Open questions | China’s ‘wiser’ long-term strategy paves way to No 1 world power: Kishore Mahbubani
Veteran Singapore envoy on what the West gets wrong about China, Asean as a bellwether region and why the US should prepare for No 2 status
One of the key points you have argued is that the US made a major strategic mistake by launching a contest with China without a long-term, comprehensive strategy. Has a clearer strategy or vision not emerged under the Biden administration, and how will a new US administration deal with the US-China rivalry?
The United States has taken various actions against China with no clear description of what the goals of these actions might be. Is it the goal of the US to overthrow the Communist Party? It cannot be done, because if it is done, it will be done by the Chinese people, not by the US. Is it the goal of the US to stop the economic growth of China?
Again, it cannot be done. Whether China grows will depend on the actions of its own people and the ingenuity of its leadership. Is it the goal of the US to try and isolate China like it successfully isolated the Soviet Union? It cannot be done because China has more substantive ties with more countries than the US does, especially in terms of trading relationships. We have a strange situation here. The US has taken several measures against China, but the goals have never been spelled out clearly.
I’m recommending a wiser approach by the US. Even if the US is going to compete with China in some areas, it should also spell out the areas in which it can cooperate with China, not for the benefit of the Chinese people but for the benefit of the American people.
One huge contradiction in the approach of the US towards China is that the Biden administration says fighting climate change should be a priority. I completely agree. But if fighting climate change is a priority, then we should press the pause button on the US-China geopolitical contest and focus on fighting climate change first. That would be an example of clear strategic thinking. The US needs to decide what is really important for its long-term interests, what it wants to accomplish, and then work out ways and means of achieving these goals. Unfortunately, there’s no such clear, comprehensive, long-term strategic thinking on the part of the Biden administration.
You’ve argued that China is on a path to become the No 1 power in the world, displacing the US in the process. Have policymakers in Washington come to terms with that possibility yet, and what would have to happen for the US to realise it has to change course strategically to adjust to new realities?
In the last 20 years, China narrowed the gap between the size of the Chinese gross national product (GNP) and the size of American GNP in nominal market terms. In recent years, China has slipped back. Because China has slipped back, there’s now a sense of triumphalism in Washington. Washington believes that the US is moving ahead and China is falling behind. This may also explain why the Biden administration has not taken new additional actions against China in recent months.
The big question the US should ask is this: what happens if all its measures to stop China do not work and China’s GNP becomes bigger? What should the US do then? Why not discuss this possibility? Why not talk about it?
My successor as dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Professor Danny Quah, published a piece in Foreign Policy magazine saying that if the Americans wake up one day and realise that their economy is No 2 and China’s economy is No 1, that is not going to change the lives of Americans. They’re going to wake up in the morning and have their cup of coffee and everything will be the same. He is right. So why have this obsession that the goal should be to stop China from becoming No 1?
Why not, instead, ask what kind of world we want to have when and if China becomes No 1? How should the US cooperate and compete with China in that situation? Bill Clinton gave the answer, which I spelled out in my book Has China Won? He said that the US should be strengthening multilateral rules, multilateral norms, multilateral procedures, and multilateral institutions, if it was going to become No 2 in the world. Such advice by Bill Clinton is an example of clear strategic thinking. I don’t understand why the US does not realise that supporting multilateralism would be the best way to constrain, not contain, China.
On China’s side, how would you describe Beijing’s way of dealing with its rivalry with the US? Has Beijing, in your view, been more rational in its approach?
It’s quite natural for Beijing to get angry when the US imposes measures against China. One undeniable fact is that it is the US that has been taking measures against China. China has retaliated, but China has not initiated measures against the US.
Relatively speaking, the Chinese have been wise to quietly proceed with their strategy of developing closer links with more countries than the US does. That is the best way to protect China from any containment policy by the US. Initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and even the New Development Bank provide ways and means for China to engage the rest of the world constructively.
In the past, it would have been the US that would have formulated a long-term strategy. Certainly, it had one in the Cold War. That is why it succeeded. But now it is China that has developed various long-term strategies. Today, it is the US and Europe that do not have any. At a time when the West should be thinking hard to develop meaningful long-term strategies, it is failing to do so.
