The Next U.S. Administration and China Policy
The
world’s two most powerful countries – the U.S. and China – are
increasingly at odds over several issues. The winner of November’s U.S.
presidential election should strive to contain the tensions in this
difficult relationship in service of stability in the wider world.
What’s new? In November’s presidential election, U.S. voters will choose between the contrasting foreign policy visions of former President Donald Trump and his opponent, Vice President Kamala Harris. The result will shape an increasingly fraught relationship between the U.S. and China, the world’s two foremost powers.
Why does it matter? Strategic competition between Washington and Beijing will likely intensify whether Trump or Harris assumes the U.S. presidency in January 2025. But the candidates’ records, as well as their top advisers’ views, suggest significant differences in how they would craft China policy if elected. Trump would likely be transactional, Harris pragmatic.
What should be done? Whoever wins in November should take certain steps to keep manageable competition from becoming an existential struggle. These include maintaining “dual deterrence” with respect to China and Taiwan, using and expanding military and political channels to Beijing, and taking care to signal that Washington does not seek Beijing’s collapse.
Strategic competition between the U.S. and China is poised to intensify whether former President Donald Trump or Vice President Kamala Harris assumes the U.S. presidency in January 2025. Distrust between the two countries is strong, growing and multifaceted. Foreign policy observers across the political spectrum in Washington assess that China is striving to overtake the U.S. as the world’s leading power, while Chinese President Xi Jinping charges that the U.S. aims to constrain China’s development. While U.S. analysts agree that Beijing is Washington’s foremost challenger, a second Trump administration and a Harris administration would likely take very different approaches to China. Regardless of who wins November’s election, the next U.S. administration should pursue a tenable cohabitation that enables Washington and Beijing to compete responsibly, reduce the risk of armed conflict and protect space for bilateral cooperation. Ways to buttress that effort include preserving key elements of the political status quo around Taiwan, expanding communication channels to Beijing and making clear that the U.S. does not seek a Cold War-style victory over China.
The world’s two most powerful countries are increasingly at odds, with several issues straining their highly consequential relationship. Taiwan remains the most contentious: China is becoming more assertive in pressing its claim to the island, testing the decades-old U.S. policy of “dual deterrence” that seeks to deter China from attacking and Taiwan from making moves toward formal independence. The near-term risk of war over Taiwan may be low, but it is growing. Maritime disputes in the South China Sea, especially between China and the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, are also escalating. The dynamics that fuel these disputes will make armed conflict increasingly likely absent reciprocal, reinforcing steps by leaders in Washington and Beijing to dial down tensions in Asia. The two countries are competing in numerous other ways as well: to drive leading-edge technological innovation, to cultivate economic and diplomatic influence in the developing world and to promulgate a compelling conception of international order.
With the U.S. presidential election taking place in early November, stewardship of this important relationship will soon pass to either former President Trump or Vice President Harris – the two of whom have distinct policy inclinations that will be important for U.S. allies, partners and competitors – including, importantly, Beijing – to understand. Three points typify Trump’s likely approach. First, he mainly views U.S.-China relations through the lens of trade, and he seems committed to accelerating economic decoupling between Washington and Beijing. Secondly, his first administration and his campaign statements underscore a fundamentally transactional mindset, whereby he subordinates most other objectives – strengthening U.S. alliances and partnerships in Asia and improving human rights conditions inside China, for example – to that of creating what he sees as a more balanced economic relationship with Beijing.
Thirdly, there is a level of unpredictability at work, not only because the former president has staked out contradictory positions over time – whether on his relationship with Xi or his feelings about the social media platform TikTok – but also because the advisers who would likely help him develop and shape China policy have divergent views on how to characterise and manage the competitive challenge that Beijing poses. With such a team of rivals giving him counsel, Trump’s own, sometimes idiosyncratic, decision-making would play a key role in setting the administration’s course on China policy.
As for Harris’s likely approach, it would likely draw from her background as the child of civil rights advocates and as a practicing lawyer. This background suggests an interest in issues of human rights and international law, which provide ample fodder for bilateral frictions – though she also has a pragmatic streak, suggesting that she would look for ways to keep the relationship on an even keel. Another theme that emerges is continuity with the Biden administration. Having helped drive the administration’s effort to rebalance U.S. foreign policy despite turbulence in Europe and the Middle East, the Harris team would likely aim to build on that legacy, which includes a three-pronged approach to China: invest in U.S. capacity at home, align with allies and partners and compete with Beijing where warranted.
Still, a Harris administration would likely contemplate some “dial shifting” of the policy that it would inherit. On export controls, for example, it might seek to work with multilateral groupings of like-minded countries to shore up aspects of the current restrictions that are not having their intended effect. It might also aim to recalibrate the U.S. approach to countries in the so-called Global South. Some of these countries contend that the U.S. views them narrowly through the lens of strategic competition with China, focusing on leveraging bilateral relations to get a leg up on Beijing. Conscious that this impression can damage U.S. interests, Harris might invest more effort in developing relationships that revolve less around big-power competition.
Much as the candidates may differ in style and approach, whoever wins should start with a realistic assessment of Washington’s competitor. Beijing is neither gliding toward hegemony nor staring down decline, contrary to assessments that have gained widespread traction in the U.S.; instead, it is likely to prove an enduring competitor on several fronts, one with which the U.S. will remain highly interdependent. However reluctant the two countries may be to countenance cohabitation, that outcome for their relationship is the most probable.
The winning candidate can take several steps that would help U.S. policy reflect this likelihood, while still preserving space that both Trump and Harris would likely see as necessary to compete with China and advance U.S. interests. They include working to enhance “dual deterrence” of both Beijing and Taipei, an approach that has governed U.S. policy toward Taiwan for 45 years; deepening communications between the U.S. and Chinese militaries; making greater use of the back channel that high-level U.S. and Chinese officials have used for decades to hold essential discussions in confidence; and avoiding intimations that the U.S. seeks to achieve a Cold War-style defeat of China.
The complex and often difficult relationship between the U.S. and China will likely test leaders in both Washington and Beijing for decades to come. As the next steward of the U.S. side of that relationship comes to power in early 2025, he or she should take these and other steps in the interest of stability that would serve both countries – and the wider world.
Washington/Brussels, 17 October 2024