Self-interest first: U.S. involvement in Xizang affairs
What is the fundamental nature of its Xizang policy over the past hundred years?
Guo Yonghu
The United States began to get involved in Xizang affairs of China in the early 20th century, and while its approach has changed since then, its goal has remained consistent.
The United States began to get involved in Xizang affairs of China in the early 20th century, and since then, while its approach has changed in different historical context, its goal has consistently been to maximize its own interests. An examination of the historical trajectory of U.S. involvement in Xizang affairs over the past hundred years reveals the underlying nature of its Xizang policy.
Open Door Policy
At the end of the 19th century, imperialist powers engaged in a frenzy of carving up China. The U.S., as a late comer, acted in response to the privileges that other western powers had grabbed in China, to initiate the Open Door policy, claiming that the U.S. respected China's administrative and territorial integrity and should enjoy equal rights to trade and commerce in China. Since it was not strong enough both politically and militarily at that time to directly intervene in Xizang affairs, this policy was aimed at opposing British occupation of Xizang.
The initiator of modern U.S. involvement in Xizang was William Woodville Rockhill (1854–1914). In 1905, Rockhill became the U.S. envoy to China, and subsequently in 1908, he met with the 13th Dalai Lama Thubten Gyatso (1876–1933) at Mount Wutai, marking the first official contact between the United States and Xizang.
During World War II, the U.S. took China as an ally and supported the Republic of China's sovereignty over Xizang, clarifying its stance in 1942 in a memorandum to the British government: "... the Chinese constitution lists Xizang among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China. This Government has at no time raised a question regarding either of these claims."
Nevertheless, the U.S. never ceased its efforts to make its presence in Xizang. In 1941, the Office of Strategic Service, the U.S. intelligence agency during World War II, under the pretext of inspecting Xizang's transportation routes, sent a couple of its officers including Ilya Andreyevic Tolstoy (1903–1970) to Xizang. In addition to deliver letters and gifts from President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) to the 13th Dalai Lama, the mission stayed in Xizang for three months, and suggested in a secret report that the U.S. should bypass the Chinese government to support Xizang.
As the Cold War unfolded in the wake of World War II, the U.S. began to include Xizang in its global strategy. Viewing Xizang as a crucial buffer zone to prevent the spread of communism across regions including India, China and Myanmar where communists could possibly rise to power, the U.S. intended to make the region a frontline against the Soviet Union. In 1948, the U.S. blatantly breached international rules by instructing the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong to issue visas directly to a "Xizang business delegation" without the consent of the Chinese government, and subsequently arranged the activities of this "delegation" in the U.S.
In 1949, as the disintegration of the Kuomintang regime became evident, Ruth E. Bacon (1908–1985), an official of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the U.S. State Department, suggested that the U.S. government should provide sufficient assistance to Xizang in order to prevent a communist takeover, thinking that it would be to U.S. advantage to recognize Xizang's independence. She also suggested raising the "Question of Xizang" in the UN General Assembly. The U.S. State Department accepted Bacon's proposal, and proceeded to calculate the most effective means of endorsing Xizang's independence. In July that year, the State Department declared the goals of its Xizang policy as follows: to avoid giving the impression of any changes in its traditional position towards Chinese authority over Xizang, but meanwhile to avoid references to China's sovereignty over Xizang, and to deal with Xizang as independent if China's dismemberment becomes permanent.
Comprehensive U.S. interference in Xizang affairs
Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China, and in particular during the Korean War and after the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the U.S. immediately shifted its approach to Xizang, abandoning its previous neutral stance and instead moving to support the separatist activities led by the Dalai Lama and his followers in order to contain and weaken new China.
In March 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) approved NSC 5412, a series of secret military plans intended to contain international communism. In accordance with this directive, the CIA carried out a series of quasi-military operations in Xizang, including providing intelligence and quasi-military training to insurgents from the region, deploying paratroopers to disrupt transportation lines and military facilities along the southwest border of China; and providing military supplies and funding to the exiled community led by the Dalai Lama.
In 1962, when the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out, the CIA collaborated with Indian intelligence agencies to carry out intelligence operations in Xizang, utilizing separatists from the region to infiltrate and gather intelligence on social, political, and military conditions there. In 1964 alone, the CIA's expenses for their covert operations in Xizang amounted to $1,735,000, reflecting the considerable resources the U.S. devoted to the region.
