Russia’s double-punch back against Ukraine’s shock raid
It is bombing Ukrainians in Kursk and advancing in Pokrovsk
The order to move crackled over the radios at dawn on August 6th. Serhiy, a private in the 80th brigade, was among the first to emerge from the cover of the forest. By the time his unit crossed into Russia, supported by constant tank fire, the border had already been largely destroyed. “Our commanders didn’t spare a single round of artillery,” he says via voice messages from inside Russia’s Kursk region. Other Ukrainian troops report crossing the border on a wave of euphoria, with lines of prisoners almost immediately heading back in the other direction.
To assess Ukraine’s shock raid and its prospects The Economist has interviewed soldiers involved and sources familiar with decision-making by General Oleksandr Syrsky, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief. A picture emerges of a daring gamble born of desperation and in great secrecy. It has boosted morale and shown that Ukraine has developed effective new tactics. But 12 days in, progress has slowed and the outlines of a new front line are emerging. It is unclear whether troops can dig in or are overcommitted at the cost of front lines elsewhere. The biggest danger is around Pokrovsk, in the Donbas inside Ukraine where Kremlin forces are gaining ground fast.
Soldiers from the 82nd brigade, the second of four involved in the opening assault, say fighting has grown increasingly intense after the initial euphoric gains. In the early exchanges there had been only one serious fight, when Russians tried to ambush them from maize fields near the first village. The Ukrainians, who somehow had a monopoly of reconnaissance drones in the sky, saw the enemy and ordered them to surrender. They didn’t. So they fired everything they had until the maize stopped rustling, and silence fell. Then the Ukrainians moved on.
A low profile, and clever tactics—such as using so-called FPV drones to provide air cover—allowed the Ukrainians to sweep through the Russian countryside. They were pursued by Russian helicopters and glide bombs, which often fell on Russian villages below, but on the ground they faced little serious resistance. The 82nd brigade pushed eastwards, in the direction of the village of Bolshoye Soldatskoye, while the 80th headed west to Malaya Loknya. Small units probed for vulnerabilities before heavier armour was committed. It was a “manoeuvre attack”, akin to the tactics used by Russia’s commander, Valery Gerasimov, says a source in Ukraine’s general staff. For the first five days, it was devastatingly effective.
Desperate times, desperate measures
The plan to invade part of Russia did not come from a happy place. In early July, General Syrsky, Ukraine’s newly appointed top commander, was under pressure. For months he had been grappling with a less-than-ideal inheritance from his predecessor, Valery Zaluzhny, and the army’s leadership was at odds with the president over mobilisation policies, leading to significant manpower shortages. In America Congress had delayed support. Avdiivka, a stronghold north of Donetsk, had consequently fallen. Front lines in the Donetsk region were crumbling, most especially around the logistical hub of Pokrovsk. Rumours circulated that General Syrsky was on the verge of being dismissed, with attack dogs associated with Andriy Yermak, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s all-powerful chief of staff, even suggesting he had been “lying” to his bosses.
Amid the turmoil, the commander began his planning. “Syrsky isn’t good at political games,” says a source close to the general. “What he is good at is war.” Several scenarios were considered for an offensive push at the weakest points in the Russian line: a strike in Bryansk region in the north; a strike in Kursk region; a combination of the two; or more. The main objective was to draw troops away from the Donbas stranglehold, and to create bargaining chips for any future negotiation. General Syrsky kept his plans under wraps, sharing them only with a tight group of generals and security officials. He spoke to the president on a one-on-one basis, without his staff. The army’s intelligence did much of the reconnaissance, rather than leaving it to HUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, which was included only at a late stage.
Western allies were also deliberately left in the dark, claims the source. “Syrsky had two previous operations undermined by the West. One was leaked to the Russians, and on another occasion, we were instructed to abort.” Limiting communication to a need-to-know basis enabled the Ukrainians to launch their attack before the Russians grasped what was happening. “They realised something was afoot but likely assumed we would need American approval for such a daring operation.” Having been presented with a fait accompli the West did not object.
General Syrsky confused the enemy by concealing the arrival of his most battle-hardened divisions. Reinforcements were brought to the forests near the border under the pretext of defending against a supposed Russian attack on Sumy. At the same time, a narrative appeared in Ukrainian media about an imminent Russian invasion. “The rotation happened about a week and a half before the start of Kursk operation,” recalls Serhiy. “The Russians continued to believe that we were simply defending the border.”
The soldiers themselves started to suspect something big was happening in early August, when they were suddenly issued with equipment: new helmets with integrated headphones, new assault rifles. They did training exercises on mock-ups later understood to represent Russian villages. The 80th brigade began preparing for a second-wave attack. General Syrsky saved most of his attacking forces for this second line, which may be why Russia initially thought the breakthrough was not too serious. The soldiers say they didn’t believe their commanders when he told them about the plans. “We laughed,” recalls Private Serhiy. “We joked that it wasn’t April 1st. The commander just smiled, knowing we had no idea what was awaiting us.”
Russia responds
General Syrsky is a pedant for detail. Yet while the first phase was planned meticulously the campaign is now developing in an ad hoc fashion. With the element of surprise lost, the Ukrainian advances have slowed. President Zelensky is still pushing for maximum progress, a source in the general staff says. But his top soldier is cautious, concentrating on expanding the flanks along the border to create more defensible lines. “Syrsky is no fool,” his confidante says. “He knows that rushing ahead risks the whole operation.” In recent days, an expanded Ukrainian contingent of 10,000-20,000 soldiers appears to be focused on establishing control on the southern bank of the Seim river to the north-west of Sudzha. On August 16th, Ukrainian missiles destroyed a bridge over the river at Glushkovo. And on August 18th Ukraine’s air force said that it had blown up a second bridge over the Seim.
General Syrsky’s great gamble has offered Ukrainians hope after a year of consistently grim news. It has also given him renewed authority. But the long-term success or otherwise of the operation will depend largely on how Russia responds. It appears to be pursuing a twin approach of responding more aggressively to the incursion while also sustaining pressure inside Ukraine along the line in the Donbas. The Kremlin’s goal will be to turn Kursk into little more than an embarrassing mosquito bite amid a bloodbath inside Ukraine.
Evidence of an intensifying response inside Kursk is now clear. Ukrainian soldiers on the ground inside Russia say they are already beginning to see a different level of resistance. Losses are increasing. The Russians have reinforced with better trained units, including marines and special forces. They had studied the area. This belated Russian response to the incursion in Kursk has forced it to divert some troops from strangleholds inside Ukraine in the Donbas. Reflecting this, a Ukrainian government source says military activity in the Donbas has significantly decreased since August 16th. However there is a big exception: Pokrovsk, the town where Russia was making steady advances before the incursion and where it is seeking to maintain heavy pressure on Ukraine.
The scene is thus set for a dramatic moment in the war: Ukraine wants to sustain its attack inside Russia and disrupt the contours of the frontline, changing the defeatist narrative about a frozen conflict to which negotiation is the only answer. Russia wants to crush the incursion and exploit the resulting depletion of Ukraine’s resources by pressing home its assault elsewhere, in Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian troops inside Russia are more vulnerable but still defiant. “The bastards have figured out how to fight and they understand our tactics,” says Private Serhiy in the 80th. “But that doesn’t mean we don’t understand their tactics—or that we won’t continue to take them down.” ■