Russia’s treaty with North Korea creates new fault lines in East Asia
In Brief
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea in June 2024 resulted in the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, marking a significant shift in the Russia–North Korea relationship. This treaty includes mutual defence clauses and extensive cooperation across various sectors. The partnership strengthens both nations against US-led minilateral groupings in East Asia. Russia seeks to leverage support from North Korea amid Western sanctions, while North Korea hopes to gain technological and military support and enhance its regime security. China’s role is cautious, seeking to maintain regional stability without escalating tensions.
Listen
On 19 June 2024 Russian President Vladimir Putin made a historic visit to North Korea, his first in 24 years. Despite arriving five hours late, he was warmly greeted by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. This visit, marked by lavish ceremonies, culminated in the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, which promises mutual defence guarantees and extensive cooperation in various sectors.
The relationship between Russia and North Korea has deep roots, dating back to the Soviet Union’s support in establishing the Kim family regime. This relationship has evolved in ebbs and flows, particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The 1961 alliance treaty was abrogated in 1996 and was replaced by non-military cooperation agreements in the early 2000s. But the relationship has gained new momentum following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
North Korea has actively supported Russia by recognising the breakaway states of Donetsk and Luhansk and supplying 11,000 containers of munitions. In return, Russia has provided North Korea with energy, food and technological support. This reciprocal arrangement has led to a significant increase in high-level exchanges between the two nations, reflecting a deepening partnership.
The 2024 Russia–North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership treaty is unique in its form and content. Unlike typical post-Cold War strategic partnerships, which are often broad and flexible, it includes specific mutual defence clauses. These clauses, while reminiscent of the 1961 Soviet–North Korean treaty, introduce constraints based on Article 51 of the UN Charter and the domestic laws of both nations. This adds a layer of strategic ambiguity, allowing both countries operational flexibility in responding to potential threats.
The inclusion of Article 51, which recognises the right to self-defence, provides a legal basis for the treaty and aligns it with international law. But the real impact of this clause is limited given the veto power held by Russia, China and the United States at the UN Security Council. The treaty also allows for domestic laws to influence the activation of mutual defence obligations, giving both Russia and North Korea room to manoeuvre based on their national interests.
Apart from ratifying the existing cooperation pattern, the treaty also emphasises comprehensive cooperation across various sectors, including food, energy, technology and defence. This partnership is poised to challenge the US-led security architecture in East Asia, which includes minilateral groupings like AUKUS, as well as the US–Japan–South Korea and US–Japan–Philippines trilaterals.
Russia’s motivations are clear — by pivoting to East Asia, it seeks to create a new frontline in its strategic rivalry with the United States. The comprehensive sanctions and military pressure from the West and others have pushed Russia to rely more on its East Asian partners — China for economic support and North Korea for munitions. This pivot is also a response to continued US support of Ukraine, which has included providing weapons and diplomatic pressure.
North Korea is motivated by its need to secure its regime amid increasing sanctions and security pressure from the United States and South Korea. The new treaty provides North Korea with critical support in technology and weapons, aiding its nuclear and missile programs. This partnership also gives North Korea greater leverage against the US–South Korea alliance.
China’s role in this evolving partnership is complex. As a major trading nation with strategic interests in both Russia and North Korea, China benefits from the new treaty but remains cautious. While China supports North Korea’s economic and regime security, it is wary of military and nuclear cooperation between Russia and North Korea. China’s strategic interest lies in maintaining regional stability and avoiding direct confrontation with the United States and its allies.
China’s primary concern is ensuring that the new alliance does not escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula or in the broader East Asian region. While China may leverage the treaty to enhance its own strategic position, it is likely to distance itself from any overt military cooperation that could be perceived as a direct threat by the United States and its allies.
The Russia–North Korea treaty marks a significant shift in East Asian geopolitics. But it does not signify a full revival of the Cold War-era alliance. The treaty’s strategic ambiguity and operational flexibility allow both nations to cautiously navigate the complex geopolitical landscape.
For Russia, the treaty provides a means to exert influence in East Asia and counterbalance the pressures from the West. For North Korea, it offers critical support for its regime and military ambitions. For China, the treaty presents both opportunities and challenges, requiring careful navigation to maintain its strategic interests without escalating regional tensions.
The evolving Russia–North Korea partnership is a response to shifting global power dynamics and strategic rivalries. It underscores the need for continuous monitoring of geopolitical developments in East Asia, as the implications of this partnership will reverberate beyond the region.
Hao Nan is Research Fellow at the Charhar Institute in Beijing.