Time To Pivot From Military Option To Diplomatic Engagement – Analysis
The Sahel region of north Africa may be understood as “one region, many crises.” This statement is taken from a paper first published in 2013 by the UN’s Africa Renewal Project, but it is no less relevant today – perhaps, more so. Africa’s Sahel region faces many complex and interconnected challenges.
A strategically important region of the African continent, recent events point to three concerns for the US. There is the real potential of US influence declining, Russian presence and influence increasing, and a deterioration in US capacity to deal with global extremist activities. Should this eventuate, economic and security concerns could spread beyond the region – beyond Africa.
This essay will address a brief recent history of the Sahel, its current status, its geopolitical significance, the US’s current position and its prospects for the future.
Geography
The Sahel (from Arabic ساحل (sāḥil [ˈsaːħil]) ‘coast, shore’) is a belt of land averaging roughly 960 kilometers in width situated between the humid savannas to its south and the Sahara Desert to its north. Stretching across northern Africa, the strip covers over 5900 kilometers from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. (The US expanse Atlantic to Pacific is only 4506 kilometers.)
The low annual rainfall in this region is variable (4-20 in or 10-50 cm) and falls in a short, intense period in July and August. In some years the rains fail to develop, and droughts are a common occurrence. The uncertain rainfall of the Sahel makes it generally unfavorable for agriculture, with competition and unrest between farmers and herders for water and grazing land.
Although there are 10 countries in the Sahel (Senegal, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Sudan, Eritrea and Guinea – Cameroon and Gambia occasionally added) 5 constitute its economic and political core: Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.
This essay will focus on those involved with the most recent economic and political upheavals/coup d’etats (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Sudan and Niger) and creation of the new Alliance (Confederation) of Sahel States (Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso).
History
The Sahel has historically suffered extended periods of drought, soil erosion, and desertification from climate change, as well as over-farming.
Overgrazing is a particularly acute problem in the Sahel with respect to the Tuareg population of some 4 million. The latter constitutes a large Berber ethnic group, nomadic pastoralists for centuries, who principally inhabit the Sahara including the Sahel – Niger 11% of populace, Mali 1.7%, Burkina Faso 1.9%, Mauritania 2.6% and Nigeria .015% . They are in continuous conflict with the governments and farmers due to overgrazing issues.
Overpopulation continues to be an intractable concern for the region. Today, Africaconstitutes 18% of the world’s population; by 2100 it will increase to 38% while 47% of the world’s population growth will come from only 4 countries all of which are in sub-Saharan Africa: Dem. Repub. Congo, Nigeria, Niger and Ethiopia.
The sub-Saharan region (which includes the Sahel – 42 of Africa’s 55 countries, excluding Djibouti, SADR, Somalia, and Sudan) has the fastest population growth and is the poorest in the world.
By 2100 Niger will increase its current population by a factor of 6.41, Mali 3.24, Burkina Faso 2.12, Chad 3.43, Mauritania 3.3.
The Sahel is also a focal point for terrorist activity in Africa. In 2023, 43 percent of global terrorism deaths were in this narrow zone, including Boko Haram, Islam State, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Some 3.3 million people in the Sahel have been displaced because of extremist violence with thousands killed.
Current Status
This impoverished region has also experienced the most political instability on the continent. By the end of March 2022, there had been six successful coups in the region — in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Sudan and Niger — and a coup attempt in Guinea Bissau.
In July 2023, after the democratically elected President of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum threatened to fire the commander of the presidential guard, the army arrested him. It then suspended the constitution and installed General Abdourahmane Tchiani, the guard commander, as head of state.
Political evolution in Africa, supported by the pan-African movement and African populations, was marked in early July by the establishment of a new confederation between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, three members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES, or Alliance des Etats du Sahel in French), which itself was formed last September. The new union, the countries assert, aims to enhance regional security cooperation, combat terrorism and instability. These three states have formally withdrawn from ECOWAS – the Economic Community of West African States – a regional political and economic union of fifteen countries located in West Africa.
