Xi balances between professionalism and political control of the PLA
Published: 15 August 2024
In Brief
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s relationship with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is marked by frequent purges, recurring organisational reforms and deep-seated distrust, despite continued military modernisation efforts. Xi's strategy of assertive rhetoric and limited military use aims to cultivate China's (and his own) powerful image and placate the PLA, without engaging in full-scale warfare, but ongoing political interferences, purges, and reforms raise questions about the PLA's actual strength and ability to control escalation dynamics.
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The tumultuous relationship between Chinese President Xi Jinping and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is marked by frequent purges, recurring reforms and persistent expressions of distrust. Simultaneously, Xi advances military modernisation and assigns the military a role in foreign policy not seen for decades. This dual approach intensifies the tension between military professionalism and political loyalty, reaching levels not seen since the Mao era.
But Xi’s lack of trust in the PLA raises concerns about its effectiveness in crisis. Launching a war would also give PLA leaders greater political influence, a situation Xi might be reluctant to accept. What does this indicate about China’s military modernisation and recent assertiveness?
A possible explanation is that China’s recent incendiary rhetoric and frequent yet limited use of the PLA does not necessarily signal a reckless use of force. Rather, it may reflect a strategy to deter adversaries without engaging in full-scale warfare, while concurrently placating the PLA.
Xi’s complex relationship with the military has been especially chaotic throughout 2023–24. In March 2023, former defence minister Wei Fenghe, who previously commanded the Rocket Force, vanished from public view. A few months later, the defence minister at the time, Li Shangfu, who had headed the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department, also disappeared, only to be officially removed in October. Both were expelled from the Chinese Communist Party in June 2024.
In December 2023, nine generals were ousted from the top legislature, including General Ju Qiansheng, commander of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force, and three aerospace executives from China’s military–industrial complex who were purged. They are not alone — more senior cadres, many linked to the PLA’s pivotal Rocket Force and the military–industrial complex, had also been purged during this period.
In addition, organisational reforms initiated by Xi just eight years earlier have been partially revised. The replacement of established bodies has altered the PLA’s command structure and its lines of subordination to the Central Military Commission and Xi himself. Notably, the Strategic Support Force, formed in December 2015 to oversee aerospace and cyber units, was dissolved in early 2024.
Any belief that these moves stabilised the Party’s relationship with the military was disproven by the June 2024 Military Political Work Conference that was held for the first time in a decade. Symbolically, it was held in Yan’an, the historic revolutionary base. Expressing deep dissatisfaction with the PLA’s conduct, Xi emphasised the need for a strong, loyal, corruption-free and capable military under Party guidelines and supervision. He stressed ideological transformation, strict anti-corruption measures and the revitalisation of the PLA’s commissar system. Xi also underscored the importance of learning from historical roots, urging PLA commanders to visit the PLA’s Civil War-era headquarters.
These measures collectively reflect Xi’s distrust of the PLA, both politically and operationally, despite its impressive progress over the last two decades. Since the 1980s, and especially in the past 25 years, the PLA’s budget has skyrocketed. This has enabled extensive modernisation in nearly every area, including weaponry, command and control, doctrine and training. Recent purges may further advance the PLA’s modernisation by removing unprofessional and corrupt officers.
But the PLA is likely not as formidable as China would like others to believe. Xi’s rule of fear, extensive political activities within PLA units, and pervasive corruption across the armed forces and the defence industry offset much of the positive impact of modernisation measures. The revival of dual leadership with political commissars further diminishes any benefits.
These factors create widespread paralysis, inefficiency, the promotion of unqualified commanders, insufficient training and other maladies reminiscent of the Mao era, which reforms since the late 1970s have attempted to address. The Ukraine War provides a pertinent context for understanding these sources of weakness. Observing the conflict, Xi might recognise the risks and costs associated with large-scale military operations.
Unwilling to compromise on China’s — and his own — image of strength, Xi aims to cultivate such a reputation without engaging in significant military conflicts that could expose weaknesses and result in substantial losses. Instead of outright military action, he emphasises deterrence, particularly regarding Taiwan. By sounding the drumbeats of war and emphasising military readiness, Xi seeks to deter any adversary from challenging China’s red lines.
This approach not only strengthens China’s assertive posture but also mitigates the risks associated with full-scale warfare. Simultaneously, it provides the PLA with a sense of purpose and mission, ideally minimising the risk of political interference. The crucial question remains whether Xi’s China can maintain control over these escalation dynamics.
Yoram Evron is an Associate Professor of Chinese Studies and Political Science at the University of Haifa. He is co-author of The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Military-Civil Fusion: A New Paradigm for Military Innovation.