Deterrence alone cannot prevent war in the Asia Pacific
Published: 07 September 2024 https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/09/07/deterrence-alone-cannot-prevent-war-in-the-asia-pacific/Rising tensions in the Asia Pacific are leading to a security dilemma, in which the United States, China and other regional governments are escalating their militarisation based on perceived threats from one another. To avoid war, it's crucial to balance deterrence with restraint, bolster diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes and provide honest communication to clarify intent and promote peace.
As tensions rise in the Pacific, the United States and its allies remain committed to peace via deterrence. While many credit the strategy with achieving a peaceful 21st century in the region, it has also contributed to Asia’s current tensions. If left unchecked, China, the United States and other regional actors may fall further into a security dilemma, in which each party is driven to militarise to keep their rapidly militarising rivals from gaining an advantage.
For peace to persist, the United States and its allies should beware of overreliance on a deterrence mindset that perpetuates the security dilemma. An approach that balances deterrence with restraint-based strategies can ease tensions and bring us closer to peace.
While the United States’ ability to inflict unacceptable costs on China may have played a role in the absence of warfare in the 21st century, this power imbalance also brought the region to its current precarious state. China’s military ascent began in the 1990s, spurred by the Gulf War, which exposed its potential vulnerability against technologically advanced Western forces.
Its rate of increase in military spending shot up again after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which raised alarms in China over the implications for China during a potential Taiwan or North Korea conflict and provided a ‘rhetorical cover’ for Chinese militarism.
Significant developments in Chinese technology, the People’s Liberation Army Navy and mainland missile systems have made China much more competitive against a ‘strong enemy’. While a hegemonic United States might have deterred some Chinese aggression, it has also encouraged China’s militarisation, bringing us to the present moment.
To meet the threat China poses, the United States and its allies are improving their military capabilities and escalating the security dilemma.
When China builds new military outposts in the South China Sea, it can be interpreted as either a ‘necessary national defence’ measure or an expansion of offensive capabilities. Similarly, when US military units transit near these outposts, it could be seen as upholding free navigation in international waters or threatening Chinese sovereignty in its territory. Chinese assertiveness either justifies deepening military ties between the United States, Japan and the Philippines or is justified by a United States-led effort to contain China. In the security dilemma, each side sees its rival as aggressive and sees itself as defensive.
The United States can no longer deter China with overwhelming military superiority, but instead with the threat of a mutually disastrous war between nuclear powers with devastating economic and social consequences for the entire world. This new reality requires efforts to de-escalate tensions, build trust and demonstrate a genuine desire for peace. While challenging, the United States and its allies can take steps to slow the security dilemma.
If Washington and its partners intend to strengthen their military capabilities, they should do so with defence in mind. The Biden administration’s support for Taiwanese aircraft, ships and air defence systems is an improvement over the Trump administration’s long-range missile sales, which have the potential to strike the Chinese mainland. The ‘porcupine strategy’, which utilises short-range weaponry to target ships and aircraft, signals fortitude against an invasion without threatening the mainland. Where feasible, the United States should apply such principles to its military support to signal resolve without aggression.
While recent years have not been kind to the ‘rules-based order’, institutions and agreements are another way to reverse the security dilemma. While Chinese non-compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is frustrating, UNCLOS does not address the root cause of dangerous naval confrontations — overlapping territorial claims between China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan.
Accidental escalations are common in many war scenarios, making it crucial for the United States to lead efforts to resolve disputes diplomatically. While a diplomatic solution would be an ambitious undertaking and likely require concessions to China, the potential benefits would be significant.
Establishing clear rules and boundaries can prevent dangerous situations where each side thinks it is acting in self-defence. Good-faith negotiations would also signal that the United States is willing to accept a powerful China as a legitimate and influential regional and global actor, easing fears in Beijing that the United States seeks to contain it.
The ‘free world’ should also ensure careful and honest communications about countries’ actions on both sides of the growing geopolitical conflict. The United States and its allies should meticulously outline the logic behind their actions, explaining to China how these steps are intended to promote peace, not war. Governments and civil society must also resist framing the conflict as a battle between ‘good and evil’, as this only exacerbates existing tensions. Instead, politicians and other observers should contextualise Chinese actions within the growing security dilemma and address Chinese concerns in good faith.
An overreliance on deterrence has brought the United States and its allies to the brink of war. To avoid the worst-case scenario, governments and civil society must develop policies that signal a desire for peace and compromise, balancing deterrence with restraint.
James Chabin is an MA candidate at Nagoya University’s Graduate School for International Development.