Rumors continued to percolate over the summer, even as some Chinese military forums pointed out that China’s only known nuclear-capable shipyard is in Huludao,
on the northern Bohai Gulf, and that there were no indications that the
Wuhan shipyard had received certifications to produce nuclear
submarines. While it is possible that the Wuhan shipyard built this
“Type 041” submarine only to have its nuclear power plant or fuel
installed elsewhere, reactors and fuel rods are not something one just
drops into a pressure hull. Installing a nuclear reactor post-assembly
would be inefficient and unlikely. Moreover, China’s limited experience
in building nuclear submarines suggests that it would more likely evolve
its designs from conventional to nuclear rather than launch a
revolutionary, keel-up nuclear design in Wuhan.
Further context comes from a PLA officer who had recently written that China’s navy will focus on building more nuclear-powered submarines. The expansion
of the Huludao nuclear shipyard over the past several years supports
that claim. However, given its relative dearth of nuclear submarine
design experience and engineering talent, it would be difficult for
China to increase nuclear-submarine production at two shipyards
simultaneously.
The point is that a preponderance of public
sourcing indicates there is far more uncertainty about the ship itself
than the headlines would have it. Indeed, there is nothing in the
available reporting that indicates an actual nuclear incident. The
satellite photos showed four crane barges that may have been deployed to
raise a sunken object, but no nuclear-response efforts were detected.
This was not Chernobyl.
What was missed
Even worse,
the media reports focusing on the potential nuclear nature of the
shipyard accident missed what this submarine actually does tell us about
PLA naval modernization. Today’s Chinese subs lack a vertical launch
system, or VLS, limiting their ability to carry and quickly fire
land-attack and anti-ship missiles. The ill-fated submarine, by
contrast, had an extended hull with a section that appears to contain a
VLS. Chinese language sources
indicate it would accommodate long-range YJ-18 anti-ship missiles or
CJ-10 land-attack missiles. Nuclear-powered or not, the prospect of
numerous, difficult-to-locate submarines that can deliver a vastly
larger salvo of weapons against ships or air bases would boost Chinese
capability and complicate allied defense plans.
This story
highlights the risk of both dropping into a topic and relying too much
on unnamed U.S. military officials, who bring biases along with
perspectives and information. In this case, the source appears to have
been happy to highlight a Chinese submarine accident and what the
incident may say about PLA capability. Yet U.S. defense officials—and
the subsequent media reports—have said relatively little about the PLA’s
announcement
that it successfully test-launched an ICBM deep into the Pacific Ocean,
the very same week of the reporting about this shipyard incident that
happened months ago.
This story also underlines a larger problem
in Western media reporting on China’s military in recent years: too
often, it swings between two extremes that portray the PLA as either
comically inept or ten feet tall.
The ICBM test reminds us of a
similar media frenzy sparked by a dubious claim earlier this year. In
January, Western media aired claims
by unnamed U.S. officials that corrupt PLA officers had filled their
missiles with water. The reporting seemed to be unaware that the Chinese
term 灌水
(guànshuǐ), which does mean “to pour water into” but also references
unscrupulous butchers adding water to meat to increase its weight and
price, used metaphorically to refer to corruption. Yes, the PLA Rocket
Force has experienced a crisis of corruption. No, they do not fill their
missiles with water to cover up that corruption.
Media coverage
of nuclear issues in particular often suffers from mischaracterization
and hyperbole. In July, the North American Aerospace Defense Command issued
a statement about a flight of Russian Tu-95s and PLA H-6 bombers near
Alaska; they were not, NORAD took pains to point out, seen as a threat.
Several media reports, however, heralded Chinese “nuclear-capable bombers” patrolling near the United States. A quick reference
check of the H-6 tail numbers clearly visible in the NORAD photos
indicates these were H-6K variants, part of the PLA’s Eastern Theater
Command 10th Air Division, 28th Air Regiment. These aircraft were not
the PLA’s nuclear-capable H-6Ns. Again, yes, China has nuclear-capable
bombers and is building up that capability; no, they did not fly into a
U.S. air defense identification zone.
The issues in U.S.-China security are of growing domestic interest and political importance,
especially during an election season. As such, it is ever more vital
that mass media reporting on PLA capabilities avoids the temptation to
hunt for “clicks” and “eyeballs” and instead seeks out the details and
context necessary to fully understand the implications of China’s
military modernization.
J. Michael Dahm is a Senior Associate
with BluePath Labs, a Senior Fellow at the Mitchell Institute for
Aerospace Studies, and a Lecturer in International Affairs at the George
Washington University.
P.W. Singer is a best-selling author of such books on war and technology as Wired for War, Ghost Fleet, and Burn-In; senior fellow at New America; and co-founder of Useful Fiction, a strategic narratives company