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The winter will impose difficult logistical issues.
By: Geopolitical Futures
At a U.N. meeting
in New York on Sept. 22, the G7 countries announced that they would
provide a $50 billion loan to Ukraine. The announcement followed reports
of new developments in the conflict related to energy infrastructure,
the country's economic conditions and another possible wave of refugees
fleeing west into Europe. As the war enters its third winter, now seems a
good time to update our readers on how the current ground conditions
could affect the outcome of the conflict.
As in all wars,
logistics is crucial. Key routes can be effectively targeted using
terrain denial weapon systems such as artillery, airstrikes, drones and
mines. But in the winter, these routes become fewer. As the initial
invasion showed, unimproved roads become impassable in snow and mud,
restricting major movements to better routes. Improved or paved roads
with predictable traffic will be more vulnerable to attack. This will
greatly affect forward locations that are farther from the main supply
routes converging at essential transport hubs. Paved roads, meanwhile,
will be vulnerable to attack.
Road conditions
will also make resupplying frontline troops increasingly difficult. This
will have a direct effect on Ukrainian positions in Russia's Kursk
region, which cannot be supplied through air assets because of Russian
air defense systems. Pontoon bridges will be less efficient and reliable
as rivers freeze, leading to chokepoints on the limited routes
available for crossing. Consequently, there will be a significant need
for route security and control if Ukrainian forces choose to maintain
positions farther from the main supply routes.
Equipment – or
rather, the lack of equipment – is also affecting realities on the
ground for the Ukrainian population. Insufficient resources needed for
the winter may hurt morale – not just for the troops but also for the
public writ large, which is contending with infrastructure problems that
have made water and food more scarce. On Sept. 19, for example, the
U.N. reported
that Russian forces struck several energy facilities, noting that it
could “take years to fully repair and restore” them. Indeed, attacks on
Ukrainian energy infrastructure persist, with 20 of 24 regions
indicating similar strikes. Reports
paint a dire picture: Some 95 percent of thermal power plants have been
destroyed, and all major hydroelectric power plants have failed. So
far, it’s unclear whether the generators provided to Ukraine as part of
its aid packages will keep the civilian population warm and meet the
military’s energy needs. (The recently announced G7 loan is expected to
address repairs and reconstruction, but both will take time.)
![Ukraine Energy Infrastructure]()
(click to enlarge)
Access to clean
water and food has reportedly become a challenge too. The war famously
wrecked Ukraine’s agricultural production, and estimates suggest
Russia has damaged roughly one-third of Ukraine’s water supplies. Even
if the country can produce enough food to meet the people’s needs,
energy shortages will drive prices up. The U.N. refugee agency reports
that over 6.7 million Ukrainians have already left the country since
the Russian invasion. Approximately 6.2 million are still in other parts
of Europe, while an additional 3.6 million are internally displaced
within Ukraine.
This raises the
obvious question of whether the Ukrainian public still supports the war.
The latest polls show that 53 percent of Ukrainians believe the war is
worth it, but only 36 percent are willing to endure the war for “as long
as it lasts." Nearly 30 percent are not willing to endure it any
longer. If the general public’s living conditions and the country's
military standing degrade further in the next few months, the percentage
of those who don’t support the war could climb higher. That could
affect political stability and, therefore, the way the war is waged.
This is
especially relevant considering Ukraine’s already high reliance on
drones, which are meant to compensate for its shortage in manpower and
conventional weaponry. Ukraine is dependent on the conventional weapons
the West delivers and uses drones and satellites for surveillance,
seeking to make it difficult for Russian forces to consolidate and mass
troops and equipment near the frontline for major advances without being
targeted. Ukraine’s drone manufacturing factories are based in Kyiv,
making them vulnerable to any political instability that would be caused
by a decrease in popular support for the war.
Given all factors constraining Kyiv’s ability to fight a protected war, the government may consider finding a way to end it
– if it can do so on favorable terms. Ending the war would benefit the
West. But victory is hard to achieve, and there’s no evidence to suggest
Russian forces are unable to use larger weapons in their arsenal, even
in Kursk. Despite the costs, the most likely outcome is a winter
stalemate with limited advances as both sides try to hold on to
territory and equipment that can be resupplied in the spring.
Ridvan Bari
Urcosta and Andrew Davidson contributed to this analysis. Mr. Urcosta is
an analyst at GPF, and Mr. Davidson, a GPF intern, is completing a
master’s degree in international relations. |