You have been consistently bullish on China’s rise and return as a strong civilisation. Given current conditions and realities, what do you see for China’s growth in the years ahead?
There’s no question that China faces some short-term challenges. The property market is in bad shape. Business sentiment is not good. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have come down. The question is whether these challenges are cyclical or structural. I believe that these are cyclical challenges. You can, over time, get out of this mess in the property market. You can, over time, try to improve business sentiment, and you can also try to increase FDI flows.
These things can be fixed. Do not forget that in the more substantive parts of the economy, especially in terms of China’s exports to the rest of the world, China is still doing well. China’s share of global manufacturing is still going up. These are the long-term structural competitive moves by China. This is where China is showing its structural strengths vis-a-vis the rest of the world. If you look in terms of long-term investments, I think it is China that is making wiser long-term investments for the future. This is why, over the medium-term and long-term, one can still remain bullish about the Chinese economy. However, I have to add here that China optimists like me are an endangered species today.
Given your view that the great power rivalry will stretch into decades, how does Southeast Asia fit into this contest as a battleground, and what will competition for influence in Southeast Asia look like?
Southeast Asia can and should be seen as a kind of a bellwether region. Many Americans have forgotten that the fall of Vietnam and the collapse of Indochina were seen as major disasters for American foreign policy. Many Americans believed then that after the collapse of Indochina, the Asean countries would become dominoes. They also believed then that there was little they could do to save Southeast Asia.
Paradoxically, what was supposed to be a defeat for the US in Southeast Asia turned out to be a victory. [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries did not become dominoes. In fact, the Asean countries thrived and grew and did well. Eventually, it was the Indochina countries that joined Asean. At the end of the day, the project to create a modern, globalised Southeast Asia has succeeded.
The success in Southeast Asia also helped the US win the Cold War. The policymakers in Washington understood that and spent a lot of time on Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, the people in the Trump and Biden administrations are trying to bypass Southeast Asia. They believe that Southeast Asia is not important at all. The Biden administration has spent more time on Australia than it has on Southeast Asia. But Southeast Asia has close to 700 million people. Australia has 27 million people.
Southeast Asia is going to matter a lot more in global geopolitics. The people in Washington do not understand the relative importance of Asean in the long-term strategic game. Fortunately, the people in Asean are wiser. Even if Washington has become distracted, Asean still continues to maintain good ties with the US. Asean will also continue to maintain good ties with China. It’s time for Washington to step back and ask which region in Asia is truly important. Which part of the world is going to be a swing region of the world? Is Southeast Asia going to be a key swing region of the world?
If the US has not been paying enough attention to Southeast Asia while Beijing has stepped up engagement with the region and deepened trade, what would be a good US strategy going forward?
The US should listen to what former president Barack Obama said: the US has got to be part of the big game in Southeast Asia and East Asia. That is why he proposed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). President Obama was very thoughtful. He would say: “Hey, if you really want to combat Chinese influence in the region, you have got to do it in the field of trade.”
Unfortunately, trade has become so toxic in the US. Nobody dares to raise the TPP. Fortunately, there is good news in the field of investment: the US has actually invested more in Southeast Asia than it has in China, Japan, South Korea and India combined. That is an asset that the US has that it should take advantage of. At the end of the day, the real competition is in the economic sphere, and if the US wants to play a bigger role in the region it has got to come forward with concrete projects to try and work with Southeast Asia.
Are you hopeful of a recalibration of the US strategy, at least in the next administration?
I think it would be very, very difficult. The US must first realise that it cannot just rely on its traditional allies, like Europe, Australia and New Zealand. At the end of the day, the West makes up 12 per cent of the world’s population, and the rest make up 88 per cent. And unlike China, the US does not have a long-term strategy for engaging the 88 per cent of the world’s population.
China is systematically and carefully improving its ties with the Global South. Recently, for example, dozens of African leaders went to Beijing to attend the China-African meeting. That is what the US needs to do in its own way. But again, this requires long-term strategic thinking and long-term strategic commitments that will not be in danger of changing every four years.
