A Russian Su-34 "Fullback" strike/interdiction fighter at sunset in Latakia, Syria [photo credit: 123ru.net]
Army goes professional
Parallel to these security agency developments, the regime has made
several significant changes to the army. These include some personnel
changes but also an overhaul of the recruitment process and of reserve
service, and various legislative decrees on conscription and the
professionalisation of the army.
In March Assad issued an extensive list of new appointments to the
General Staff and to division and brigade leadership. The sectarian
composition of the army remains, however, a significant obstacle to
genuine reform. Of the 24 senior officers promoted, 92 per cent were
Alawites – reflecting a continuation of a policy initiated by Bashar's
father Hafiz Assad of relying on sect and loyalty rather than competence
as the fundamental criterion for promotion in the military.
In June, meanwhile, the regime announced a plan to gradually end
reserve service. Soldiers will be discharged after completing six years,
then five, then four, gradually decreasing the period until it reaches
two years by the end of 2025. The conscription period, however, remains
unchanged at 18 months. A leaked government document said that 152,000
soldiers would be discharged from reserve service by the end of 2025 – a
figure contrasting sharply with previous estimates that suggested a
severe military manpower shortage.
The regime has also launched a plan to transition to an all-volunteer
professional army. Significant benefits were offered to the new
volunteers such as higher salaries and bonuses – such that these
contracts now rival those offered by IRGC-backed militias. This might be
interpreted in Arab capitals as the regime weakening Iran’s influence
by absorbing militia personnel into the formal army. The flip side is
that veteran IRGC militiamen are likely to form a significant bloc in
the new professional army.
New Baath
At its general conference in early May the Baath Party re-elected
Assad as Secretary-General. It also elected a new Central Committee and
expanded its number of seats from 80 to 125, 45 of which are reserved
for Assad appointees. Significant figures like Ali Mamlouk, Bouthaina
Shaaban, and Luna al-Shibl (before her death) were dropped. The Central
Leadership (the politburo) underwent a more extensive clear-out, with an
entirely new line up of party apparatchiks being promoted, the majority
from relative obscurity. The conference was said to be a starting point
for the "reformation" and “repositioning” of the party that Assad has
often spoken about.
Soon after the purge, the People’s Assembly elections were held, on
15 July. These were conducted under "international supervision," with
the regime claiming they were "the first of [their] kind in Syrian
history." With a turnout that did not exceed 45 per cent, the Baath
Party and its allies won about 70 per cent of the seats. The elections
were soon followed by a bevy of legislative changes. In a 23 July
meeting Assad made clear that the new People’s Assembly would address
many vital issues, adding that "the elections reflected the will of the
Syrian people and their desire to participate in the new phase, a phase
of work and rebuilding."
Historically, in terms of wielding effective power, the Baath Party
has been the junior partner to the army and security agencies.
Nevertheless, it has proved itself as a useful instrument to co-opt and
organise elites. Going forward, the new leadership of the party will be
expected to embrace free market reforms and demonstrate enthusiasm for
anti-corruption drives. Should Assad face the prospect of having to
conduct real legislative elections – to ratify a new constitution
perhaps – a fresher and more effective Baath Party will be needed.
State sell-off
The regime has also been busy renovating the administrative state.
Since early 2024, it has issued 46 legislative texts (20 decrees and 26
laws) – more than double the number in the same period of 2023.
Entirely new bodies created since the start of 2024 have included a
General Authority for Managing State Property, a National Authority for
Information Technology Services, an Earthquake Victims Support Fund, and
a Student Loan Fund.
Further, since early 2024 several public companies have been merged.
The new entities include the General Company for Cement and Building
Materials Production and Marketing (Omran), the General Company for
Textile Industries and the General Company for Food Industries.
Laws and regulations on the governance and management of joint-stock
and public companies have been overhauled, possibly as the prelude to
future large-scale privatisation, given the current financial
difficulties facing state-owned enterprises and the need to repay $50
billion of debts to Iran. Any such sell-off of state assets would give
Gulf Arabs investment opportunities in the post-conflict economy.
Sanctions notwithstanding, a sell-off of the energy, construction, and
light manufacturing sectors might attract the kind of Gulf investor that
Assad desperately needs. With privatisation would come a new Riyadh-
and Abu Dhabi-facing Syrian business elite that would lend the dictator a
degree of Sunni Arab legitimacy.
Déjà vu
Under pressure from Saudi Arabia to deliver on change, the regime has
initiated an overhaul of the tools it uses to control the state. Beyond
making the regime more efficient, the changes (announced or actual) are
meant to appeal to an “Arab solution” to the Syria crisis: one that is
likely to prioritise economic opportunities and leave core regime
interests intact.
Assad’s concept of “transition” is all about shifting from
“counter-terrorism” (i.e. survival) to building Regime 2.0. The key
means to that objective will be to re-position the state strategically
so that it can take maximum advantage of anticipated Gulf investment and
UN early recovery funding. The changes do not signal any systemic
change in the regime’s behaviour. They do not address core opposition
demands and they do not provide a political solution aligned with the
vision of UNSCR 2254.
The most consequential effects of Assad’s transition will be the end
of old networks and figures that once symbolised the regime. In the
coming years, those associated with the conflict will disappear
entirely, and a new post-conflict elite will emerge that will share the
spoils of the reconstruction bonanza. This is likely to include a cohort
of Gulf-associated businessmen who will dominate the privatised economy
while Assad retains tight control over all political and security
matters. It’s a sort of transition and some may well market it as
progress. Absent genuine multi-party politics and real security sector
reform, however, it will be a transition to something depressingly
familiar.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website