20 October 2024 by Larry C. Johnson
Well, the freakout over the leak of the US intelligence documents regarding Israel’s preparation for an anticipated attack on Iran is growing in intensity. I missed something important in my initial review of the document pictured above. The varied classification of the paragraphs in the document tell a story. The overall classification is Top Secret//TK//FGI ISR//RSEN/NOFORN. In other words, a highly classified document that is not going to be widely disseminated. You not only need a TS clearance, but you have to be cleared for TK, FGI ISR, and RSEN. Without detailing what those letters mean (I will leave it to you to do the Google search), I can elaborate on the key acronym that appears at the end — NOFORN. That means no release to foreigners, i.e., anyone who is not a US citizen.
Now, jump down to the “Report Summary.” It carries a slightly different classification — TS//TK//RSEN//REL TO USA FVEY. That means that the info contained above that line carries a higher classification and that this report, at least parts of it below Report Summary, can be released to some select foreigners — in this case the Five Eyes, which consists of the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
But wait. Look at the classification on each paragraph. The Five Eyes countries were only given access to paragraphs one, three and five. Paragraph two is for US persons only — no foreigners, including the Israelis and the non-US members of Five Eyes, had access to this information until it was leaked to the Middle East Spectator.
How about paragraph four, which is classified TS//TK//RSEN//REL TO USA, GBR? This means only the Americans and Brits with appropriate clearances can access this information.
Do you see the problem? First, the Israelis (and the Iranians and the Russians and the Chinese and everyone else in the world) can now see for themselves the kind of information not being shared with all members of the Five Eyes. Second, Australia, New Zealand and Canada now realize they are being cut off from certain information. They are second class citizens within the Five Eyes conglomeration.
I suspect this is going to generate some uncomfortable and unwelcome questions from Aussie, Kiwi and Canuck intel officials, who now have proof that they are not fully apprised of all relevant intelligence pertaining to Israel’s preparations for attacking Iran.
The second paragraph also is bound to stir up some trouble. Let’s go to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
The LOR (i.e., Limit of Reporting) must comply with DoDM 5200.01, which notes that when U.S. offices receive Foreign Government Information (FGI) which is marked with original host markings that are not the same classification as U.S. markings, that these documents are to be remarked to indicate the equivalent U.S. marking so that all other personnel who subsequently receive and/or review these documents are aware of the appropriate handling requirements.
According to DoDM 5200.01, Volume 3, 17.b.2:
“FGI shall be re-marked if needed to ensure the protective requirements are clear. FGI may retain its original classification if it is in English. However, when the foreign government marking is not in English, or when the foreign government marking requires a different degree of protection than the same U.S. classification designation, a U.S. marking that results in a degree of protection equivalent to that required by the foreign government shall be applied. See Appendix 1 to Enclosure 4 of Volume 2 of this Manual for comparable U.S. classification designations.”
A single line through the host marking (to ensure it is still readable) and then remarking with U.S.-equivalent marking is required.
In other words, the information in paragraph two came from a foreign government — i.e., Foreign Government Information Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance. If that government is Israel, then I suspect Netanyahu and his intel chiefs are beyond livid. But that is just my opinion. I have no firsthand or secondhand information about the specific nature of that information. You can read the second paragraph for yourself and decide.
Stephen Bryen’s latest at The Asia Times mirrors what I have written in the preceding days, but gives you a flavor of the outrage over this leak. He writes:
It is extraordinarily valuable material that Iran can, and likely will, use to prepare its defenses. . . .
Whoever leaked it to Tehran was warning that an Israeli strike was imminent. It also told the Iranians the types of weapons that would be used and the probable targets, the latter being mainly Iranian air defense sites and long-range radars. . . .
There can be no doubt that the leak of geospatial-origin intelligence has brought significant harm to Israel. It is also likely that much more sensitive intelligence was leaked to the Iranians, information that Iran may be protecting from public disclosure. Some releases on the Spectator channel admit as much. . . .
All of this is likely to cause a significant reassessment in Israel. At minimum, the Israelis will have the opinion that US intelligence is unreliable and penetrated. Beyond that, some will understand the US to be overtly hostile and acting against Israel. (After the drone attack, the prime minister received phone calls from foreign heads of state and from former President Trump and US House Speaker Mike Johnson. Neither President Biden nor Vice President Harris called.)
Whoever leaked these documents clearly had at least one objective in mind — stopping Israel’s preparation for an attack on Iran. Who done it? I don’t know.