“ECOWAS has not performed well when it comes to achieving regional integration, promoting intra-African trade in West Africa, as well as ensuring security,” said Ahmed Jazoum, a professor of politics at the University of South Africa. “So, this justifies the feeling of many in West Africa, especially ordinary citizens but even intellectuals.” While pushing out France and the US, the three countries have “obviously increasingly pursued security and economic ties with Russia,” he said.
The Sahel is the center of gravity of upheaval in Africa that carries the potential to negatively impact global security.
Geopolitical Significance
There is currently a new “scramble for Africa,” with a focus on the Sahel. The key nations vying for influence if not presence in the Sahel are the United States, European Union and France – with Russia, China and Iran making inroads. The competition for influence and resources is intense.
In general, the Sahel is viewed geopolitically as significant for the following reasons:
- It has an abundance of natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas, and lithium.
- It is strategically located between North and sub-Saharan Africa.
- economic interests of the countries involved in the scramble
- defense and security cooperation in the form of arms sales.
European Union
The Sahel’s primary attractiveness to the EU is related to the strategic location of the countries in the region, especially Niger, as they are essential in reducing mass illegal immigration into the European Union. In addition to the migration routes linked to Europe, Niger had security and defense partnerships with the EU until recently when the country unilaterally cancelled the deals. This is a source of considerable concern to the EU.
France
France is concerned about maintaining its economic hegemony over its former colonies. Control is weakened by robust anti-French feeling in many of them, particularly in the Sahel. Most of the countries in the Sahel region were colonized by France. Unlike Britain, France has maintained strong links with former colonies. They cooperate in the economy, defense and resource extraction, to mention a few areas.
France has the first right to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and anti-French sentiments across Africa have revealed the opposite.
Despite these cracks, France is intent on maintaining its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. Although ultimately relenting, the French were initially hesitant to remove its military from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.
US
The US interest is primarily security related. The United States has a $100 million drone base and 1,000 troops at Agadez. The government of Niger has asked the United States to withdraw its troops and close the base. In 2019, the US opened its largest drone base in Africa in Agadez-Niger. There are today security implications of the base for the region.
Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the US has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the US can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa.
As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence. The US took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a “coup” so as not to jeopardize strategic military cooperation and dominance.
The year 2023 has been particularly challenging for the countries in the Sahel. With issues ranging from economic instability to insecurity, the region remains fragile. Despite the instability and fragility, the scramble for the region remains intense with traditional allies such as France losing its grip and other powers entering the fray.
Russia
For Russia, the Sahel offers an opportunity to reestablish its presence and prestige in Africa after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The relationships between Russia and many Sahelian countries were established during the cold war and colonial era. More recently, the emphasis by western countries on human rights, especially during counterterrorism operations, has pushed Sahelian countries closer to Russia. While western allies demand the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in return for security and economic support, Russia portrays itself differently. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 also increased Russia’s interest in the Sahel because it is keen to maintain allies in Africa. Russia has openly backed military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and warned against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the Wagner group, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has canceled its defense agreement with the EU and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel.
China
The Chinese – though they could serve as an alternative to the Sahel’s traditional alliances – are primarily interested in access to the region’s rich natural resources. Like Russia, China portrays itself as an alternative to the traditional ally (France) of Sahelian countries. With a mantra of “non-interference” and “respecting sovereignty,” China has entrenched itself as a “partner” of countries in the Sahel.
The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises operate in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. For instance, Mali potentially has one of the largest lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has invested heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to test its arms products.