In 1969, after Richard Nixon (1913–1994) took office, the U.S. began adjusting its Xizang policy. Seeking Chinese support in order to counterbalance the Soviet Union and mitigate difficulties caused by the Vietnam War, the Nixon administration decided to gradually reduce U.S. support for separatist forces in the plateau region. Since, according to the CIA, the military activities of these separatist groups had not achieved the intended results and did not pose a substantial threat to the internal stability of China, the Nixon administration reassessed the value of supporting these "guerrillas," ultimately concluding that their attacks on China were unsuccessful and had no real impact upon China's policies. Consequently, the U.S. decided to terminate aid to these "guerrillas" and cease funding for intelligence operations, media activities, political groups, administrative training, and the "Xizang Office" itself. In 1974, the CIA stopped providing financial assistance to the Dalai Lama and his entourage.
The evolution of U.S. policy toward Xizang after World War II illustrates how America's broader strategy in Asia and its relationship with China have shaped its approach to Xizang. This policy reflects a pragmatic stance marked by notable double standards. Put simply, the U.S. has exploited Xizang-related issues not only to curtail China, but also to provide tangible benefits to the U.S. itself.
With the thawing of Sino-U.S. relations, the status of the separatist forces from the region fell from being pawns of the U.S. to outcasts. It is thus clear that the U.S. did not truly care about Xizang, but rather was solely concerned with the advantages that it could reap in return for aiding these separatists.
Following the establishment of China-U.S. diplomatic relations
Jimmy Carter assumed the Office of President in 1977, and began to promote human rights diplomacy worldwide. After the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, the U.S. began incorporating human rights issues into its policy toward China. In 1979, the U.S. government allowed the Dalai Lama to visit the U.S. for the first time. In the late 1980s, as the international political landscape grew more diverse, the triangular relationship between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union was no longer the main focus of U.S. global strategy. As such, the U.S. gradually downplayed the strategic significance of its relations with China in its approach to the Soviet Union, believing that the role of China in U.S.-Soviet rivalry was diminishing and thus seeing no further need to accommodate the Chinese government for geopolitical concerns.
Since the late 1980s, the so-called "Xizang's human rights issues" have become an important consideration when the U.S. addresses its relationship with China. The U.S. Congress has gradually overtaken the president and the executive branches, becoming the primary driver of U.S. interference in China's internal affairs.
Since 1987, the Congress has introduced and passed a series of Xizang-related bills with the purpose of interfering in China's internal affairs via its legislative activities. The central points of these bills include linking the U.S. policy towards China with the "Question of Xizang," interfering in China's internal affairs under the pretext of "Xizang's human rights," and providing assistance to the separatist forces from the region. These bills have had a serious negative impact on Sino-U.S. relations and fueled the activities of separatist forces abroad.
From the Carter administration to the present, U.S. policy towards Xizang has operated on two levels. On the one hand, the U.S. government recognizes Xizang as an integral part of China and does not acknowledge the Dalai Lama's "government-in-exile." On the other hand, the U.S. maintains a policy of "new interventionism" towards Xizang, and such interference has been intensifying steadily over the past five years.
Joe Biden continues the interventionist tendency of the Donald Trump era while also incorporating the "Xizang question" into his "Indo-Pacific strategy," revealing his intent to contain China through Xizang. The U.S. State Department regularly releases various reports related to Xizang, using them as tools for its human rights diplomacy efforts towards China.
Legislative activities related to Xizang by the U.S. Congress remain commonplace. For instance, Trump signed the so-called "Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018" into law in December of that year.
In December 2020, the U.S. Congress passed the so-called "Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020," which includes seven main provisions:
1) Diplomatic representation relating to Tibet;
2) Policy regarding the succession or reincarnation of the Dalai Lama;
3) Policy regarding the environment and water resources on the Tibetan Plateau;
4) Democracy in the Tibetan exile community;
5) Sustainability in Tibetan communities seeking to preserve their culture, religion and language;
6) Authorization of appropriations;
7) Determination of budgetary effects;
This Act is essentially a recent consolidation of a number of so-called "Xizang-related bills" from the U.S. Congress that comprehensively reflects their position on Xizang affairs. The strength and breadth of interference this "law" seeks are unprecedented in the history of U.S. Congress legislation on Xizang.
On July 12, 2024, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law S. 138, the "Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act" (the Act). In his Statement, President Biden said that his Administration would "continue to call on the People's Republic of China to resume direct dialogue, without preconditions, with the Dalai Lama, or his representatives, to seek a settlement." The Resolution also accused the Government of the People's Republic of China of "failing to meet the expectations of the United States."
In summary, the historical trajectory of U.S. policy on Xizang since the start of the 20th century, shows clearly that the primacy of national interest is the driving force behind American governmental and congressional interference in Xizang affairs. Hence, the U.S. will not easily give up using Xizang-related issues to interfere in China's internal affairs.
The views don't necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.
The author is Guo Yonghu, professor at Jilin University.
Editor/ Liu Xian