that] I’m moving as fast as possible.”
Would she continue to serve in another administration if asked?
“I love this job—it’s been an honor of a lifetime to serve. President Biden is an extraordinary leader, and I would be honored to stay in the job,” she said, “but I won’t work for just any leader. I have to work for someone I believe in and who’s principled.”
Our conversation took place two days before Biden announced that he would not seek reelection, instead endorsing Vice President Kamala Harris for the Democratic Party’s nomination. But with rumors of that eventuality already surfacing, I asked if she’d serve another Democratic president.
“Yeah,” she said, matter-of-factly. “I think it’s a fantastic job, and there’s so much more to do.”
But she prefaced all that with a clear response barely a second after I asked my question: “I will not work for President Trump.”