US’ Current Position
The US Government’s military focus on the Sahel, specifically support of counterterrorism operations, has created ethical dilemmas and caused the government to engage in verbal gymnastics that could negatively impact American relations with other African countries and have the potential to undermine American credibility globally. When the military in Niger seized power on July 26, 2023, the US Government hesitated to call it a “coup.” A Pentagon spokesperson described the situation in Niger as “fluid” and said that it was “just too soon to characterize the unrest as a coup.” The administration called it a “coup attempt.” On the line in Niger, in addition to $200 million in humanitarian and economic support that is legally limited after a coup, was the US drone base at Agadez and 1,000 American troops engaged in counterterrorism, surveillance. and intelligence gathering. The administration did suspend military cooperation with Nigerien forces but seemed to hold out hope that the elected civilian leadership would be restored. Rising tensions with the “attempted coup” leaders and the arrival of Russian military advisors in Niger in April 2024, however, moved the needle. The United States agreed to withdraw its troops in compliance with a March decree from the junta suspending military cooperation with the United States. The status of the drone base has not been announced.
In early April, the air force chief of Chad ordered a halt to all US operations at an air base near N’Djamena, where 100 US troops were training local military. The Pentagon is calling the removal of troops a “temporary step” and expects that talks of security cooperation with Chad will resume after May 2024, elections. Chad’s former ruler, Idriss Deby, was killed leading troops against rebel insurgents. The army installed his son, Mahamat Idriss Deby, formerly commander of the presidential guard, as president, in what many called an “institutional coup.”
It should not be ignored that in the case of both Niger and Chad, pushback against cooperation with the United States followed closely on the heels of the juntas of both countries establishing closer ties with Moscow. With France being ejected from most of its former Sahel colonies and with more and more of them drifting into Moscow’s orbit, in addition to being ruled by military juntas who show no signs of relinquishing power, the United States faces a serious dilemma. With the United States and France out, Russia (and in some cases Iran) will move in to fill the gap.
The effect will reduce US capacity to deter global terrorism and negatively impact America’s ability to influence regional events. Any effort to foster democracy in the region will be severely diminished, since military junta regimes will at least for a while be less receptive. A demand that the US leave is in large part both a defensive reaction and emotional response to the failed policies of the French. Thus, an already unstable region is likely to descend further into chaos which can spill over into neighboring countries.
When pivotal countries in the Sahel evict the United States, no number of promises or rhetoric can change that. Given that Russian disinformation often paints the United States as neocolonial, a refusal to leave when asked would only validate the premise of Russian propaganda.
The current status is that the American position in the Sahel at the moment is weak and shows no signs of recovering in the near term.
US Future Prospects
The situation in the Sahel has the potential to spread to neighboring countries, and lack of cooperation from countries like Niger and Chad imperil US ability to forestall global terrorist attacks. In addition, allowing countries like Russia and Iran to have unfettered and unchallenged access to a region with so many critical resources threaten the health of the free world economy.
How US Should Respond
The proposed course of action for the US at this juncture is fourfold:
- reduce counterterrorism efforts
- increase diplomacy efforts
- detail aid to specific countries
- unilateral implementation
We should credit the Quincy Institute and the United States Institute of Peace for early on providing the intellectual impetus for the first two recommended courses of action by the US to build credibility, political stability and an opportunity for peaceful relations in the Sahel.
Decrease reliance on military option
The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership is the agreement under which US security assistance is provided to the Sahel. It addresses the issues which contribute to extremism in the region. Yet, it is this document and its attendant programs that delineates the essentially militaristic approach to resolving the issues in the Sahel. The United States has spent over $3.3 billion dollars in security assistance over two decades in the Sahel, according to the Security Assistance Monitor. Yet, there is little to show for the millions spent other than civilian casualties, human rights abuses, corruption and recent coup d’etats.
Increase diplomatic efforts
Asserting U.S. diplomatic leadership in the Sahel will require unambiguous U.S. positioning through clear and targeted statements and strategic leverage of U.S. representation at the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, commonly referred to as ECOWAS.
Localized conflicts and terrorist threats are better tackled by national and regional entities; thus, the United States should recast its Sahel policy. Due to weak militaries, porous borders and fragile states, international assistance has been essential in the region. However, the United States and its regional partners should redirect funds toward a well-articulated diplomatic architecture. Continuing a policy overly focused on militarized counterterrorism has been ineffective and yielded negative results. Enhancing and expanding diplomatic efforts in Washington and in the region is a step towards reduced violence and stability in the region.
