[Salon] Facing war in the Middle East and Ukraine, the US looks feeble. But is it just an act?

[Chas Freeman <cwfresidence@gmail.com>]

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/oct/10/war-middle-east-ukraine-us-feeble-biden-trump

Facing war in the Middle East and Ukraine, the US looks feeble. But is it just an act?

Adam Tooze   

The idea that Biden is just muddling through these global crises isn’t convincing. Look closely and his foreign policy has been as radical as Trump’s

Thu 10 Oct 2024

Writing on-the-spot histories always comes with risks. But the urgency of the situation demands it. We need some explanation for why the US is not doing more to calm the situation in the Middle East and to push for negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.

There is one school of thought that says the Biden administration is muddling through. It has no grand plan. It lacks the will or the means to discipline or direct either the Ukrainians or the Israelis. As a result, it is mainly focused on avoiding a third world war.

If so, that is a sad testament to the decline of American hegemonic ambition. No wonder there are calls in the US for Washington to develop an “independent” foreign policy – independent, that is, of Ukraine and Israel.

But what if that interpretation is too benign? What if it underestimates the intentionality on Washington’s part? What if key figures in the administration actually see this as a history-defining moment and an opportunity to reshape the balance of world power? What if what we are witnessing is the pivoting of the US to a deliberate and comprehensive revisionism by way of a strategy of tension?

Revisionist powers are those that want to overturn the existing state of things. In an extended sense, this can also mean a desire to alter the flow of events; for instance, to redirect or halt the process of globalisation. Revisionism is often associated with resentment or nostalgia for an earlier, better age.

What makes us shrink from this interpretation of Joe Biden’s foreign policy is the sheer aggression of Russia since February 2022 and Hamas on 7 October. The US-led west is generally seen as reactive, not proactive. But focus not on the process but on the outcomes of US policy, and a different interpretation seems plausible.

Under Donald Trump, after all, the demand to make America great again was quite literally revisionist. He had no interest in the existing rules of the game. He tossed trade treaties out the window. He slapped tariffs on China. “America first” was the mantra.

By comparison with Trump, the Biden team boast of their commitment to a rules-based order. But when it came to the world economy and the rise of China, Biden has been every bit as aggressive as, perhaps more so than, his predecessor.

Under Biden, Washington has been committed to reversing years of decline apparently brought on by excessive favour shown to China. The US has tried to stop China’s development in tech. To do so, it has strong-armed allies such as the Dutch and the South Koreans. When the World Trade Organization dared to protest against US steel tariffs, the White House reaction was contemptuous. Bidenomics is Maga for thinking people.

In what is now called the Indo-Pacific, the US is not merely defending the status quo. The very definition of the strategic arena is new. In the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), Washington is putting in place a new latticework of alliances that ties India, Japan and Australia to the US. If nothing else had happened in the past two years, the judgment would be clear. The geo-economic policy of the US towards China under Biden is a continuation of the revisionism first seen under Trump.

Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin in Geneva on 16 June 2021. Photograph: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

It was because it was focused on confronting China that the White House sought detente with Russia in 2021. What spoiled that were two miscalculations made by Vladimir Putin. The first was to assume that his assault on Ukraine was a bagatelle. The second was to underestimate the willingness of the west to use Ukraine as a proxy against Russia. Two years into the war, the position of the west has hardened into its own revisionism. In relation to both Ukraine and Russia, the status quo ante is no longer acceptable.

In the Middle East, the situation is even more clear cut. Here, too, the Biden administration was not looking to escalate. Trump’s Abraham accords between the United Arab Emirates and Israel had opened up a promising vista. But Russia’s growing ties with Iran, and China’s involvement in the region darkened the picture. Once Hamas launched its attack on 7 October, and once the Israeli government’s determination to end the modus vivendi with Hamas and Hezbollah became clear, Washington gave the green light.

The US is paying for more than 25% of Israel’s rampage as it physically annihilates Gaza, victimises the West Bank and sets about uprooting Hezbollah. It has pulled allies such as Germany and the UK into line. It is shielding Netanyahu against the reach of international justice.

Of course, unlike in Ukraine, the US has continued diplomacy. But to what effect? First and foremost to keep Iran boxed in and the powerful Gulf states on side. Meanwhile, Israel is wiping out Iran’s network of influence and annihilating the 1990s vision of a two-state solution.

In all three arenas – China, Ukraine and the Middle East – the US will say that it is responding to aggression. But rather than working consistently for a return to the status quo it is, in fact, raising the stakes. While insisting that it supports the rules-based order, what we are witnessing is something closer to a revival of the ruinous neoconservative ambition of the 1990s and 2000s.

With regard to China, the revisionist strategy was clear from the start. In Ukraine and the Middle East, Washington has responded to events. But that isn’t evidence against strategic intent. Using your enemy’s aggression, the desperation of your friends and the ruthlessness of your allies to your own advantage is simply smart policy. Washington has not been entirely reckless. Biden has resisted the most radical calls for engagement in Ukraine. He pulled out of Afghanistan and has refused to put American boots on the ground. At some point the White House may decide that ceasefires are necessary.

But there is more going on here than simply muddling through. First the Trump and now the Biden presidencies are willing contributors to the controlled demolition of the 1990s post-cold war order.

• Adam Tooze is a professor of history at Columbia University