With the US-China rivalry set to possibly intensify, what do you think are at top of the bloc’s concerns?
The main worry of the Southeast Asians is obvious – they do not want to be pushed to take sides between China and the US. They want to be friends with both China and the US, and they want to carry on dealing normally with both. It’s very important for Asean to stay united on this stance. If the 10 Asean countries stick together, they will have more room to manoeuvre than if they try to act individually.
Those countries have made clear that they do not want to pick sides, but with growing pressure from both the US and China, will there come a day when it is impossible for Asean countries to stay neutral?
It will become impossible if Asean falls apart. But if Asean sticks together, its combined size will give it some clout. In 2000, Japan was the world’s second largest economy. It was eight times bigger than Asean. Now, Japan is only 1.2 or 1.3 times bigger than Asean. By 2030, Asean will be bigger than Japan. The combined size of the Asean economies makes it a significant player now globally.
It’s very important for the US to realise that it has got to be seen to be working with success stories. Asean is clearly a success story. In fact, Asean was created as a pro-American organisation in 1967; both Moscow and Beijing denounced Asean when it was created. Logically, since Asean has historic stores of goodwill toward the US and is doing well, the US should develop a consistent, comprehensive, long-term strategy for engaging Asean as part of its strategy to manage competition with China.
But there is a very low level of knowledge about Asean in Washington. Even secretaries of state find it difficult to attend Asean meetings regularly. The American leadership has not sent clear signals that they recognise Asean’s importance. But in the long run, it will matter a lot where Asean swings.
How easy or difficult will it be for Asean to stay united if member states increasingly or more explicitly lean towards Beijing or Washington, and what would be the implications for Asean’s internal dynamics?
However, though each country may lean one way or another, all of them still want to be friends with both the US and China and not be forced to choose a side. On that core issue, there’s a lot of consistency within Asean.
In your book Has China Won? you wrote that there is a sort of goodwill and pro-American sentiment in Southeast Asia. Do you think some of that goodwill has dissipated?
I think the long-term goodwill is still there. But if you look at a recent issue of the magazine Foreign Affairs, Lynn Kuok, a fellow Singaporean, has written an article that says the US is losing ground in Southeast Asia. In an annual poll across Southeast Asia, most respondents have always said that if forced to choose between China and the US, they would choose the US. But after the events in Gaza, things have flipped. This year, the majority said that they would choose China over the US. If the US wants to work out a comprehensive strategy against China, it should think about what might persuade other countries to work with the US.
If the US is seen to be fair and balanced in its policies on the Middle East, it will win over many Islamic countries. But America’s standing in the world has gone down dramatically after its failure to find a peaceful settlement in Gaza and its failure to bring about a two-state solution. There’s a lot of public anger in many Southeast Asian countries – especially the Islamic countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei – towards American policies in the Middle East. What the US has to understand is that this is a global chessboard. Failing in Gaza has consequences in Southeast Asia.
But the US no longer has strategic minds like [former US secretary of state] Henry Kissinger who can see the global chessboard and put all the pieces together. As a result, Americans try to make policies in silos. They have a silo for Gaza, a silo for Ukraine, and a silo for Asean, not realising all these parts are interlinked. They must make the effort to ask themselves how all these different pieces fit together.
I say this as a friend of the United States: it needs to step back and ask itself where it wants to be 10 to 20 years from now vis-a-vis China. Then, it needs to figure out what assets it has, what liabilities it has, and how it can enhance its assets and reduce its liabilities. It should then try to work out a consistent, long-term policy which has strong bipartisan support and will not change from administration to administration. But this will require leaders with this big quality of mind, and that is what’s missing in Washington.
How much will the escalating tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea dictate Beijing’s future actions there?
I would, on one hand encourage China, as the bigger and more powerful country, to show patience and understanding in dealing with smaller countries. But at the same time, to the Philippines, I would say if you’re dealing with a great power which is going to be your neighbour for the next 1,000 years, you’ve got to work out a consistent policy towards China that does not change with every president.