Particularize the problems
Develop aid programs specific to a country. This would recognize the interrelatedness of issues like climate change and narcotics trafficking and enable more coordinated efforts. By making them country specific, they can be adjusted to fit the situation on the ground.
Unilateral implementation
The US should approach any actions it takes regarding the above proposals unilaterally. History is the appropriate guide for this. The US must detach itself from any actions the EU initiates in the Sahel under the guise of alleviating the problems (politically or militarily). The history of Europe in the Sahel in particular and Africa in general is one of colonial misadventure since the 19th century “scramble for Africa.” France is known in the region for talking out of both sides of its mouth.” Consequently, the French have been told to leave several countries in Africa (including Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso). The EU has been told by Chad and Niger that they are withdrawing from previous agreements to help stem the flow of immigration into the EU.
By association with the historical baggage of European countries, the US has also felt the repercussions of anti-French and anti-European sentiment and mistrust. The US has recently been told to remove its military hardware and personnel from Niger and Chad. The result is that such reactions places the US at a disadvantage in pursuing counterterrorist efforts and establishing trust and credibility with the new unstable regimes in the region. Thus, the US should implement its actions towards establishing stability in the region by detaching itself from EU initiatives. The US should consult with its European allies but not identify closely with the latter’s initiatives in the region.
The US must guard against any more proxy wars with Russia or being drawn into one with China.
Moreover, the US must act unilaterally to build credibility and trust based on a more diplomatic approach whereby the people of the Sahel are shown that America is interested in the people, the stability in their country and not the resources of their country. The US should demonstrate beyond any effort of the Europeans, a humanitarian aid effort that reaches the hearts and minds of the people. This will help reduce instability in the countries of the new regimes allowing these governments to stabilize their positions (irrespective of the West’s view of these regimes). Whenever possible, the US should offer aid with as few political strings attached as possible – China and Russia will have virtually none.
The result will be a more credible US voice and influence on the new regimes in the region which will help America push back against Russian and Chinese influence which continues to increase.
The US Must Decide if it Wants to Commit to a Long-Term Effort in Sahel
These four steps are not offered as a solution to the seemingly intractable problems in the Sahel. They do suggest an alternative approach that if the US is to effectively move towards greater influence and more productive outcomes with the unstable governments (regimes) currently in the ascendency in the Sahel.
The US must recognize that the unfortunate, recalcitrant, often fractious situation in the Sahel was years in the making. It will not be amenable to quick solutions or heavy-handed influence. The recent coups, purging of the French, the lack of cooperation with the US from Niger and Chad requesting the US’s withdrawal, the newly formed Sahel Alliance-Confederation, other countries’ interest in joining the latter, the latter’s withdrawal from ECOWAS and the continued displacement of millions of people creating an even greater humanitarian crisis and further instability — all point toward one conclusion. The US must pivot unilaterally from a military-first approach in solving the Sahel crisis to an increase in diplomatic efforts locally, regionally and at the UN. Nothing less than a unilateral effort initiated by the US (distinct from association with the historical issues of Europe) can hope to alleviate the strain under which the people in the Sahel toil daily.
The United States must decide if it is willing to commit for what is likely to be an extended period of time with perhaps (for a period of time at least) little to show except the hope for a measure of greater stability in the Sahel. Otherwise, nothing will be accomplished except perpetuation of a crisis and perhaps exacerbation of the failures of the past.
About the authors:
- F. Andrew Wolf, Jr. is a retired USAF Lt. Col. and retired university professor of the Humanities, Philosophy of Religion and Philosophy. His education includes a PhD in philosophy from Univ. of Wales, two masters degrees (MTh-Texas Christian Univ.), (MA-Univ. South Africa) and an abiding passion for what is in America’s best interest.
- A.R. Corbel Dupont is a graduate of Open University (Europe) with a forthcoming book on ethics and the divine. She is a researcher at The Fulcrum Institute.