https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3277614/more-talk-not-always-best-us-china-relationship-its-results-count
Open questions |More talk ‘not always best’ for US-China relations, it’s results that count, expert says
I’ve repeatedly emphasised that establishing communication channels between China and the US – no matter how frequent or senior level – is one thing, while producing tangible results is another.
However, it’s clear that Sino-US relations have consistently deteriorated over the past 11 years. The trend has definitely gone down, again and again. This fully demonstrates that establishing communication channels is one thing, while improving relations and resolving major issues is another.
Moreover, if both sides engage in too many talks and are too candid with each other, there may be another scenario: that [both sides] think the other one is not really a good country.
Their thoughts may become clearer than if they had not held these talks, which also proves that talks themselves, communication itself, and exchanges themselves, are distinct from the results they produce.
Chinese President Xi Jinping with then US leader Barack Obama at the Sunnylands estate in California in June 2013. Photo: AP
This is a major breakthrough in preventing military conflicts. On the other hand, it also indicates that both sides have heightened their attention and efforts to prevent military conflicts because the danger of such conflicts is escalating.
You mentioned that, in some fields, the more China and the US engage in talks, the more they will reveal their vast differences. Can you give some examples?
After that, North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities continued to develop, including the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Every time Western countries propose new sanctions resolutions, China and Russia always veto them, up to this day.
Meanwhile, around the same time at the graduation ceremony of the US Military Academy at West Point, [US President Joe Biden] said he had “always been willing to use force when required” to protect the US, its allies, and core interests. These words are all pointed remarks that carry a lot of meaning.
Another major issue is that since April 2, when Biden and Xi spoke over the phone, the US has repeatedly threatened China over the so-called large-scale revitalisation of Russia’s military industrial foundation and has already taken some measures.
To conclude, these events clearly demonstrate that China and the US have been nearly in full-scale confrontations, and it is not uncommon for non-military conflicts to occur over certain major issues.
There is a special reason for this, which is the US presidential election. >From initiating the 301 investigation to implementing high tariffs on multiple [Chinese] sectors at an unprecedented speed, Biden did all this because he was in a hurry to compete with Trump for votes.
This is a domestic political issue in the US, and it’s not a new thing to harm China’s economy, but he raised some fields to a higher level. However, the sanctions regarding Russia are quite significant and brand new.
In fact, the difference between Trump and Biden rests in their attitudes towards the United States’ allies. But this difference is mainly evident in Europe and the Atlantic region.
Some people would point out that former president Barack Obama also had an Asia pivot strategy during his term.
The principle was established in Obama’s “pivot”, which stated that this region was important and must be competed for. However, specific measures, especially significant and powerful ones, were lacking at the time.
Obama focused on diplomatic relations with countries, but he didn’t do much about boosting US military power or strategic weapons systems in the Pacific. It was Trump who did that.
How do Biden and Kamala Harris differ from Trump in their overall policies towards China?
Trump is truly not good for China. Biden is also not good [for China], but at least he never says the “Chinese Communist Party is this or that”, and he always uses the name of the People’s Republic of China.
At least, as stated in his publicised policies, he doesn’t directly aim to overthrow the Chinese government. Biden and [Vice-President and 2024 Democratic presidential nominee] Harris have never and will never regard changing the Chinese regime as a programmatic goal.
In contrast, Trump was extremely hostile towards China after the pandemic outbreak prevailed in the US after March 2020. This is one thing.
Second, Trump is a very ruthless Machiavellian.
Based on these two points, both options are harmful [to China], and China would rather pick the lesser of two evils.
China has already announced that it won’t intervene in the US election, and it can’t. Moreover, the act of expressing goodwill in itself would be seen as interfering in the election. Whoever wins, China will still have to deal with it.
Some say that the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have given China an opportunity to increase its influence on the global stage. What’s your opinion?
Has China’s influence increased? Absolutely not.
A true mediator must meet two conditions: first, it must be a major country or one that has a crucial position, like Qatar [mediating between Israel and Hamas] because of its location and geopolitical weight. Second, it must be genuinely neutral. Without being neutral, how can both sides listen to you?
If we shift our focus back to the Asia-Pacific region, many people look at three places when they assess the risk of military conflict: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and Northeast Asia. From a geopolitical risk perspective, which of these places do you think is the most dangerous?
There are two flashpoints.
In the first half of 2017, Beijing almost pushed North Korea to a position of long-standing enmity with China. But it didn’t work out. So in March 2018, when Kim made his first visit to China, Beijing put the [denuclearisation] issue on the back burner.
The top priority was to maintain a good relationship with North Korea, no matter what. Denuclearisation should not seriously damage China’s relations with North Korea.
Then, in March 2021, after the high-level talks between China and the US in Anchorage, Alaska, it became clear that denuclearisation was no longer a key element of China’s Korean peninsula policy. It was no longer important.
The second most dangerous flashpoint is the military arms race [in the Asia-Pacific region]. No matter how many talks there are between China and the US, or how many achievements there are, the strategic military build-up between the two sides will continue to escalate, as long as they have the financial ability to do so.
Because using force to attack Taiwan would at least potentially lead to a massive joint military intervention by the US, Japan and other allied countries, including Britain and others.
The possibility of a military conflict breaking out on the Korean peninsula is the greatest; the military arms race is the biggest and most common direct driving force behind the possible conflict between China and the United States. The risk of a conflict between China and the US in the South China Sea is low and controllable.
Many people actually assess the risk of Taiwan by debating what signals are worth paying attention to. What signals translate to a high-risk period, or to a manageable situation?
China’s Anti-Secession Law in 2005 [offers some hints].
Firstly, Taiwan’s de jure independence and secondly, foreign countries’ control over Taiwan. Now, the US is actually controlling Taiwan in essence, but according to the law, the foreign force has to directly control Taiwan, such as establishing a US-Taiwan joint command, or stationing US troops and warships in Kaohsiung harbour.
However, even if such a situation arises, making the call is very difficult. Both China and the US are constantly preparing for war, but making a formal decision to launch a massive attack is extremely difficult.
Therefore, preparing for war is day-in and day-out, but making a formal decision to launch a massive attack is just as challenging as it was five years or even 10 years ago.
You don’t agree that the military power gap between China and the US is narrowing and that China is becoming more confident in this area?
Many scientists believe that it’s not the case. In some areas, the gap may be narrowing, but overall, it has probably widened even further.
For example, recently there has been an opinion that if China wants to engage in large-scale military intervention, [the US] will change its tactics and not move a single inch.
Instead, the US will rely on 200 strategic bombers, each carrying at least 12 or 14 missiles. What does this mean? With 200 strategic bombers, there will be more than 2,000 conventional bombs with excellent range and radar-evading capabilities.
Assuming that four Ohio-class cruise missile submarines are added, each about 150 metres (492ft) long and known for their excellent sonar capabilities, they can basically get to [mainland China’s] Yangtze River mouth, Xiamen [in Fujian province, opposite Taiwan], or even Bohai Bay without being detected.
China’s destroyers are being built at a rapid pace, but China’s anti-submarine warfare and anti-submarine capabilities are extremely weak. The worst part is that China barely has a missile defence system, which is crucial.
To conclude, everything in the world is contradictory. If China is weak, it is relatively safe. But if China becomes strong, despite increasing its security, it will mobilise its opponents to counter-attack it, making it relatively less safe.
From a broad strategic perspective, some say China’s foreign policy is becoming more ambitious. Recently, it is becoming more distant from developed countries, while interacting more frequently with the developing world. What do you think?
This is a cliché, and it may have been true three to 10 years ago, but not now. It’s been a few years since China began interacting more frequently with developing countries.
China’s national income and tax revenue have been decreasing, and debt has been increasing. Now with shallow pockets, when China visits other countries it doesn’t give anything in return or pay back, will they be happy about that?
So I think overall, the interconnection between China and developing countries has somewhat reduced – which is good and right, because a country’s foreign policy has to conform to its capabilities.
So you think China is being more cautious about the Belt and Road Initiative?
It’s very clear. President Xi emphasised in August 2018 the need to do a good job of painting a “fine brushstroke painting”, which means to observe and analyse carefully, and plan and negotiate specifically, according to the actual situation.
Within a few months, all informed media outlets and think tanks had concluded that China’s belt and road programme was shrinking significantly. And up to now, it has indeed shrunk further.
As a professor who has been teaching at Renmin University for many years, what changes have you observed in the understanding of international affairs among Chinese university students?
To begin with, I have to admit that my assumption is limited, as I only interact with a specific group of students, and it may not be representative of all Chinese university students.
However, I can generalise that Chinese universities are tiered. Top-tier universities are quite different from second or third-tier ones. Even though students from these top-tier universities may have a somewhat simplistic view of the world and China’s place in it, they are more sophisticated and less nationalistic than students in lower tiers.
Renmin University is also a major alma mater for government officials. How do you compare the new generation of Chinese officials’ understanding of the country and international perspective with their predecessors of 10 years ago?
To become a government official, you need to be cautious about what you say. So, even when you’re speaking to someone you know well, unless you’re very familiar with each other, you can’t really expect them to be completely honest with you.
Those who pass the civil service exam are undoubtedly clever and understand what can be said and what cannot be said. Over time, they may not only stop talking about certain topics but also become unable to imagine anything different.
How would you compare the academic communities in China and the US that study each other?
I think in general, American scholars’ views on China are correct, just like Chinese scholars’ views on the US are basically correct as well.
[US scholars think] China is challenging American dominance, the US-led existing international order and key political security rules.
Chinese [academics] believe that the US is trying to maintain its dominance and won’t allow China to adjust the international system according to its own legitimate rights and core interests – and won’t even allow China’s military aircraft and ships to cross the Taiwan Strait median line.
Although the mutual views may contain biases, in general, I think their views of each other are correct.
What are your thoughts about people-to-people exchanges between the US and China?
There are pros and cons of people-to-people exchanges. The positive effects include increased understanding, but that won’t necessarily mean reduced biases. With more interactions, people can reduce the exaggeration of certain aspects.
However, there is a possibility that such exchanges can also prove [many Chinese people’s] original assumption: that Americans are indeed trying to ruin China and exercise global hegemony.
And just imagine if Americans were to live in China like Chinese do, what would be the possible repercussions?
The depiction of China by mainstream media and the government in the US can be summarised in two words: “suppressive” and “aggressive”. If many Americans were to live in China for quite a period, the two perceptions may become even more solidified.